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The legal implications of the European economic and monetary union (EMU) under the laws of
New York State and other U.S. jurisdictions is one of the most important legal questions facing the
international financial markets today.  The Bank for International Settlements estimates that at the end of
March 1995 the OTC derivatives market stood at $47.5 trillion.
1  Approximately half of all derivatives
contracts worldwide are believed to be governed by New York law, including most U.S. swap contracts,
up to half of the swap contracts in the London derivatives market and a significant proportion of swap
contracts in other offshore financial centers (e.g., Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore).
2
The Deutsche mark is the world’s second most widely used currency after the U.S. dollar, and taken
together the 15 currencies of the European Union and the ECU basket currency form a powerful currency
bloc.
3
Aside from the derivatives market, eurobonds denominated in EU currencies are frequently issued
by U.S. corporations in offshore transactions governed by New York law.
4  As with derivatives contracts,
many of these transactions involve long-term obligations.  Finally, long-term loan agreements and cross-
border commercial transactions governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions also involve obligations
denominated in EU currencies.
5
In May 1995 the European Commission’s *UHHQ3DSHURQWKH 3UDFWLFDO$UUDQJHPHQWVIRUWKH
,QWURGXFWLRQRIWKH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ&XUUHQF\ predicted that under the laws of non-EU jurisdictions the
proposed single currency would be recognized as the successor to existing EU national currencies at the
fixed conversion rates at which the single currency will substitute    EU national currencies.
6  T h e  
Commission’s Green Paper thus concluded that under the laws of non-EU jurisdictions the continuity of
monetary obligations and other terms of a contract such as interest rates and other ancillary obligations
could be expected.
7
This study will address the issues raised by the Commission’s Green Paper.  Thus study reaches the
following conclusions regarding the legal implications of EMU for transactions governed by the laws of
U.S. jurisdictions, regardless of whether legislation ensuring the continuity of contracts is passed in
particular American jurisdictions and regardless of whether such legislation applies prospectively or
retroactively.
Á All long-term debts denominated in EU currencies must be discharged in the new single
European currency – the euro – at the official conversion rates at which the euro will substitute
existing EU currencies.
Á All foreign exchange transactions (e.g., FX forwards, cross currency swaps and currency
options) in which an EU currency is used on one side of the transaction (e.g., a US$/DM swap)
must be discharged in the euro at the applicable conversion rates.
Á All foreign exchange transactions involving the exchange of two currencies participating in
EMU (e.g., a DM/FFr swap) should also be discharged in the euro at the applicable conversion
rates.  In the case of contracts involving periodic payments (i.e., a cross currency interest rate
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swap) the economic effect will be to impose an obligation on one party to make net payments
for the remaining life of the contract, similar to an annuity.  It may be necessary to explore the
tax implications of this with the U.S. tax authorities.
Á All fixed interest rate obligations (including fixed rate swaps) must be discharged at the rate
specified in the contract.
Á All floating interest rate obligations linked to particular EU national currencies should be
discharged in accordance with the interest rates established by successor price sources for the
euro in the event that existing price sources are no longer available after EMU.
Á Force majeure clauses used in debt transactions which call for the discharge of EU currency
debts in U.S. dollars or some other currency in the event that the currency of the contract is no
longer available due to circumstances beyond the party’s control will not be triggered by EMU.
Á Impossibility clauses used in debt transactions which call for the discharge of EU currency
debts in U.S. dollars or some other currency in the event that the currency of the contract is no
longer used by the government of the country issuing such currency should not be triggered by
EMU.
Á All obligations denominated in the ECU basket currency should be discharged in the euro at 
the rate of one euro for one ECU, unless the   terms of the contract and the surrounding
circumstances establish a clear intention to the contrary.
  Substantially identical legislation confirming the continuity of contracts in   accordance with the
above principles has been proposed in the three leading U.S. trading jurisdictions    — New York, Illinois
and California.  This legislation has been enacted into law in New York and Illinois.  This study reaches
the following conclusions with respect to this legislation.
Á   Notwithstanding certain possible discrepancies, the New York and   Illinois legislation    confirms
the continuity of contracts after EMU in a   manner that is broadly consistent with the continuity
regulations endorsed by the Council of the European Union.
Á Any discrepancies between the EU Council regulations and the New York or Illinois
legislation must be resolved by applying the applicable rules established under the EU Council
regulations.
Á Assuming that the New York and Illinois legislation applies retroactively, the legislation does
not contravene the provisions of the United States Constitution prohibiting the states from
enacting legislation that impairs the obligation of contracts.  This is because state legislation
confirming the continuity of contracts after EMU in a manner that is broadly consistent with
the EU Council regulations is declaratory of existing law and does not impair pre-existing
contractual obligations in any manner.  In any case, such legislation has been enacted to protect
a broad societal   interest (i.e., the avoidance of needless litigation after EMU), and would
therefore be upheld by American courts in deference to the judgment of the    state legislatures.
Á Because the New York and Illinois legislation recognizes the continuity of contracts in a
manner that is broadly consistent with the monetary sovereignty of the European Union over
the currencies of EU member states, the legislation does not infringe the U.S. Federal
Government’s undisputed authority over international monetary relations.
The conclusions    reached by this study are based on the following legal   considerations.xi
6WDWH7KHRU\RI0RQH\
The State theory of money is widely accepted under U.S. and New York law.  According to this
theory money is a creature of law and it is the law of the country that issues a currency that determines
what things are money and how, in case of a currency alteration, sums expressed in the former currency
are to be converted into the new currency.
8  Applying this theory, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money at the time
the payment is to be made.
9  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that every contract for the payment of
money is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever
that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is therefore assumed with reference to that power.
10
This power has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as an attribute of sovereignty both in Europe
and America.
11  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that legislation fixing the conversion rate at
which an old currency is substituted by a new currency and providing for the discharge of debts originally
denominated in the old currency at the fixed conversion rate in the new currency is derived from this
power of a sovereign government over its currency.
12  Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York
Court of Appeals have recognized that the monetary sovereignty of a country over its currency extends    to
the use of the country’s currency by non-nationals outside the country’s jurisdiction in contracts governed
by the laws of other   countries.
13  The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the State theory expansively,
holding that the monetary sovereignty of a government over its currency extends not only to the
regulation of monetary obligations contained in private contracts, but also to the regulation of ancillary
contractual obligations that are inextricably linked to such monetary obligations.
14   Thus, the monetary
sovereignty of a    state over its   currency can be regarded as extending to the regulation of interest rate
obligations linked to monetary obligations.
15
The State theory thus articulated by the Supreme Court has been applied on a number of occasions
in American monetary history, including after the American Civil War when Congress authorized the
issuance of paper “greenback” dollars not backed by gold, after the Spanish-American War of 1898 when
the island of Puerto Rico was absorbed as a U.S. possession and the Puerto Rican peso was converted into
the U.S. dollar, and again during the Great Depression of the 1930s after the U.S. abandoned the gold
standard.
16  The State theory of money has also been applied by American courts to cases involving
foreign currencies, including the Pound sterling following Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard in
1931, the German reichsmark substituted for the Austrian schilling following the 1938 Austro-German
Anschluss, the Japanese military currency imposed on the Philippines during the Second World War, the
Deutsche mark introduced in Germany in 1948 in substitution for the former German Reichsmark, the
successive currencies introduced in China from 1933-55 and the Canadian dollar following the collapse
of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s.
17
The State theory of money also attracted some support from the New York courts in cases decided
after the collapse of the Russian rouble following the First World War and the collapse of the Weimar
German mark during the 1920s.
18  In a small number of cases resulting from the collapse of these foreign
currencies, as well as in cases decided after the collapse of the Confederate dollar issued by the rebel
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forces during the American Civil War, American courts did not always strictly adhere to the State theory,
sometimes seeking to revalorize contractual obligations denominated in collapsed currencies so as to
ascribe a real economic value to such obligations.
19  It appears that the State theory was not always
applied in such cases because the currencies in question were not issued by a legitimate government (as in
the case of the Southern Confederacy) or perhaps because of the harshness involved in strictly applying
the State theory to obligations denominated in collapsed currencies.
20  These cases have little or no
relevance to the highly organized plan by some of the United States’ closest international allies for an
orderly transition to a single European currency.
21  Moreover, the State theory of money, in addition to
being generally applied by American courts to obligations denominated in collapsed currencies, has also
been applied by the U.S. International Claims Commission in cases involving the collapse of various
foreign currencies after the Second World War (e.g., the Yugoslav dinar, the Hungarian pengö and the
Romanian lei).
22
The State theory of money has constitutional underpinnings insofar as the U.S. Consitution
implicitly recognizes that the power to establish foreign currencies is vested in foreign governments.  
23
The State theory of money should be treated as part of federal law insofar as the question of how the
introduction of a new currency by a foreign country will affect contractual obligations governed by the
laws of U.S. jurisdictions implicates the monetary sovereignty of that country, and therefore affects the
relationship of the United States with that country.
24
The State theory of money is also endorsed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which defines
money as a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part of
its currency.
25  This legislative definition of money, which has been adopted in all 50    states of the United
States (including   New York), has been recognized as a legislative incorporation of the State theory of
money into American law.
26  Both the text of the UCC and the legislative history preceding its adoption
clearly establish that money is a creature of law and that the nature of foreign currency must therefore be
determined in accordance with the law of the foreign country that issues such currency.
27  In addition, the
UCC definition of money explicitly rejects the narrow view that money is limited to legal tender, and will
therefore regard the euro as the sole currency issued under the laws of EU    member states during the
proposed transitional period after the introduction of the   euro single currency but preceding the
introduction of euro notes and coins.
28
In addition, the 20 American jurisdictions (including California and Illinois) that have adopted the
Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act have expressly legislated that if, after an obligation is expressed in a
foreign money, the country issuing or adopting that money substitutes a new money in place of that
money, the obligation is treated as if expressed in the new money at the rate of conversion the issuing
country establishes for the payment of like obligations denominated in the former money.
29  T h i s
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provision will be applied by all courts in the adopting jurisdictions regardless of governing law (e.g., by a
Californian court in a case involving a foreign currency obligation governed by New York law).  
30
The State theory of money is analogous to the act of state doctrine, which   holds that the U.S. courts
will not examine the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign government done within its own
territory.
31  Thus, under the act of state doctrine, foreign legislation introducing a new currency and
providing for the performance of obligations denominated in the old currency    should be applied to  
contractual obligations whose situs is located within that foreign country (e.g., where the obligor is based
in the foreign country and/or where payment is to be made in the foreign country, regardless of what law
is the governing law of the contract).  
32
The State theory of money is also widely recognized under the laws of foreign countries, and it is a
generally accepted principle of international law that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency.
33
Interestingly, the State theory of money has been defined more broadly by the U.S. courts than in many
foreign countries, permitting a sovereign to exercise its monetary sovereignty so as to alter or abrogate
pre-existing contractual rights in the aftermath of a currency change.
34
&RQWUDFWXDO([FXVHV8QDYDLODEOH
Various contractual doctrines which might permit parties to avoid or otherwise terminate
contractual obligations, such as the UCC doctrine of commercial impracticability and the common law
doctrines of impossibility and frustration, would be unavailable after EMU.
35  This is because the State
theory of money, in the manner in which it has been articulated by U.S. courts, is applicable to all U.S.
contracts affected by EMU.
36  Thus,    any contractual obligations denominated in or   by reference to EU
national currencies must be discharged in euros in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU
Council regulations on the introduction of the euro and the irrevocably fixed conversion rates at which the
euro substitutes the EU national currencies.  The continuity of all interest rate obligations can also be
expected in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations and/or pursuant to
successor interest rates established for the euro.
37
)RUHVHHDELOLW\RI(08
The doctrines of commercial impracticability, impossibility and frustration only excuse
performance under a contract where performance has been rendered impracticable, impossible or has
been otherwise frustrated by the occurrence of an unforeseen event which could not have been anticipated
or guarded against in the contract.
38  In general, American courts have adopted an expansive approach
with respect to the foreseeability of international political and economic developments.
39  The advent of a
single European currency has long been foreseeable, going back to the decision of the European Council
to commission the Delors report in 1988, followed by the decision of the European Council in 1989 to
launch the first stage of EMU in 1990, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and its entry into
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force  in 1993.  Moreover the first plans for the introduction of a single European currency were laid in
1970, and it can be argued that the creation of a single European currency has been one of the goals of
European integration since that time.
40  More broadly, in view of the widespread acceptance of the State
theory of money and the fact that all countries have, at various times in history, changed their currencies,
it may be argued that all currency alterations are inherently foreseeable.
41
%HQHILWRIWKH%DUJDLQ
The New York courts would be reluctant to entertain claims of commercial impracticability,
frustration or impossibility where a contract can be performed according to its terms and the parties
obtain exactly what they contracted for (i.e., the currency of the country designated in the contract).
42
/DZIXO&XUUHQF\
Many legal documents, including the ISDA standard forms used for over-the-counter derivatives
contracts, contain contractual definitions of EU currencies that define each such currency as the “lawful”
currency of a particular country (e.g., the Deutsche mark is defined as the lawful currency of the Federal
Republic of Germany).  This formula clearly directs American courts to the laws of the Federal Republic
of Germany (including the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations) for a determination as to
the meaning of the term “Deutsche mark”.
43  Other clauses used in many U.S. foreign currency debt
documents call for payment in such coin or currency as at the time of payment is legal tender for the
payment of debts.  Such clauses also ensure the continuity of contracts after EMU.
44
)RUFH0DMHXUH,PSRVVLELOLW\&ODXVHV
Force majeure clauses in many U.S. foreign currency debt documents call for the payment of debts
in U.S. dollars in the event that the currency of the contract is no longer available due to the imposition of
exchange controls or other circumstances beyond the party’s control.  Such force majeure clauses would
not be triggered by EMU because such clauses refer to situations where the currency in question is in
circulation but access to such currency is restricted through exchange controls or other similar
restrictions.
45  Moreover, force majeure clauses are only triggered by unforeseeable events.
46
Impossibility clauses often call for repayment in U.S. dollars where the currency of the contract is
no longer used by the government of the country issuing such currency.  Such clauses could give rise to
interpretive difficulties when applied to EMU.
47 However, all obligations created by contracts containing
force majeure or impossibility clauses should, in accordance with the State theory of money, be
performed in euro under the EU Council regulations because the clauses are general in nature and were
not drafted with specific reference to the introduction of the euro.
48
(08&RQWLQXLW\&ODXVHV
Since 1995 a large number of U.S.    bond issuers have adopted language that   expressly ensures the
continuity of contracts after    EMU in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU Council
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regulations on the introduction of the euro, and ISDA has recently adopted an EMU continuity clause for
swap contracts documented under the ISDA standard form.
49
2EOLJDWLRQVLQ(&8
The official ECU issued by the European Monetary Institute explicitly falls within the legal
definition of money that has been adopted in 43 American jurisdictions. Under the laws of such
jurisdictions    the replacement of all references   to ECU by references to euro at the rate of one euro to one
ECU in private ECU obligations defined by reference to the official ECU would therefore be enforced in
accordance with the applicable provisions of EC law.  
50
The argument can also be advanced that the official ECU falls within   the general legal definition of
money under New York law.
51  Nonetheless, it is not certain that the official ECU would be recognized as
legal money under New York law.
52  Assuming that ECU obligations governed by New York law are not
monetary obligations but rather creatures of contract, the    replacement of references to ECU by   references
to euro in obligations denominated in the official ECU and governed by New York law will still be
assured under recent legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature.
53  This legislation also
provides, consistent with the EU Council regulations, that references to the ECU in contracts not defined
by reference to the official ECU shall be presumed to be references to the official ECU, unless a contrary
intention by the parties is demonstrated.
54  Furthermore, the legislation also prevents parties from
invoking the doctrines of commercial impracticability, frustration and impossibility as a means of
terminating or otherwise discharging    ECU obligations   based on EMU.
55  In view of the long-standing
foreseeability of the    development of   the ECU as a currency in its own right (even before the Maastricht
Treaty was signed) it is unlikely that such doctrines could have been invoked in any case.
56
Finally, the contractual definitions of the ECU used for the vast majority of private ECU obligations
governed by New York law refer to the official ECU and will therefore ensure the 1:1    replacement of
references to ECU in private ECU   obligations by references to euro after EMU.
57
%LODWHUDO)ULHQGVKLS7UHDWLHV
The United States has entered into bilateral treaties of friendship with a majority of EU    member
states (including France and Germany) which require the   United States not to take unreasonable measures
that would impair the rights or interests of nationals of such EU    member states in their enterprises or their
capital.
58 Also, the United States is required under these treaties not to impose restrictions   which would
burden or interfere with payments or funds transfers between the U.S. and such EU    member states.
59  A
failure to recognize the continuity of financial   obligations after EMU in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the EU Council regulations might be inconsistent with the spirit if not the letter of these
requirements.
1HZ<RUNDQG,OOLQRLV6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQ5HJDUGLQJ(08
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In July 1997    the New York and Illinois State Legislatures enacted legislation that confirms the
continuity of contracts after EMU.  
60  Notwithstanding certain   possible discrepancies, this legislation
confirms the continuity of contracts denominated in EU national currencies and the ECU in a manner that
is broadly consistent with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro.  
61  This approach is
consistent with the fact that the enactment of any legislation by an American state legislature that fails to
fully recognize the monetary sovereignty of the European Union over the currencies of EU member states
would represent an unconstitutional infringement on the Federal Government’s undisputed authority over
international monetary relations.
62  In accordance with standard principles of statutory construction, any
possible discrepancies between the    New York or Illinois   state legislation and the EU Council regulations 
must be reconciled by ascribing    an   interpretation to the state legislation such that it conforms to the EU
Council regulations.  
63  In addition, in the case of any conflict between the state legislation and the EU
Council regulations, the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations shall prevail insofar as the
State theory of money is rooted in federal common law.
64
It has been suggested that the New York and Illinois EMU legislation does not have any retroactive
effect with respect to contracts entered into prior to the enactment of the legislation in mid-1997.
65
While the text of the legislation might imply that it only applies prospectively, both the legislative history
and the purpose of the legislation demonstrate a legislative intent that the legislation should apply
retroactively.
66  In any case, regardless of whether  the New York and Illinois legislation has any
retroactive effect, all relevant contractual obligations created before the passage of the legislation must be
discharged in accordance with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro in view of the
application of the State theory of money under U.S. federal law.
67
While the New York and Illinois legislation does not address the question of bond redenomination,
the provisions of the EU Council regulation facilitating the redenomination of bonds    should still be
applicable to transactions governed by New   York law and the laws of other U.S. jurisdictions by virtue of
the State theory of money.
68
&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RI5HWURDFWLYH&RQWUDFW&RQWLQXLW\/HJLVODWLRQ
The legislation passed by the New York and Illinois State Legislatures confirming the continuity of
contractual obligations after EMU would withstand constitutional challenge.  
69  Assuming the legislation
applies retroactively, the   legislation    will not impair contractual obligations insofar as it confirms the
continuity   of contractual obligations in a manner that is consistent with the State theory of money.  
70
Notwithstanding certain possible discrepancies, the New York and Illinois legislation confirms the
continuity of contracts after EMU in a manner that is broadly   consistent with the continuity regulations
adopted by the Council of the European Union.
71  By confirming the continuity of contracts consistently
with the EU Council regulations, the New York and Illinois  legislation is declaratory of existing law and
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does not impair pre-existing contractual obligations in any manner.
72  In any case, the legislation has been
enacted to protect a broad societal interest (i.e., the avoidance of needless litigation after EMU), and will
therefore be upheld by American courts in deference to the judgment of the    state legislatures unless it is
not appropriately   tailored to the public interest it was designed to meet.
73
&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RI6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQ$IIHFWLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\5HODWLRQV
The enactment of legislation by    the New York and Illinois State Legislatures   confirming the
continuity of contracts after EMU does not infringe the U.S. Federal Government’s undisputed authority
over international monetary relations because the legislation recognizes the continuity of contracts in a
manner that is broadly consistent with the monetary sovereignty of    the European Union over the
currencies   of EU member states.
74 The enactment of such legislation by a    state legislature does   not
infringe the Federal Government’s authority over international monetary relations so long as the
legislation is fully consistent with the State theory of money.  
75 This is consistent with the official position
of the Federal Government towards EMU which recognizes that it would be inappropriate for the U.S.
Government to enter the debate of how EMU should be structured since this question is one which
Europeans must answer for themselves.
76 The    state legislation would be best insulated from constitutional
challenge by evidence that Congress and the executive branch of the Federal Government implicitly
acquiesce in the enactment of legislation by the state legislatures in this area. Nonetheless, it is highly
unlikely that the failure of the state authorities to consult the Federal Government would of itself
prejudice the constitutional validity of the    state legislation.
77
&RQFOXVLRQ  
This study concludes that the introduction of the single European currency presents few
uncertainties for the continuity of contracts governed by New York law and the laws of other U.S.
jurisdictions.     In accordance with the State theory of money, all such contractual obligations must be
discharged in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations on the introduction
of the euro   .   The legislation enacted in New York and Illinois    confirming the continuity of   contracts    after
EMU is broadly consistent with the EU Council regulations.  Possible   discrepancies between the state
legislation and the EU Council regulations can be overcome by interpreting the state legislation so as to
harmonize it with the EU Council regulations. In any case, in the event of a conflict between the EU
Council regulations and the New York or Illinois legislation, the provisions of the EU Council regulations
shall prevail by virtue of the State theory of money
Contractual obligations denominated in the official ECU and governed by the laws of most U.S.
jurisdictions (but not New York) shall be automatically discharged in accordance with the provisions of
the EU Council regulations.  ECU obligations governed by New York law shall be discharged either
pursuant to the EU Council regulations or in accordance with the substantially identical provisions of the
New York legislation confirming the continuity of contracts after EMU.
Because the state legislation confirms the continuity of contracts in a manner that is broadly
consistent with the applicable EU legislation, it will not retroactively impair the obligation of contracts
contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitution.  Nor will the state legislation infringe the
U.S. Federal Government’s authority over international monetary relations.  This is because the state
legislation generally defers to the monetary sovereignty of the European Union over the currencies of EU
member states.
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This study attempts to analyze how the continuity of contracts governed by the laws of New York
State and other U.S. jurisdictions will be treated in the event that existing European Union (EU)
currencies are replaced by a new single European currency.  This analysis will be taken in several stages.
Á First, the study will outline the historic evolution of European economic and monetary union
(EMU) and the manner in which the transition to EMU is proposed to be achieved.
Á Second, the study will consider the circumstances in which American courts will hold that
financial obligations denominated in EU currencies are governed by the laws of particular
jurisdictions (e.g., New York State or a foreign country).
Á Third, assuming that the law of a U.S. jurisdiction such as New York law is the governing law
of the contract, the study will then explore whether American courts would accept that the
question of what a currency such as the Deutsche mark or the French franc consists of is
exclusively defined by the laws of the    state issuing such currency (e.g., the laws of   Germany or
France, as the case may be).
Á Fourth, the study will assess the extent to which various legal doctrines such as the Uniform
Commercial Code doctrine of commercial impracticability or the common law doctrines of
impossibility and frustration could be invoked as a means of terminating or otherwise
discharging contractual obligations in the aftermath of EMU.  This discussion will also touch
on the remedies open to parties following a breach of contract.
Á Fifth, the study will examine various currency definitions that are used in the North American
financial markets, and consider the continuity clauses that have been adopted by certain market
participants to ensure the continuity of contracts in the aftermath of EMU.  The study will also
look at contractual provisions affecting bond redenomination.
Á Sixth, the study will consider the special concerns pertaining to the legal status of obligations
denominated in the European Currency Unit (the ECU), the basket currency which under the
Maastricht Treaty is set to become a currency in its own right.
Á Seventh, the study will discuss the possible relevance of various bilateral friendship treaties
between the United States and EU    member states and   the relevance of the Bretton Woods
Agreement to the introduction of the single European currency.
Á Eighth, the study will outline the content of the recent legislation passed by the New York and
Illinois State Legislatures to ensure the continuity of contracts after EMU.
Á Ninth, the study will consider whether the retroactive application of this legislation to pre-
existing contractual obligations would be contrary to the provisions of the United States or
New York State Constitutions.
Á Tenth, the study will consider whether the enactment of this legislation by state legislatures
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement by the state authorities on the undisputed authority
of the Federal Government over international monetary relations.
%7KH0DDVWULFKW7UHDW\xix
In 1993, the then 12    member states of the European Economic Community   — Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom — entered into the Treaty on European Union.
1  The Treaty is commonly referred to as the
“Maastricht Treaty”, so named after the small town in the Netherlands where the treaty was signed.  Since
1992 three more countries — Austria, Finland and Sweden — have joined the European Union, thereby
acceding to the terms of the Treaty.
2  Under the Treaty the    member states of the EU agreed to a number of
significant amendments to the treaty   establishing the then European Economic Community, including an
agreement to establish among themselves the European Union and to replace the European Economic
Community with the European Community.
3
The most far-reaching provisions of the Maastricht Treaty relate to the agreement by the EU 
member states, subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions,   to replace their individual national
currencies with a single European currency no later than January 1, 1999.
4  Two    member states, Denmark
and the United Kingdom,   have negotiated opt-outs under the Treaty which free them from the obligation
to participate in the proposed monetary union, even if they satisfy the  preconditions to monetary union.
5
The remaining    member states are legally obliged to participate in   EMU if they satisfy the preconditions
laid down by the Maastricht Treaty.
&,PSDFWRI(08RQ86)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWV
The Treaty clearly has important legal implications for financial obligations maturing after January
1, 1999 that are governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions, particularly New York.  A multitude of
financial obligations contained in derivatives and eurobond transactions are governed by the laws of New
York State and are denominated in the national currencies of EU    member states and the ECU.  Set forth  
below are statistical details demonstrating the extent to which derivatives and eurobonds affected by
EMU are governed by New York law.
27&'HULYDWLYHV0DUNHW
According to a triennial report published by the Basle-based Bank for International Settlements in
May 1996, the global notional amount outstanding of derivatives contracts in the so-called over-the-
counter (OTC) markets at the end of March 1995 is estimated to have stood at $47.5 trillion (with a gross
market value of $2.2 trillion), of which 61% applied to interest rate instruments and 37% to foreign
exchange instruments.
6  A very significant proportion of such interest rate and foreign exchange
derivatives contracts are both governed by New York law and affected by EMU.  This point can be
demonstrated by several factors.
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Á U.S. counterparties to OTC derivatives contracts select New York law as the governing law of
their contracts in order to ensure the enforceability of netting provisions.
7  It has been
suggested that “[n]early 100 percent of all swap contracts between U.S. counterparties,
irrespective of the currency in which the deal is made, are governed by New York law” and
that “[p]erhaps half of all derivative contracts are governed by New York law.”
8  Thus the
standard forms of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which
document many OTC derivatives contracts, designate either New York or English law as the
governing law of the contract.
9
Á After London, New York is the largest center of foreign exchange and derivatives market
activity in the world.  In April 1995 the reported average U.S. daily turnover of OTC foreign
exchange and interest rate derivative contracts was $164 billion in notional amounts,
accounting for over 14% of the global turnover during the same period.
10  The vast majority of
U.S. derivatives contracts are governed by New York law.
Á London is the leading international center of foreign exchange and derivatives activity, and in
April 1995 the reported average U.K. daily turnover of OTC forex and interest rate contracts
was $351 billion in notional amounts, accounting for over 30% of the global turnover during
that period.
11  An October 1995 report by the London Investment Banking Association
estimated that up to half of the swaps entered into in the London markets are governed by New
York law.
12  This preference by U.S. counterparties operating outside the United States to
select New York law as the governing law of the contract must also mean that New York law
governs a significant portion of derivatives contracts in the world’s five other important centers
of foreign exchange and derivative market activity: Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Frankfurt
and Paris (in April 1995 Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Germany and France accounted for
over 11.5%, 6.5%, 5%, 4.5% and 4.5%, respectively, of the global turnover in OTC derivatives
contracts).
13
Á Many OTC derivatives contracts governed by New York law involve obligations denominated
in European Union currencies.  Thus, the reported foreign exchange derivatives turnover in
April 1995 shows that the Deutsche mark was used on one side of the transaction in over 23%
of all forex derivatives transactions during that period, Pound sterling in over 9% of such
transactions, the French franc in over 7.5% of transactions, the ECU in over 2.5% of
transactions, and the remaining 12 EU currencies in over 15% of transactions.
14  The Deutsche
mark was the underlying currency in over 12.5% of the notional amount outstanding of OTC
interest rate derivatives at March 1995, and EU currencies can be reasonably expected to
account for a significant proportion of the 31.5% of interest rate instruments whose underlying
currencies were currencies other than the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark or the Japanese yen.
15
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These transactions are spread out over all markets, and there is no concentration of local
currency transactions in the leading financial centers.
16
Á Many derivative obligations denominated in currencies affected by EMU or calculated by
reference to interest rates linked to EU currencies will mature after January 1, 1999.  As of
March 1995, some 43% of OTC interest rate derivative contracts had maturities of 1-5 years
and 13% had maturities of over 5 years, while 16% of OTC foreign exchange instruments had
maturities of 1-5 years and 5% had maturities of over 5 years.
17
In conclusion, based on the above statistics, there is a very significant amount of outstanding OTC
derivatives instruments governed by New York law that are denominated in EU currencies and that will
mature after January 1, 1999.
  (XURERQG0DUNHW  
In March 1995 the Euroclear securities clearance system operated by the Brussels office of Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York released a report regarding the impact of EMU which estimated
that there were some $600 billion of securities denominated in EU currencies within its system alone and
that many of these securities are issued under the laws of non-EU jurisdictions.  
18  By 1996 the eurobond
market for debt securities sold to investors outside the country of the currency in which the debt is
denominated had grown to an annual new issue volume of over $650 billion.
19  International capital
market issues in core EMU currencies (in order of size, the Deutsche mark, French franc, Italian lire,
Dutch guilder, Luxembourg franc,  ECU, Finnish markka, Belgian franc and Irish pound) accounted for
$194 billion in 1996.
20  North American issuers accounted for $19 billion of EMU currency borrowings in
1996.
21  Eurobonds issued by U.S. issuers on offshore markets are usually expressly governed by New
York law. 
([FKDQJHWUDGHG'HULYDWLYHV0DUNHWV
According to the Basle report, the total reported notional amount of outstanding exchange-traded
derivatives stood at $16.4 trillion at the end of March 1995.
22  Almost all (96%)  exchange-traded
business consists of interest rate contracts (comprising futures and options).
23  U.S. commodities
exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Mid-America Commodity Exchange, Financial
Instruments Exchange (FINEX), which forms part of the New York Cotton Exchange (NYCE), and the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange accounted for 17% of the global share of such interest rate contracts as of
April 1995.
24  It appears, however, that most exchange-traded interest rate instruments affected by EMU
are traded on European exchanges, and that a comparatively small amount of long-term contracts
implicated by EMU are traded on U.S. exchanges.
2WKHU&URVV%RUGHU7UDQVDFWLRQV
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176HHLGat 27.
18   EUROCLEAR  OPERATIONS  CENTER, MEMORANDUM ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY  UNION  -  COMMENTS AND ISSUES FROM THE
EUROCLEAR OPERATOR 2, 9 (Mar. 1995).  
196HH I NTERNATIONAL PRIMARY MARKET ASSOCIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET: AN EMU POSITION PAPER 12-13
(Autumn 1997).
206HHLGDW 14-15.
216HHLG. at 15. 
22BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, VXSUD note 6, at 33.
236HHLG. at 33.
246HHLG. at 35.xxii
Many long-term loan agreements and cross-border commercial transactions governed by the laws of
U.S. jurisdictions also involve obligations denominated in EU currencies.
'3UHSDUDWLRQVIRU(08E\86)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWV
The preparations of the international financial markets for the introduction of the single currency
got underway in 1993 with the establishment of various study groups to consider the implications of
EMU.  In April 1993 an ad hoc working group was established with the assistance of the European
Commission and the ECU Banking Association to consider the legal definition of the ECU.  This group
enjoyed the participation of representatives of various U.S. financial institutions, law firms and
international trade associations, including ISDA and the International Primary    Market Association
(IPMA).
25
As awareness of the legal implications of EMU in the international financial markets increased,
U.S. eurobond issuers began to adopt language updating the description of their ECU bonds in 1994 and
1995 to take account of the ECU’s development as a currency in its own right.
26  Beginning in early 1995
a number of U.S. issuers began to include specific language in their debt documents ensuring the
conversion of obligations denominated in EU national currencies (e.g., the Deutsche mark, the French
Franc) into the single currency in accordance with the applicable provisions of EC law.
27
In May 1995 the European Commission
28 released its Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements
for the Introduction of the Single Currency.
29  The Commission Green Paper predicted that under the laws
of non-EU jurisdictions the recognition of the single currency as the successor currency to existing EU
national currencies at the fixed conversion rates, as well as the continuity of the other terms of a contract
such as interest rates and other ancillary obligations, could be expected.
30
In late 1995 IPMA and ISDA released a joint statement recommending a standard definition of the
ECU for use in terms and conditions of securities and derivatives contracts designed to take account of
EMU.
31  The adoption of this language followed a consultative process with ISDA and IPMA members
and contacts, including a large number of U.S. financial institutions and law firms.
In 1995 there was a flurry of speculation in the international financial media regarding the legal
ramifications of EMU for EU currency contracts governed by New York law.
32  U.S. based working
groups were established to consider the legal implications of EMU for North American financial markets
in late 1995 and early 1996.  The first such group, the Wall Street Committee on the Transition to EMU,
held its inaugural meeting in March 1996,
33 and this was followed by the establishment of an ISDA New
York EMU Working Group in May 1996.  Representatives of Wall Street financial institutions, law firms
and trade associations began to consider whether the continuity of foreign currency contracts governed by
New York law might be best protected against the impact of EMU through the enactment of legislation by
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Securities and Exchange Commission); VHHLQIUD pp. 139-41.
28The European Commission is broadly responsible for initiating new  European Community policies and for implementing existing
Community policies.  6HHJHQHUDOO\ T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 11-17 (3d ed. 1994).
29European Commission, Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the Single Currency, COM(95)333 final.
30,G. at 60VHHDOVR European Commission (DG II), The Legal Framework for the Use of the Euro: Questions and Answers on the
Euro Regulations 9 (Nov. 1997).
31INTERNATIONAL  PRIMARY  MARKET  ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL  SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES  ASSOCIATION  INC., JOINT
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326HH,HJ, David Shireff, 6LQJOH0RQH\1LJKWPDUH, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1995, at 28; $/HJDO%DVNHW&DVH, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9,
1995, at 78.
33Wall Street Committee on the Transition to European Monetary Union, Minutes (Mar. 29, 1996) (on file with author).xxiii
the New York State Legislature.
34  The ISDA New York EMU Working Group, which was expanded to
include the Financial Markets Lawyers Group, the Public Securities Association and the Securities
Industry Association, forwarded a draft legislative proposal to the New York State Legislature in Albany
in early 1997.
35  In July 1997 the legislation passed both Houses of the New York State Legislature and
was signed into law by the Governor of New York as an amendment to the New York General
Obligations Law.
36
Similar legislative proposals have been forwarded to the Illinois and California State Legislatures,
and in July 1997 the legislative proposal drafted by the New York EMU working group was enacted in
Illinois as the Illinois Euro Conversion Act.
37
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There is nothing new about the idea of introducing a single currency for a number of different
countries.  Gold served as the single currency of the international monetary system while countries
subscribed to the gold standard.
1  During the Bretton Woods conference at the end of the Second World
War the economist John Maynard Keynes unsuccessfully advocated the adoption of a single world
currency which he proposed to call the “bancor”.
2  Since 1960 three regional transnational currencies
have been established:  the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) franc issued by the Central Bank for
West African    states on behalf of seven African   countries participating in the West African Monetary
Union; the CFA franc issued by the Bank for Central African    states on behalf of six African countries
participating   in the Central African Monetary Union; and the East Caribbean dollar issued by the Eastern
Caribbean Central Bank on behalf of eight Caribbean island    states.
3
The concept of a European monetary union grew out of the increased   economic integration of post-
War Europe that followed the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, leading to the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1958.
4  Arising
out of a suggestion by the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
5 steps towards the introduction of a
single European currency were taken in 1969 when the original six    member states   of the European
Economic Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) decided to
draw up a plan for the creation of an economic and monetary union.
6  This led to the publication of the
Werner report in 1970
7 and the adoption of a Resolution on the attainment in stages of economic and
monetary union by the six    member states in March 1971.
8
These plans for the introduction of a single European currency were upset by   the violent upheavals
in the international monetary system caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of near-fixed
exchange rates during the early 1970s, resulting in the announcement by President Nixon in August 1971
that the U.S. dollar would no longer be convertible into gold.
9  The European Economic Community
responded to the advent of floating exchange rates by adopting a new Resolution on the attainment of
economic and monetary union in March 1972 which established a plus or minus 2.25% band within
which the currencies of    member states   would be permitted to float.
10  With the withdrawal of the U.K.,
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Bull. E.C. No. 11 (Supp. 1970), 3.  The report was named after Pierre Werner, former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, who chaired the study.
8Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 22 March 1971 on the attainment
by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, UHSULQWHGLQ Monetary Committee of the European Community, Compendium
of Community Monetary Texts 33 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Monetary Compendium].
96HH GROS AND THYGESEN, VXSUD note 4, at 12-15; GUTTMANN, VXSUD note 1, at 137-43 (1994).
10Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 21 March 1972 on the
application of the Resolution of 22 March 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, 1972 J.O.
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Italy and France from this arrangement, the joint float had in effect become a Deutsche mark zone by the
mid-1970s.
11
European monetary integration was given a fresh impetus with the passage of a Resolution in 1978
establishing the European Monetary System (EMS), which established bands of 2.25% above and below
bilateral central exchange rates within which member currencies could float.
12 The EMS requires that
when the market exchange rate for two currencies reaches the limit of its fluctuation margins, central
banks from both countries must intervene to keep the exchange rate within the band.
13  The 2.25%
exchange rate margins of the EMS survived until 1993 when it was decided, in response to pressure on
the currency markets, to widen the bands to 15%.
14  With the exception of the Greek drachma and the
Swedish krona, the currencies of all EU    member states have at various times participated in the exchange  
rate mechanism of the EMS.
The project for European monetary union began to gather fresh momentum in 1988.  Arising out of
a proposal by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German Foreign Minister, the then 12    member states of
the European Economic Community   decided at the European Council summit meeting in Hanover in June
1988 to commission a report under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors, President of the European
Commission, regarding the introduction of a single European currency.
15  The direct antecedents of the
Maastricht Treaty provisions on EMU can be traced to the Delors report of April 1989, which
recommended a three-stage process for the achievement of economic and monetary union.
16  T h e
European Council summit meeting in Madrid in June 1989 decided to launch the first stage of EMU on
July 1, 1990.
17  The main features of the first stage involved increased co-ordination of economic and
monetary policies between the    member states and increased integration   of financial and capital markets.
18
The launch of the first stage did not require any amendments to the Treaty of Rome, under which the
European Economic  Community was established.
The second and third stages of EMU were laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in
February 1992.
19  The Treaty did not enter into force until November 1993 due to the fact that the
enabling legislation underwent a protracted passage in the 12    member states. Three member states
(Denmark, France and Ireland)   held popular referenda to ensure the passage of the Treaty.    While the
French and   Irish referenda were passed, the Danish referendum resulted in an initial rejection of the
Treaty, only to be overturned after Denmark had been granted an opt-out from the Treaty provisions
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relating to EMU.  Legal proceedings challenging the validity of the Treaty ensued in various national
courts, including those of France, Germany and the U.K.
20
Against this backdrop, Europe experienced one of the most turbulent currency crises in recent
history, causing some to question the credibility of the proposed monetary union.
21  As a result of this
short-lived currency crisis in September 1992 and July 1993, a re-alignment of European currencies
participating in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS took place while Italy and the United
Kingdom withdrew altogether from the ERM.
22  Finally, in August 1993 the ERM’s margin of fluctuation
was widened from 2.25% to a new 15% band, subject to a bilateral arrangement between Germany and
the Netherlands to maintain the 2.25% margin between their currencies.
23
After the Maastricht Treaty had finally entered into force in November 1993, the second stage of
EMU began on January 1, 1994.
24  Three new    member states —   Austria, Finland and Sweden —
subsequently acceded to the Treaty by joining the European Union on January 1, 1995 after a series of
popular referenda in 1994.
25
%6HFRQG6WDJHRI(08
The start of the second stage of EMU on January 1, 1994 saw the establishment of the Frankfurt-
based European Monetary Institute (EMI), precursor to the future European Central Bank (ECB).  The
second stage is designed to promote progressive convergence among the economies of the EU member
states as   a prelude to a decision by the Council of the European Union, meeting in the composition of the
Heads of State or of Government of the member states,
26 as to   which    member states “fulfill the necessary
conditions for the adoption of a single   currency”.
27  This decision must be made    after taking into account
two reports   submitted to the Council by the European Commission and the European Monetary Institute
which examine the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence by reference to the
fulfillment by each    member state of certain economic   convergence criteria.
28  These criteria relate broadly
to the achievement by    member   states of specified inflation rates, budget deficits, government debt ratios,
exchange rates and interest rates.  
29  The Council must also take into account the opinion of the European
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Parliament, and the Council’s decision must be made on the basis of the recommendations of the
European Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).
30
In the Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European Council of December 1995, which laid
down the changeover scenario for the introduction of the single currency, it was agreed that the decision
of the Council will be made “as soon as possible in 1998” on the basis of “the most recent and reliable
actual data for 1997.”
31
The Maastricht Treaty requires the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or of
Government of the 15    member states no later than July 1, 1998, to confirm which    member states fulfill
the necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.
32  The Treaty provides that immediately
after either the date of the Council’s decision or on July 1, 1998 the members of the Executive Board of
the European Central Bank will be appointed by common accord of the governments of the participating
member states, and both the ECB and the European   System of Central Banks (ESCB) will be established
and will prepare for their full operation from January 1, 1999.
33  The ESCB will be composed of the ECB
and the national central banks and will be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB.
34  The
two main decision-making bodies of the ECB will be the Executive Board appointed by the governments
of the member states and the Governing Council comprising the members of the Executive Board and the
Governors of the national central banks.
35  The Maastricht Treaty provides that the basic tasks to be
carried out through the ESCB are to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community; to
conduct foreign exchange operations; to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the    member
states; and to promote the smooth operation of   payment systems.  
36
The Maastricht Treaty provides that the third stage of EMU shall start no later   than January 1,
1999.
37  The legal implications of this timetable have not been clarified, and it has been suggested that
these procedures might be capable of being used after the specified deadlines have expired.
38
&&KDQJHRYHUWRWKH6LQJOH&XUUHQF\
,QWURGXFWLRQRIWKH(XURDQG&KDQJHRYHU6FHQDULR
The Maastricht Treaty provides that at the starting date of EMU the Council shall, acting with the
unanimity of the    member states participating in EMU, adopt the   conversion rates at which their
currencies shall be irrevocably fixed and at which irrevocably fixed rate the ECU shall be substituted for
these currencies, and the ECU will become a currency in its own right.  
39  The European Council has
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decided that the   single currency will be named the euro, rather than the generic term “ECU” used in the
Treaty.
40
The Treaty also provides that the Council shall, acting with the unanimity of the    member states
participating in EMU, also take other measures necessary for the   rapid introduction of the euro as the
single currency of the participating member states.
41  The details regarding the changeover to the single
currency were fleshed out in the December 1995 Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European
Council, which expressly followed the changeover scenario adopted in the November 1995 EMI report on
The Changeover to the Single Currency.
42  As stated in the Madrid Presidency Conclusions, EMU “will
start on January 1, 1999, with the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates among currencies of participating
countries and against the euro and with the single monetary policy which will be defined and
implemented by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in euro.”
43  At this point it is helpful to
quote from the Madrid Presidency Conclusions in full:
A Council regulation entering into force on January 1, 1999 will provide the legal framework
for the use of the euro.  From that date the euro will be ‘a currency in its own right’ and the
official ECU basket will cease to exist.  This Regulation will have the effect that the national
currencies and the euro will become different expressions of what is economically the same
currency.  As long as different national monetary units still exist, the Council Regulation will
establish a legally enforceable equivalence between the euro and the national currency units
(‘legally enforceable equivalence’ means that each monetary unit is assigned, in a legally
enforceable way, an unchangeable countervalue in terms of the euro unit at the official
conversion rate and vice versa)¼ [T]he Regulation will ensure that private economic agents
will be free to use the euro; at the same time they should not be obliged to do so.  As far as
possible, they should be allowed to develop their own mechanisms of adjustment to the
changeover¼. The Regulation will also provide that national banknotes will continue to
remain legal tender within the boundaries of the respective national territories until the
completion of the changeover to the single currency¼. By January 1, 2002 at the latest, euro
banknotes and coins will start to circulate alongside national notes and coins.  Euro notes and
coins will have legal tender status.  In line with the increasing circulation of euro notes and
coins, national notes and coins will be withdrawn¼ [N]ational notes and coins will cease to
be legal tender at the latest 6 months after the introduction of euro notes and coins.  By that
deadline, the changeover will be complete.
44
The Madrid Presidency Conclusions laid down further markers with respect to the status and usage
of the euro during the transitional period beginning on January 1, 1999 and ending no later than January
1, 2002:
Á the ESCB will encourage the use of the euro in the foreign exchange markets, and its
operations in these markets will be effected and settled in euro;
Á the payment system’s infrastructure will need to be in place so as to ensure the smooth
functioning of an area-wide money market based on the euro;
Á national central banks can provide conversion facilities for those financial institutions which
have not been able to equip themselves with such facilities to translate amounts from euro into
national monetary units and vice-versa;
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Á new tradeable debt will be issued in euro by the participating    member states   as from January 1,
1999.  By July 1, 2002 at the latest, public debt denominated in the former national currencies
will be redeemable only in the single currency.
45
(8&RXQFLO5HJXODWLRQV
The European Council Madrid Presidency decided that the legal framework for the use of the euro
should be laid down in a regulation adopted by the EU Council.
46  A regulation is a legislative enactment
that is directly applicable in all member states of the European Union.
47  It was subsequently decided to
establish the legal framework for the use of the euro in two separate regulations, both of which were
finalized in June and July 1997.
48
The first regulation — the Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of
the euro — deals with the    replacement of references to the ECU by references to the euro, the continuity
of contracts and rounding rules.  The second regulation — the Council regulation on the introduction of
the euro — deals with the substitution of the euro for the EU national currencies participating in EMU,
the status of the euro during the proposed three-year transitional period, the discharge of obligations
during the transitional period, bond redenomination, netting arrangements during the transitional period,
the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, and other related issues.  The first regulation entered into
force in June 1997,
49 while the second regulation will be adopted immediately after the decision which
member states will participate in EMU has been taken as early as possible in 1998.
50
The main reason why the legal framework for the use of the euro was set forth in two separate
regulations arose out of the need to provide legal certainty well before the introduction of the euro.
51
Since certain provisions can only be enacted after the Council has confirmed which    member states fulfill
the necessary conditions   for the adoption of the single currency, it became necessary to draft a second
regulation addressing those legal issues where there was an urgent need for legal certainty well before the
introduction of the euro.
52  It appears that there is some uncertainty as to the application of the regulation
that will be adopted after the selection of the participating    member states in those    member states that do
not   initially participate in EMU,
53 and it may be that this possibility also argued for the adoption of a
regulation that would clearly be directly applicable in all    member states   of the EU.
(XURDVWKH6LQJOH&XUUHQF\
In accordance with the Madrid Presidency Conclusions, the Council regulation on the introduction
of the euro is expressly based on the immediate introduction from January 1, 1999 onwards of the euro as
the single currency of the participating    member states and the substitution of the euro in place of the  
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participating national currencies.
54  This approach rejects a dual currency    regime   whereby the euro and
national currencies exist side by side for a transitional period after 1999.
55
In this regard the regulation draws a careful distinction between a currency and a legal tender: the
euro will be the currency of the participating    member   states while banknotes denominated in the old
national currencies will remain legal tender until after the end of the transitional period.
56
Thus, it is provided that as from January 1, 1999 the currency of the participating    member states
shall be the euro; the currency unit shall be one euro; one   euro shall be divided into one hundred cents;
and the euro shall be substituted for the currency of each participating    member state at the irrevocably
fixed conversion rate   adopted for each such currency by the Council pursuant to the Treaty.
57
During the transitional period beginning on January 1, 1999 and ending on December 31, 2001 the
euro shall also be divided into the national currency units (i.e., the units of the currencies of participating 
member states as those units are   defined immediately prior to EMU) according to the irrevocably fixed
conversion rates.
58  Thus, during the transitional period the national currency units will be defined as sub-
divisions of the euro, thereby establishing a legal equivalence between the euro unit and the national
currency units.
59  The euro unit and the national currency units are therefore units of the same currency.
60
During the 3-year transitional period the national currency units will simply be denominations or
expressions of the euro.
61
At a date yet to be decided the European Central Bank and the central banks of the participating 
member states shall put banknotes denominated in euro into   circulation, which banknotes shall be the
only banknotes which have the status of legal tender in all the participating    member states.
62  Banknotes
denominated in a   national currency unit shall remain legal tender within their territorial limits until six
months after the end of the transitional period at the latest, but this period may be shortened by national
law.
63  Subject to the provisions of the regulation, the monetary law of the participating    member states
will continue to apply during the transitional   period.
64
Thus the euro will be the single currency of the participating    member states   as and from January 1,
1999.  As is stated by the European Council and the EMI, in January 1999 the national currencies and the
euro will become different expressions of what is economically the same currency.
65  Thus, “the
changeover will necessarily be characterized by a temporary co-existence in each participating country of
two monetary units.”
66  There will be a legally enforceable equivalence between the euro unit and the
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national monetary unit whereby each monetary debt denominated in a national unit is assigned a fixed
and unchangeable countervalue in terms of the European monetary unit at the official conversion rate and
vice-versa.
67  The legally enforceable equivalence between the euro and the national tenders will be
facilitated by the establishment of conversion facilities that will translate amounts from euro into national
monetary units and vice-versa by financial institutions or, for those financial institutions unable to equip
themselves with such facilities, by the national central banks, as part of the ESCB.
68
,VVXDQFHRI(XURV
The important role to be played by the new European Central Bank also   establishes the status of the
euro as the single currency of the participating member states. The Maastricht Treaty confers upon the
ECB what many would regard as one of the hallmark monetary functions of a sovereign    state: the ECB
will have the   exclusive right to authorize the issue of banknotes within the participating    member   states.
69
The Treaty further provides that both the ECB and the national central banks may issue    such banknotes 
and that the banknotes issued by the ECB and the national   central banks shall be the only such notes to
have the status of legal tender within the Community.
70
5RXQGLQJ
The EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro lays down
rules with respect to rounding.
71  Under the regulation conversion rates between the euro and the
participating national currencies are to be adopted with six significant figures (i.e., a rate which has six
figures counted from the left and starting by the first non-zero figure).
72  Monetary amounts to be
converted from one national currency unit into another national currency unit must first be converted into
a monetary amount expressed in the euro unit, which amount may be rounded to not less than three
decimals and must then be converted into the other national currency unit.
73  Monetary amounts to be
paid or accounted for when a rounding takes place after a conversion into the euro unit shall be rounded
up or down to the nearest cent.
74  Monetary amounts to be paid or accounted for which are converted into
a national currency unit shall be rounded up or down to the nearest sub-unit or in the absence of a sub-
unit to the nearest unit, or according to national law or practice to a multiple or fraction of the sub-unit or
unit of the national currency unit.
75  If the application of the conversion rate gives a result which is
exactly half-way, the sum shall be rounded up.
76
1R&RPSXOVLRQ1R3URKLELWLRQ
Significantly, the European System of Central Banks will carry out its monetary policy operations
in the euro unit.
77  With respect to banks in the private sector it has been decided that    private economic
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agents should be neither compelled   nor prohibited from using the euro unit as a means of payment during
the 3-year transitional    period.
78  This “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle is fleshed out   in the EU
Council regulation on the introduction of the euro.  It is provided that, subject to anything which parties
may have agreed, acts to be performed under legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in a
national currency unit shall be performed in that national currency unit and acts to be performed under
legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in the euro unit shall be performed in the euro
unit.
79  It is further provided that, notwithstanding this provision, any amount denominated either in the
euro unit or in the national currency unit of a given participating    member state and payable within that 
member state by crediting an   account of the creditor can be paid by the debtor either in the euro unit or in
that national currency unit, and the amount paid shall be credited to the account of the creditor in the
denomination of his account, with any conversion being effected at the irrevocably fixed conversion
rates.
80
Thus, an obligation denominated in a national currency of a given participating    member state can be
discharged in the euro unit   where the amount due is payable within that    member state by credit transfer to
the   creditor’s account.  An obligation denominated in euro can also be discharged in the national currency
unit of a given participating    member state where the amount due   is payable within that    member state by
credit transfer to the creditor’s account. The   preamble to the EU Council regulation indicates that these
provisions are designed to ensure that credit transfer payments inside a participating    member state can be  
made either in the euro unit or the respective national currency unit, and that these provisions should also
apply to those cross-border payments which are denominated in the euro unit or the national currency unit
of the account of the creditor.
81
It is important to understand that the provision permitting payments to be made either in the euro
unit or the national currency unit of a given participating member state is intended to operate as a
derogation from the general rule that acts to be performed under legal instruments stipulating the use of a
particular national currency unit or the euro unit shall be performed in the stipulated unit.
82 In particular,
the regulation envisages the limited application of this provision to cross-border payments denominated in
the euro unit or the national currency unit of that member state where the creditor’s account is located.
83
For example, if Counterparty A in New York has an obligation to pay Counterparty B an amount of FFr.
5 million, and that amount is to be paid by crediting Counterparty B’s FFr. account with its bank in Paris,
Counterparty A would be entitled to discharge its obligation by instructing its bank to make the payment
in the euro unit rather than in the French franc unit to Counterparty B’s bank.  On the other hand, if the
amount is to be paid by crediting Counterparty B’s FFr. account in London, Brussels, Frankfurt or
Luxembourg, Counterparty A would not, under the EU Council regulation, be entitled to pay the amount
in the euro unit.
84
It will of course be necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of payment systems to facilitate the
crediting of accounts in the euro unit.
85  From January 1, 1999 the ESCB will support the smooth
functioning of a euro area-wide money market based on the single European currency and will offer a
real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system (TARGET) of which the interlinking system will
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operate from the start in the euro unit; the national RTGS systems will also be capable of operating in the
euro unit from the starting date of EMU.
86
The preamble to the EU Council regulation states that financial intermediaries are not obliged to
make available payment facilities or products denominated in any particular unit of the euro.
87  I n
practice, however, financial institutions can be expected to establish conversion facilities for their
customers to translate amounts from the euro unit to the national currency unit and vice-versa or to look
to their national central banks for the provision of such conversion facilities.
88  The preamble to the EU
Council regulation suggests that financial intermediaries might coordinate the introduction of payment
facilities denominated in the euro unit which rely on a common technical infrastructure during the
transitional period.
89
In summary, the euro unit may be used in credit transfers before the introduction of euro banknotes
and coins and will therefore start to be used in scriptural (i.e., book-entry) non-cash form from January 1,
1999.
90  The significance of this development for the changeover to the single currency is highlighted in
the European Commission’s May 1995 Green Paper on the Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of
the Single Currency, where it is noted that “the outstanding amount of sight deposits with banks
represents a much larger quantity of money” than “the notes and coins issued by the monetary
authorities”, and that “[w]hile notes and coins are easily used between individuals as a means of payment,
the growing automation of the various types of banking transactions¼ and of payments¼ has prompted
banks to introduce increasingly sophisticated computerized processing and payment systems.”
91  I t is
therefore expected that the wholesale financial markets will largely change over to the euro unit at an
early stage during the transitional period.
92
(XURDQG)RUHLJQ([FKDQJH0DUNHWV
The euro will be the single currency of the participating    member states on the   international capital
and foreign exchange markets as from January 1, 1999.  It has been suggested that by permitting parties
to discharge payments either in the euro unit or the national currency unit, forward foreign exchange
trading between the national legal tenders during the transitional period that arises out of speculation that
EMU may fall apart has been rendered commercially pointless.
93  This is because a contract for the
purchase of the Deutsche mark legal tender on a forward basis at a different rate from its irrevocably
fixed euro conversion rate could be legally discharged in the euro unit at its fixed Deutsche mark
conversion rate if, at the time of delivery, the market valued the Deutsche mark more highly than its
official euro conversion rate.
94
The EMI has emphasized the importance of the emergence of the euro as the single currency of the
participating    member states on the foreign exchange markets   on January 1, 1999:
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It is worth underlining the fundamental change in nature which will take place at the start of
Stage Three in the areas of money and foreign exchange rates for the participating Member
States.  Their bilateral exchange rates will no longer exist and will be replaced by irrevocably
fixed conversion rates; their national currencies will cease to be foreign currencies in terms of
one another.  In economic terms, there will remain only one currency which can be expressed
in different ways: either in terms of the European monetary unit or in terms of any of the
national monetary units¼.  The national central banks involved in the foreign exchange
market will accordingly change their market practice and quote third countries’ currencies
against the European currency only.
95
Thus, the preamble to the EU Council regulation notes that there will be no exchange rate risk either
between the euro unit and the national currency units or between the national currency units during the
transitional period, and that legislative provisions should be interpreted accordingly.
96  Financial
institutions will not therefore be required to recognize exchange rate risk for capital adequacy purposes.
97
%RQG5HGHQRPLQDWLRQ
Another feature of the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro that is designed to
encourage an increased usage of the euro unit during the transitional period is that the regulation permits
each participating member state to take measures which may be necessary in order to redenominate in the
euro unit outstanding debt issued by that member state’s general government that is denominated in its
national currency unit and issued under its own law.
98  Thus, the German government may redenominate
its    DM–denominated sovereign debt governed by German law (i.e., German bunds).  “Redenominate”
shall mean changing the unit in which the amount of outstanding debt is stated from a national currency
unit to the euro unit, but which does not have through the act of redenomination the effect of altering any
other term of the debt, this being a matter subject to relevant national law.
99
Thus redenomination is defined narrowly as involving no more than a change in the stated amount
of the debt from the relevant national currency unit to the euro unit.  Upon such a change in the stated
amount of the debt the resultant number may, when paid or accounted for, be rounded to the nearest euro
cent,
100 in accordance with the EU Council regulations’ rounding rules.
101
If a    member state has taken such a measure to redenominate its outstanding   debt, other issuers of
bonds and other forms of securitized debt negotiable in the capital markets and issuers of money market
instruments may redenominate in the euro unit debt denominated in that    member state’s national currency
unit unless   redenomination is expressly excluded by the terms of the contract.
102  Thus, issuers will be
able to redenominate outstanding debt if the debt is denominated in a national currency unit of a    member
state which has redenominated part or all of its   outstanding general government debt.
103  It is intended
that private issuers should be able to redenominate such debt irrespective of the law which governs the
issue, and the preamble to the regulation states that the provisions on redenomination should be such that
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they can also be applied in the jurisdictions of third countries.
104  Thus it is intended that a U.S. corporate
issuer of bonds originally denominated in Deutsche marks that are governed by New York law should be
able to redenominate its DM bonds into the euro unit as soon as the German government has
redenominated any part of its general government debt.
It is important to emphasize that the act of redenomination does not have the effect of altering any
other term of the debt, this being a matter subject to relevant national law.
105  Thus, as stated in the
preamble to the regulation, the provisions on redenomination do not address the introduction of additional
measures to amend the terms of outstanding debt to alter, among other things, the nominal amount of
outstanding debt, these being matters subject to relevant national law.
106  It is therefore intended that a
U.S. issuer of DM bonds governed by New York law would not be able to redenominate into the euro unit
by rounding to the nearest euro unless permitted under the terms of its issue or any applicable provisions
of New York law because such a redenomination would involve an alteration in the nominal amount of
the debt.
107
&RQYHUVLRQRI2UJDQL]HG([FKDQJHVLQWR(XUR
Finally, the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro permits participating    member
states to take measures to enable securities and commodities   exchanges, clearance and settlement systems
and payment systems to change the unit of account of their operating procedures from a national currency
unit to the euro unit.
108
'&RQWLQXLW\RI&RQWUDFWV
The status of contracts denominated in the EU national currencies after the introduction of the
single currency is addressed in the EU Council regulations.
6WDWXVRI(85HJXODWLRQV2XWVLGHWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
While the two regulations will, when adopted, only be directly applicable within the European
Union, the preamble to one of the regulations notes that “the recognition of the monetary law of a    state is
a universally accepted principle” and   that “the explicit confirmation of the principle of continuity should
lead to the recognition of continuity of contracts and other legal instruments in the jurisdictions of third
countries”.
109  As discussed in greater depth below, the State theory of money whereby the law of the 
state that issues a particular currency will determine how, in   the case of a currency alteration, sums
expressed in the former currency are to be converted into the existing one is widely accepted under U.S.
law.
110  Applying this theory to EMU, American courts will primarily look to the EU Council regulations
to determine how obligations governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions and denominated in currencies
affected by EMU are to be discharged in the aftermath of EMU.
  3HUIRUPDQFHRI2EOLJDWLRQV'XULQJWKH7UDQVLWLRQDO3HULRG  
In addition to defining the monetary law provisions of the    member states   which have adopted the
euro,
111 the regulation on the introduction of the euro also addresses the status of legal instruments during
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the 3-year transitional period and thereafter.
112 “Legal instruments” are defined to include contracts,
payment instruments other than banknotes and coins, and other instruments with legal effect, and the term
“contract” is meant to include all types of contracts, irrespective of the way in which they are
concluded.
113
Where reference is made to a national currency unit in a legal instrument this reference shall, during
the transitional period, be as valid as if reference were made to the euro unit according to the conversion
rates.
114  Thus, an obligation expressed in Deutsche marks will be valid notwithstanding the fact that the
Deutsche mark has been substituted by the euro and survives during the transitional period as a mere
expression or denomination of the euro.
It is further provided that the substitution of the euro for the currency of each participating    member
state shall not in itself have the effect of altering the   denomination of legal instruments in existence on the
date of substitution.
115  Thus, an obligation denominated in Deutsche marks will continue to be
denominated in Deutsche marks during the transitional period, notwithstanding the substitution of the
Deutsche mark by the euro. This provision might also be interpreted as generally preventing the
redenomination of legal instruments into third country currencies such as the U.S. dollar pursuant to
contractual provisions permitting such redenomination in certain circumstances.
116
The regulation provides that, subject to anything which parties may have agreed, acts to be
performed under legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in a national currency unit shall
be performed in that national currency unit and acts to be performed under legal instruments stipulating
the use of or denominated in the euro unit shall be performed in the euro unit.
117  Notwithstanding this
provision, any amount denominated either in the euro unit or in the national currency unit of a given
participating    member state and payable within that    member   state by crediting an account of the creditor
can be paid by the debtor either in the euro unit or in that national currency unit, and the amount paid
shall be credited to the account of the creditor in the denomination of his account, with any conversion
being effected at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.
118
3HUIRUPDQFHRI2EOLJDWLRQV$IWHUWKH7UDQVLWLRQDO3HULRG
The regulation provides that where in legal instruments existing at the end of the transitional period
reference is made to the national currency units, these references shall be read as references to the euro
unit according to the respective conversion rates.
119  Thus, all obligations will be performed in the euro
unit after the introduction of euro tender at the end of the proposed three-year transitional period (i.e., at
the end of 2001).
3ULQFLSOHRI&RQWLQXLW\RI&RQWUDFWV
The regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro contains additional
provisions regarding the continuity of contracts.  The regulation provides that the introduction of the euro
                                                
112Draft Council Regulation on the introduction of the euro, VXSUD note    48, arts. 5-8, 14.  
113,G art. 1, preamble (7).
1146HHLG art. 6(2).
115,G art. 7.
1166HHLQIUD pp. 138-39.
117,G art. 8(1)-(2).
118,G art. 8(3), discussed VXSUD pp.    18-20.  
119,G art. 14.xxxvii
shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing
performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such
an instrument, subject to anything which parties may have agreed.
120  As indicated in the preamble, this
provision reflects the “generally accepted principle of law that the continuity of contracts and other legal
instruments is not affected by the introduction of a new currency”.
121  Thus, the doctrines of frustration
and impossibility recognized under English    or New York law could not be invoked to terminate or
otherwise avoid contractual obligations in the aftermath of EMU.
122
In addition, the preamble notes that the principle of continuity of contracts “implies, in particular,
that in the case of fixed interest rate instruments the introduction of the euro does not alter the nominal
interest rate payable by the debtor.”
123  This will ensure the continuity of long-term fixed rate coupons
negotiated on the basis of the prevailing interest rate climate linked to a particular national currency.
124
The continuity of floating interest rate obligations can also be reasonably expected under the continuity
principle, with floating rate price sources for the euro replacing existing EU national currency interest rate
sources that may disappear after EMU.
125  The provision that the introduction of the euro will not give a
party the unilateral right to alter or terminate a legal instrument would also appear to be designed to
prevent the invocation of contractual terms such as those contained in force majeure or similar clauses as
a means of terminating or modifying contractual obligations after EMU.
126
)UHHGRPRI&RQWUDFW
The continuity principle “is subject to anything which parties may have agreed”, reflecting the
regulation’s insistence that “the principle of freedom of contract has to be respected.”
127  The preamble
makes it clear that the continuity principle cannot be overcome by general language that might be
interpreted as excusing performance or as giving a party    the right to terminate a contract.  Rather   the
agreement of the parties to override the principle of continuity must specifically relate to the eventuality
of EMU because “the principle of continuity should be compatible with anything which parties might
have agreed with reference to the introduction of the euro” (emphasis added).
128
1HWWLQJ
One final issue relating to the implications of EMU for private contracts is that the regulation on the
introduction of the euro provides that national legal provisions of participating    member states which
permit or impose netting, set-off or   techniques with similar effects shall apply to monetary obligations,
irrespective of their currency denomination, if that denomination is in the euro unit or in a national
currency unit, with any conversion being effected at the conversion rates.
129
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127Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro, preamble (7),
art. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 162/1).
128,G preamble (7).
129Draft Council Regulation on the introduction of the euro, VXSUD note    48, art. 8(6).  xxxviii
In view of the participation of some but not all EU    member states in EMU the   European Council
has adopted a resolution establishing the framework for a new exchange rate arrangement between the
euro and the national currencies not participating in EMU.
130  Under this resolution the existing European
Monetary System will be replaced by a new exchange rate mechanism (commonly referred to as ERM II)
that will be established when EMU begins on January 1, 1999.
131  ERM II will link currencies of    member
states outside the euro area to the euro which will   be the center of the new mechanism.
132  Participation in
ERM II will be voluntary.
133
Under the new exchange-rate mechanism a central rate against the euro will be defined for each
currency participating in the mechanism, and as with the bilateral central rates of currencies participating
in the existing ERM there will be a relatively wide standard fluctuation band of plus or minus 15%
around the central rates.
134  As in the existing ERM it will be possible to negotiate narrower fluctuation
bands than the standard one.
135  Central bank intervention at the margins of the fluctuation band will in
principle be automatic and unlimited, but the ECB and the central banks of other participants in the ERM
could suspend intervention if this were to conflict with their primary objective of maintaining price
stability.
136  Again, similar to the existing ERM, coordinated intra-marginal intervention will be possible
in ERM II.
137  A very short-term financing facility to support the fluctuation bands will be available, and
this facility will be determined broadly on the basis of the comparable facility used in the existing
ERM.
138
The main contrast between ERM II and the existing ERM is that the fluctuation bands which the
participating central banks are required to defend will be constructed around the euro rather than a series
of bilateral exchange rates.  Nonetheless, it will be possible for    member states participating in ERM II to  
establish, on a bilateral basis, fluctuation bands between their currencies and intervention arrangements
aimed at limiting excessive bilateral exchange rate oscillations.
139
Finally, it should be noted that ERM II is viewed by the European Commission as a purely
transitional arrangement ahead of the participation of all EU    member states in EMU.
140
)$GPLVVLRQRI$GGLWLRQDO0HPEHU6WDWHVWR(08  
The Maastricht Treaty lays down detailed procedures for the admission of non-participating EU 
member states to the euro area after the launch of the single   currency.
141  At least once every two years, or
at the request of a non-participating member state, the European Commission and the European Central
                                                
130Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of an exchange-rate mechanism in the third stage of economic and
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137,G § 2.2.
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1396HH European Monetary Institute, VXSUD note    36, at 25.  
1406HH Reinforced Convergence Procedures and a New Exchange Rate Mechanism in Stage Three of EMU: Communication from the
Commission to the Council, COM(96)498 final 1-2.
141EC TREATY, art. 109k(2).xxxix
Bank shall report   to the Council on the progress made in the fulfillment by the non-participating    member
states of their obligations regarding the achievement of EMU.
142
Again,   following a consultative process, the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of
State or of Government, shall decide on the basis of the economic convergence criteria which non-
participating    member states fulfill the necessary   conditions for the adoption of the single currency.
143
After the commencement of EMU the interests of the non-participating    member states will be
represented in the European Central Bank through a third   decision-making body of the ECB to be known
as the General Council whose membership will comprise the President and the Vice-President of the ECB
and the governors of all the national central banks, including the central banks of countries initially
outside the euro area.
144  The primary functions of the General Council relate to the preparations by non-
participating    member states to participate in EMU.
145  In   addition, the General Council will contribute to
certain advisory functions of the ECB, and must be informed of the decisions of the ECB’s Governing
Council.
146
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This study analyzes the implications of EMU for the continuity of financial contracts governed by
New York law and the laws of other U.S. jurisdictions.  The first issue to be considered is the conflicts of
law question of how to determine the governing law of the contract.  State courts will follow the conflicts
of law rules established by the forum    state, while U.S.    federal courts exercising their diversity   jurisdiction
over cases involving questions of    state law will apply the choice of law   rules of the forum    state in which
they sit to determine which body of substantive law   will govern a contractual agreement.
1
$9DOLGLW\RI&KRLFHRI/DZ&ODXVHV
In most sophisticated international financial transactions the parties select the law that is to govern
their rights and obligations.  When New York law is selected as the governing law, the parties’ choice of
law will be enforced by the New York courts.  Under Section  5-1401 of the New York General
Obligations Law the parties to any contract entered into after 1984 involving an amount of $250,000 or
more may agree that the law of New York State shall govern their rights and duties whether or not such
contract bears a reasonable relation to New York State.
2  Thus, the choice of New York law as the
governing law in any large financial transaction must be respected regardless of whether the substance of
the transaction or the parties involved in the transaction have any connections with New York.
3  This rule
is consistent with the deference that the New York courts generally accord to contractual choice of law
clauses.
4  Indeed, all American courts    (state and federal)   will in general enforce contractual choice of law
clauses.
5
There is, however, one important exception to the general enforceability of contractual choice of
law clauses.  If application of the law of the chosen    state would   be contrary to a fundamental policy of a 
state which has a materially greater interest   than the chosen    state in the determination of the particular
issue, and which would   be the    state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the   parties, then the law chosen by the parties will not be applied.
6  While the EU    member states have a
materially greater interest than U.S. jurisdictions in the   determination of disputes arising out of EMU,
7 the
application of the laws of a U.S. jurisdiction to such a case would not be contrary to the fundamental
policy of any EU    member states because the continuity of legal obligations governed by U.S. laws will   be
fully assured in accordance with the provisions of the EU Council regulations.
8  In addition, it would
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Euro 14-16 (June 2, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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appear that this exception to the general enforceability of choice of law clauses may no longer be
applicable to clauses specifying New York law as the governing law, in view of the passage of Section 5-
1401 of the New York General Obligations Law.
9  In light of this, contractual provisions designating the
laws of New York or other U.S. jurisdictions as the governing law of a contract can be expected to be
enforced in transactions affected by EMU.
Another exception to the general rule that choice of law clauses will in general be enforced by New
York and American courts is that a choice of law clause stipulating a foreign law as the governing law
will not prevail where such choice of law represents an affront to public policy in the forum    state.
10  A
clause selecting the   laws of an EU jurisdiction as the governing law would    not conflict with the public  
policy of a U.S. jurisdiction because    under U.S. law the continuity of    all contractual   obligations    will be
fully assured after EMU in accordance with the provisions of the   EU Council    regulations, regardless of
what law governs the contract.
11
%*RYHUQLQJ/DZLQ$EVHQFHRI&KRLFHRI/DZ  
In those contracts where there is no choice of law clause the analysis becomes more complicated.
The current approaches taken by the New York courts hold that the law of the jurisdiction having the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties will be applied,
12 and/or that the facts or
contacts which obtain significance in defining    state interests are those which relate to the purpose of the  
particular law in conflict.
13  These approaches, known variously as the “significant contacts” and
“governmental interest” theories, have attracted widespread support from American courts in modern
times.
14  Applying these tests under New York law courts have given consideration to the following
factors:
·  the policy considerations or purpose behind the law sought to be applied;
15
·  the place of the making of the contract, while not decisive, is “nevertheless to be given heavy
weight in determining which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute”;
16
·  the location of the negotiations preceding the formation of the contract in question;
17
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·  the place where the contract is to be performed or where the payment is to be made;
18
·  the domicile, business location and, if applicable,    state of incorporation   of the parties;
19
·  the location of the subject matter (i.e., the assets or securities) which form the basis of the
litigation;
20
·  the language in which the contract was written;
21 and
·  in the case of proceedings before the New York courts, New York’s policy interest in  ensuring
the application of New York law so that New York can maintain its position as an international
financial capital.
22
It has been suggested that “New York law generally gives controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issue in the litigation.”
23  In the absence of a choice of law provision in
a contract, this test points to the application of the laws of the relevant EU    member state whose currency
forms   the basis of a monetary obligation that may be litigated in the aftermath of EMU.  EU    member
states would have a greater interest than the State of New York in the   application of their laws to disputes
concerning the legal implications of the substitution of their currencies by a single European currency.
By analogy, American courts have indicated that the U.S. has an overriding interest in the
application of its monetary laws to debt obligations denominated in the U.S. dollar.  ,Q&RPSDxtDGH
,QYHUVLRQHVY,QGXVWULDO0RUWJDJH%DQNRI)LQODQG
24 the New York Court of Appeals considered the
decision to take the U.S. dollar off the gold standard in 1933, which was accompanied by a Congressional
resolution abrogating “gold clauses” in private contracts which called for the repayment of debts in “gold
coin of the United States” as opposed to paper dollars.  The Congressional resolution permitted debts to
be discharged, dollar for dollar, in legal tender coin or currency, rather than in the gold value of the dollar.
It was held that Congressional regulation of “the kind and amount of the currency wherewith the
obligation may be discharged” implicated “a matter of public policy in this jurisdiction.”
25  The court
cited with approval the decision of a Dutch court to respect the U.S. Congressional resolution, holding
that gold dollar bonds were not payable in the gold value of the bonds by virtue of the resolution.
26  The
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26,G.xliii
implication here is that the New York courts would similarly recognize the monetary laws of the
Netherlands as implicating Dutch public policy in a case involving a monetary obligation denominated in
the Dutch currency.
In addition, New York courts have applied New York law as the governing law of the contract in
several cases because the U.S. dollar was selected as the currency of repayment, thereby evincing the
“trust” which the parties had placed “in [New York’s] policies.”
27  In one case the New York Court of
Appeals applied English law because, among other things, the agreement spoke “in terms of English
currency in providing for payments”.
28  In :HOOV)DUJR$VLD/WGY&LWLEDQN, N.A.,
29  the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York law applied to a dispute regarding a eurodollar
deposit in a Philippine branch of a U.S. bank headquartered in New York.  It was held that New York law
should apply because “the transactions were denominated in United States dollars” and “Eurodollar
transactions denominated in U.S. dollars customarily are cleared in New York.”
30
These cases, in conjunction with the strong policy considerations supporting the application of the
laws of an EU jurisdiction to the resolution of legal issues arising in the aftermath of EMU, suggest that
New York and other American courts would apply the laws of the relevant EU jurisdiction to resolve such
issues in the absence of a specific choice of law provision in the relevant contractual documents.
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The question of what is money is central to the legal analysis of EMU under New York law and the
laws of other American jurisdictions.  Because the common law inherited from England has been adopted
as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of the Union (with the exception of Louisiana, where the
civil law prevails in civil matters),
1 this study will explore in detail the concept of money that has been
articulated by the American courts.  At common law American state courts (including the New York state
courts) are generally required to follow the precedents established by courts of equal or higher rank, while
decisions rendered by courts in other states and decisions of federal courts in cases involving questions of
state law have persuasive authority.
2
The question of what is money might be regarded as a mixed question of state and federal law. It
triggers questions of contract interpretation under    state law   insofar as parties seek to understand the
meaning of an obligation expressed in currencies like the Deutsche mark after EMU.  Federal courts,
acting on the basis of their jurisdiction over questions of    federal law, have applied    state law to the  
interpretation of contracts because “[t]he control of all types of contracts has been primarily a state
function since the States came into being”,
3 and “it is to state rather than federal law that private parties
are likely to refer when formulating the terms of a contractual [agreement].”
4
However, the    federal courts have also held that “it is clear that federal law will control contracts
between private parties if there is sufficient federal interest.”
5  The question of what constitutes foreign
money implicates questions of federal law insofar as the Federal government is vested with exclusive
authority under the U.S. Constitution to conduct foreign relations with foreign nations.
6 The introduction
of the single European currency is a foreign affairs matter insofar as it implicates the monetary
sovereignty of the    European Union over the currencies of EU member   states.
7 This sovereignty extends to
the use of EU currencies in transactions governed by the laws of American jurisdictions.
8  In7H[DV
,QGXVWULHV,QFY5DGFOLII0DWHULDOV,QF
9 the Supreme Court stated that “federal courts are free to
develop [federal] common law .... in such narrow areas as those concerned with ... our relations with
foreign nations”.  In such cases the “international nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for
state law to control.”
10
In%DQFR1DFLRQDOGH&XEDY6DEEDWLQR
11 the U.S. Supreme Court, in concluding that the scope of
the act of state doctrine must be determined according to    federal rather than    state law, felt “constrained to
make it clear that an issue   concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the
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Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”  Thus, under the act of state doctrine
contractual obligations whose situs are located in a foreign country are subject to the acts of a foreign
sovereign government.
12  By    analogy, the question of how the introduction of a new currency by a foreign
country   will affect contractual obligations denominated in the old currency and governed by the laws of
U.S. jurisdictions implicates the relationship of the United States with that foreign country and should
therefore be treated exclusively as a question of    federal law.  
The application of    federal common law in this area would also be consistent   with “[t]he desirability
of a uniform rule” throughout the United States.
13  Thus, it has been suggested that questions concerning
foreign currency matters might be more properly treated as matters of    federal common law,
14 with the
result that the decisions   of the    federal courts, and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, are of paramount  
importance.
15  Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court held during the late 19th century that the question of
whether bonds payable in currency of the United States were payable in gold coin or paper dollars
implicated a question of    federal rather than    state   law because of the Federal government’s constitutional
authority to establish the currency of the United States.
16
The question of what is money clearly has    federal law aspects, and the   decisions of the    federal
courts -- particularly the Supreme Court -- are precedents   which    state courts are obliged to follow.  In
addition, insofar as the question of what   is money raises a question of    federal common law,    federal
common law pre-empts   conflicting    state law, including    state legislation.
17  The Supreme Court has held,  
however, that in the absence of any conflict between    state and federal law, the    federal   courts will refrain
from the creation of a special    federal rule.
18  This study will   therefore examine both    federal and state law.
Insofar as matters of contract law fall   within the competence of the    states, there is an emphasis in the
study on New York   law over and above the laws of other American    states because of the overriding  
importance of New York law for international financial transactions affected by EMU.
%6WDWH7KHRU\RI0RQH\
Assuming that the law of a U.S. jurisdiction such as New York law has been selected by the parties
as the governing law of the contract, the next question which must be considered is whether    it is
recognized under U.S. and New York law    that the   question of what a currency consists of is exclusively
defined by the laws of the    state   issuing such currency.  According to this legal theory of money,
sometimes referred to as the State theory of money (so named after the work of G.F. Knapp),
19 the
essential attribute of money is that it is “a creature of the law” and “is regulated by the State”.
20  F.A.
Mann explains this theory as follows in7KH/HJDO$VSHFWRI0RQH\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As each State exercises these sovereign powers over its own currency, and as there is no State
which would legislate with reference to another country’s currency, it must be the law of the
currency (lex monetae) which determines whether a thing is money and what nominal value is
attributed to it.  What 10,000 French francs consist of is exclusively defined by French law;
there is no other law in the world which would explain the meaning of that denomination and
which would lay down whether and for what nominal amount certain chattels are French legal
tender.  We therefore arrive at the rule that the law of the currency determines which things
are legal tender of the currency referred to, to what extent they are legal tender, and how, in
case of a currency alteration, sums expressed in the former currency are to be converted into
the existing one.
21
According to the State theory of money, the units of account referred to in a monetary obligation are
defined by the recurrent link adopted by the    state issuing the   currency.
22  The concept of a “recurrent
link”, first developed by Knapp,
23 holds that a linking is always effected between an old currency and a
new currency by the rate of conversion which the    state establishes for the payment of debts denominated
with   reference to the old standard.
24  This recurrent link must be universally applied irrespective of
whether the contract is governed by the law of the country concerned.  
25
Mann points out that the State theory of money is applicable to a monetary system which authorizes
an international organization to issue money because the sovereign powers exercised by the supranational
entity stem from a treaty between states granting the necessary power and authority.
26
Applied to EMU, the State theory of money would require American courts to hold that all
monetary obligations denominated in existing EU currencies be discharged in the new euro currency at
the conversion rates between the national currencies participating in EMU and the euro, as established by
the Council of the European Union pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty.  For example, the new currency —
the euro — will, under French law, be the sole currency circulating in France, and monetary obligations
created before the substitution of the French franc by the euro will therefore be capable of being
discharged in the new currency at the specified conversion rates provided for in accordance with French
law (which of course includes the Maastricht Treaty and other legally applicable measures adopted
pursuant to the Treaty).
The implications of changes in a monetary system for legal obligations have been considered by
American courts in a significant number of cases since American Independence.  These cases involve
changes to both the domestic and foreign monetary systems.  This study will consider the historic
precedents in chronological order.  Overall, the precedents establish that there is widespread support for
the State theory of money under U.S.    law.  
The State theory of money also has underpinnings in the U.S. Constitution and finds legislative
expression in the definition of money in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that has been incorporated
into the laws of all 50    states of   the United States.  The U.S. Constitution and the UCC definition of
money will be closely analyzed following the exposition of the relevant case law.
27
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$VVLJQDWVDQGWKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQ
In 1790, during the French Revolution, the French Constituent Assembly issued paper notes not
backed by specie called assignats that were made legal tender for the payment of debts.6HDULJKWY
&DOEUDLWK
￿￿concerned an action between two U.S. citizens on a bill of exchange drawn in 1792 and
payable in Paris for 150,000 livres tournois.  The question was whether the contract called for payment in
gold and silver coins up to the stated amount of livres tournois, or whether payment could be made in the
depreciated paper assignats which passed as lawful money in France at the time of payment.  A two judge
circuit court took divergent positions on this point, with one judge appearing to reject the application of
French law on the ground that the contract involved American citizens and the other judge moving closer
to the State theory of money by holding that if the parties intended to refer to “the current money of
France” then “the tender in assignats was lawfully made.”
29  It appears that the parties may have
expressly intended that payment be made in specie because “livres tournois” was the medium identified,
even though assignats had been made legal tender two years previously.
30  Overall the case is of historic
interest but of limited precedential value in view of its lack of reasoned analysis.
86*UHHQEDFNVDQGWKH$PHULFDQ&LYLO:DU
The State theory of money has found favor with the U.S. Supreme Court on a number of occasions
in American monetary history.  The first important example of this arose out of the American Civil War.
Because of the urgent need to raise capital to fight the war against the insurgent Southern forces,
Congress authorized the issuance of paper money not backed by specie as legal tender.
31  Unsurprisingly,
this paper money was considered to have a lower commercial value than regular U.S. currency, and when
debtors sought to discharge their debts using these “greenbacks” instead of U.S. gold dollars, creditors
sued, challenging Congress’ right under the Constitution to issue the greenbacks.
In its 1870 decision, /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
32 the Supreme Court held that Congress’ issuance of
greenbacks was valid under its constitutional power “to coin Money”, and that contracts to pay money
could be satisfied using the paper currency.
It was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time
when the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal intrinsic value in the
market¼.  [T]he obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall
recognize as money when the payment is to be made .... Every contract for the payment of
money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the
currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed
with reference to that power.
33
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the constitutional power of Congress to make
particular notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts is “a power confessedly possessed by every
independent sovereignty other than the United States” and that the constitutional power to coin money
and regulate its value “was intended to confer upon Congress that general power over the [U.S.] currency
which has always been an acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our
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own”.
34  Thus, the Court acknowledged that a contract for the payment of foreign money is likewise
subject to the constitutional power of the applicable foreign government over its currency.
In-XLOOLDUGY*UHHQPDQ
￿￿another case arising out of the issuance of paper greenbacks during the
Civil War, the Supreme Court held as follows:
A contract to pay a certain sum in money, without any stipulation as to the kind of money in
which it shall be paid, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum in any currency which
is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made.
The Court was “irresistibly compelled” to this conclusion based on “the power to make the notes of
the government a legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to
sovereignty in other civilized nations”.
36  In particular, the Court stated that “Congress has the power to
issue the obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress upon them such qualities as
currency for the ... payment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign governments.”
37  The Court
stated that this power “was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and
America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution of the United States.”
38  The Court
noted that “[t]he governments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the
distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing
paper money and of stamping coin.”
39  The Court also cited with approval an English case which
“distinctly recognized” this power by granting an injunction to the Emperor of Austria, as King of
Hungary, against the issue in England, without his license, of notes purporting to be public money of
Hungary.  
40
The decision of the Supreme Court    in-XLOOLDUGdemonstrates the Court’s acceptance that it lies
within the sovereign powers of foreign nations to establish their currency and to stipulate what form of
currency is acceptable for the payment of debts.  It follows that U.S. courts will apply legislation enacted
by a foreign power that provides for the alteration of  its currency and the satisfaction of debts in its new
currency.
Finally, in:RRGUXIIY0LVVLVVLSSL
￿￿it was held that bonds issued in 1871 when gold and silver
coins and U.S. paper notes were in circulation that did not specify the particular kind of money in which
payments be made constituted an “obligation . . . to pay what the law recognized as money when the
payment was to be made.”  The Supreme Court held that “[t]he bonds were, therefore, legally solvable in
the money of the United States, whatever its description, and not in any particular kind of that money”
(i.e., gold coin).
42
F.A. Mann has correctly cited the /HJDO7HQGHUCases in support of  the State theory of money and
as demonstrating that the State theory is the necessary consequence of the sovereign power or monopoly
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over currency invariably established by modern constitutional law.
43 It has also been pointed out that
while claims of “inherent sovereign powers” have on occasion been greeted with hostility by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the tradition of fiat money reflected in the Legal Tender Cases has outlasted the gold
standard and remains as valid today as it was in the late 19th century.
44  Thus the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
were relied upon by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of the U.S. abandonment of the gold standard
during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
45  The /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV have continued to be relied upon by
American courts to this day in cases upholding the validity of paper dollar notes issued through the
Federal Reserve System and not redeemable in specie.
46
&RQIHGHUDWH'ROODUVDQGWKH$PHULFDQ&LYLO:DU
An interesting refinement of the State theory of money can be found in the cases decided by the
Supreme Court regarding the continuity of contracts following the collapse of the Confederate currency
after the American Civil War.  During the Civil War, the residents of the insurgent    states entered into
contracts with reference   to the Confederate dollar as the standard of value.  The value of the Confederate
dollar in terms of its purchasing power fluctuated against the U.S. dollar throughout the Civil War, before
completely collapsing after the defeat of the Confederate forces.  The Confederate dollar notes were
stated to be payable only “after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the
United States of America.”
47
In 7KRULQJWRQY6PLWK
￿￿decided after the War, the Supreme Court held that contracts made among
residents of the Confederate    states with reference to the   Confederate currency were enforceable, and that
the value of obligations created by such contracts was to be determined by the value of Confederate notes
in lawful money of the United States.  The Court held that although the Confederate notes were in
themselves nullities because payment was contingent on a successful revolution, the notes “were used as
money in nearly all the business transactions of many millions of people” and “must be regarded,
therefore, as a currency, imposed on the community by irresistible force.”
49  The Court took the position
that the inhabitants of the insurgent    states “must be regarded as under the authority of the   insurgent
belligerent power actually established as the government of the country, and contracts made with them
must be interpreted and enforced with reference to the condition of things created by the acts of the
governing power.”
50  Thus the Court treated the Confederate dollar as a de facto foreign currency.
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The question of how contractual obligations denominated in Confederate dollars were to be valued
in U.S. dollars was somewhat more complex, particularly in the case of long-term obligations.
Traditionally, U.S. courts awarded damages with respect to a breach of a foreign currency contract in U.S.
dollars based on the exchange rate prevailing between the foreign currency and the U.S. dollar at the date
of breach.
51  Thus in 3ODQWHUV¶ %DQN Y 8QLRQ %DQN
52 the Supreme Court held that where a bank
wrongfully failed to pay a depositor an amount in Confederate dollars deposited with the bank, the
depositor was entitled to recover U.S. dollars equal to the value of the Confederate dollars at the date of
demand rather than the earlier date of deposit.  The Court insisted that “the risk of depreciation” in the
value of the Confederate dollar “necessarily” lay with the depositor.
53
Pushed to its logical conclusions, this rule would require that obligations maturing after the collapse
of the Confederacy would be virtually worthless because of the extreme depreciation in the value of the
Confederate dollar that preceded the defeat of the Confederate forces.  Consistent with the State theory of
money, obligations denominated in Confederate dollars could be discharged in U.S. dollars at the rate of
exchange prevailing between the worthless Confederate dollar and the U.S. dollar at the time of the defeat
of the Confederacy and the re-introduction of the U.S. dollar as the currency of the vanquished
Confederate states.  This, of course,   would have caused considerable hardship for creditors.  In order to
avoid such hardship the Supreme Court held in a long line of cases that Confederate creditors could
recover an amount of U.S. dollars equal to the value of the Confederate dollar at the time and place of the
contract rather than the time of maturity.
54
In  (IILQJHU Y .HQQH\
￿￿ the Supreme Court considered the question from the perspective of a
Confederate dollar-denominated bond issued in March 1863 and payable in March 1865.  At the date of
the bond’s issue the purchasing power of the Confederate dollar was approximately one-third less than
that of the U.S. dollar, whereas at the date of the bond’s maturity, when the Confederacy was in the throes
of dissolution, the Confederate dollar was not worth more than one-twentieth of the U.S. dollar, and
shortly thereafter the Confederate currency lost all appreciable value.
56  The Supreme Court stated that
“[w]here a contract is payable in a specified currency, the rule is [] clear that such currency is demandable
and receivable at the maturity of the contract, whatever change in its value by increase or depreciation
may have taken place in the mean time.”
57  However, the Supreme Court held that this rule did not apply
to the Confederate dollar because the Confederate notes were not recognized as lawful currency under
U.S. law, but rather were “the promises of an insurgent and revolutionary organization.”
58  Because the
Confederate dollars were not recognized as lawful currency, the Court held that the bondholder could
recover the “exchangeable value of  Confederate notes, in which the bond was payable, estimated at the
time and place of its execution in lawful money of the United States.”
59  Any other rule “would be
inconsistent with justice in determining the value of contracts thus payable, where they matured near the
close or after the overthrow of the Confederacy.”
60
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Professor Nussbaum, formerly of Columbia University, has cited the Confederate dollar cases to
support the thesis that media of exchange not recognized by a    state as money can acquire monetary status
because of their widespread use by   a particular community rather than because of their recognition under
the laws of the issuing    state.
61  F.A. Mann has pointed out that Nussbaum’s reliance on the   Confederate
dollar cases to support this proposition is misplaced because the monetary character of the Confederate
currency was explained by the Supreme Court in 7KRULQJWRQ on the ground that the Confederacy
succeeded in establishing itself as the de facto government of the Confederate    states.
62
Nussbaum and other commentators have pointed out that the conversion of   Confederate dollar debts
into U.S. dollars at the time of contracting effectively amounted to a judicial revaluation of such debts.
63
It appears that such revaluation was permitted by the Supreme Court because of the complete collapse of
a currency issued by an illegal government not recognized by the United States.
It almost goes without saying that the collapse of the Confederate dollar is   clearly distinguishable
from the introduction of the single European currency. The introduction of the euro involves a highly
organized plan by the    European Union for   an orderly transition to a new monetary regime.
64 While    the
Confederate dollar was   issued by a revolutionary government not recognized by the United States,    the
euro   will be issued by the European Central Bank on behalf of some of the United States’ closest
international allies.     Indeed the official position of the United States with   respect to    EMU is that the U.S.
regards EMU as “the latest step in the process of   European integration” and “has long supported the
broad objectives of European integration.”  
65
&RQYHUVLRQRIWKH3XHUWR5LFDQ3HVRLQWRWKH86'ROODUDQG(VWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH3KLOLSSLQH
3HVR)ROORZLQJWKH6SDQLVK$PHULFDQ:DU
The State theory of money was re-confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases arising out of the
absorption of the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico as a U.S. possession and the U.S. annexation of the
Philippine islands after the Spanish-American War of 1898.
66  At the outbreak of the 1898 War, the
Puerto Rican gold peso was worth 40% less than the U.S. gold dollar.  Following the War and cession of
Puerto Rico, Congress passed a law for the conversion of the Puerto Rican peso into the U.S. dollar at the
fixed exchange rate of one Puerto Rican peso for U.S.$0.60.
67  The legislation provided for a three-month
period between the passage of the legislation and the date Puerto Rican coins ceased to be used as legal
tender; it also provided that “all debts owing on the date when this act shall take effect shall be payable in
the coins of Puerto Rico now in circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the rate of exchange
above named.”
68
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In Succession of6HUUDOHVY(VEUL
￿￿a contract made in 1894 called for payment to be made “in
money that is in circulation or is accepted in the province, at the rate of one hundred centavos of the
money in circulation for each peso”.  The Supreme Court held that “a centavo” is equivalent to one
hundredth of a Puerto Rican peso, not one hundredth of a U.S. dollar, and applied the conversion rate laid
down in the Congressional legislation.
70  In arriving at this conclusion the Court held that “[t]he
withdrawal of the coins of Puerto Rico in circulation at the time of the passage of the act of Congress, and
provided for therein, did not take legal effect, so far as concerned debts then existing, except upon the
condition that those debts might be solved in the coins of the United States, at the rate of exchange stated
in the act.”
71  The Court stated that “[t]his did not impair or change the obligation of any contract, and
was but an exercise of power to fix the value of the coins which were to be withdrawn, and to state the
rate of exchange at which existing debts might be paid in American money and as there was no contract
to pay at any other rate, the act was valid and applied to this case.”
72
6XFFHVVLRQRI6HUUDOHVis important insofar as the Supreme Court held that the legislation introduced
by Congress fixing the exchange rate at which the Puerto Rican peso was substituted for the U.S. dollar
after the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico, and providing for the payment of debts denominated in the
Puerto Rican peso at the fixed exchange rate, derived its validity from Congress’ constitutional authority
to establish and regulate the monetary system.  It must follow,DIRUWLRULthat U.S. courts will accept that
a foreign country’s legislation specifying the rate of exchange at which a foreign currency is to be
substituted for a new currency and providing for the discharge of debts in the old currency at such
exchange rate is similarly derived from that country’s inherent sovereign powers with respect to the
issuance and regulation of its currency.
In another Puerto Rican case the Supreme Court confirmed that where the character of money
changes between the time the parties enter into a contract and the time fixed for performance under the
contract, payments may be made in the money as so changed at the time of performance.  Thus in&LW\RI
6DQ-XDQY6W-RKQ¶V*DV&R
73a case involving a Puerto Rican contract which called for payment in
U.S. currency, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the contract “required the payment to be
made in foreign current money circulating in the island [of Puerto Rico] at the time the contract was
made, instead of money of that character circulating at the time the payments were to be made.  The
general rule, under both the common and the civil law, is that in the absence of a stipulation to the
contrary, the character of money which is current at the time fixed for performance of a contract is the
medium in which payments may be made” (emphasis added).
Following the Spanish-American War the United States also annexed the Spanish colony of the
Philippines.  Congress passed legislation establishing the gold peso as the new unit of value of the local
administration of the Philippines and providing for the coinage of a silver peso and various silver coins
and further providing for the recognition of U.S. gold coins as legal tender in the Philippines at the rate of
one dollar for two pesos.
74
In /LQJ6X)DQY8QLWHG6WDWHV
75the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a local Philippine
regulation prohibiting the exportation of Philippine silver coins from the islands, holding that the
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regulation was derived from powers conferred on the Philippine administration by the U.S. Congress.  In
reaching this conclusion the Court noted that the power of Congress to coin money “is a prerogative of
sovereignty.”
76  The Court held that there is attached to the ownership of Philippine silver coins affected
by the regulation
those limitations which public policy may require by reason of their quality as a legal tender
and as a medium of exchange.  These limitations are due to the fact that public law gives to
such coinage a value which does not attach as a mere consequence of intrinsic value.  Their
quality as a legal tender is an attribute of law aside from their bullion value.  They bear,
therefore, the impress of sovereign power which fixes value and authorizes their use in
exchange.
77
The Supreme Court decision in/LQJ6X)DQrecognizes that all money is a creature of law and is
therefore subject to legal regulation by the sovereign power that authorizes the issuance of such money.
Thus, F.A. Mann relies on Ling Su Fan as evidence of the support for the State theory of money under
U.S. law.
78  This case has also been relied upon in modern cases involving foreign exchange regulations
as establishing that a foreign country’s “[c]ontrol of the national currency and of foreign exchange is a
necessary attribute of sovereignty”
79 or “an essential governmental function.”
80
5XVVLDQ5XEOHVDQGWKH%ROVKHYLN5HYROXWLRQ
In cases resulting from the collapse of the Russian ruble after the 1917 revolution the New York
courts generally displayed a willingness to apply the State theory of money.  There is, however, one
authority where a court sought to avoid the harsh consequences of applying the State theory to debts
denominated in the collapsed ruble.
At the outbreak of the First World War the Russian ruble was worth around U.S. $0.514 and was
exchangeable for gold.  During and after the War the value of the ruble declined dramatically due to the
suspension of its exchangeability for gold and the successive creation of several new paper ruble issues.
On three separate occasions between 1922 and 1924 the Soviet government discontinued all existing legal
tenders, replacing them with new ruble currencies which substituted the predecessor currencies at
established conversion rates (10,000:1 in 1922, 100:1 in 1923 and 50,000:1 in 1924).  By 1924 the Soviet
government, having placed the Russian currency on a gold basis again, succeeded in stabilizing the value
of the ruble near its old pre-War exchange rate of U.S.$0.514.  At the same time as these monetary
alterations were taking place between 1922-1924, decrees were issued by the Soviet authorities providing
that obligations expressed in the old currencies could be discharged at maturity in the new currencies at
the specified conversion rates.  The result of these currency alterations was that by 1924 one gold ruble
was equivalent to a staggering 50 billion pre-Revolution rubles.
81
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The first New York decision addressing the legal basis of a Russian ruble obligation is5HLVIHOGY
-DFREV
82 a case involving an alleged breach of a foreign exchange contract involving the exchange of
Imperial Russian rubles for U.S. dollars.  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
before the rubles could be considered money, the court “would have to take judicial notice that they were
issued under the authority of and backed by the credit of a responsible government.”
83  In view of the fact
that, with the collapse of Tsarist Russia, the Imperial rubles “were issued by a government now defunct”
and, with the rise to power of the Bolsheviks in the 1917 revolution, “the United States at present has no
relations with any government in Russia”, the court could not “take judicial notice that these notes are
backed by the credit of a responsible government, or that they even pass current anywhere as money.”
84
This case established that the test of what is currency under New York law depends on whether the
currency enjoys the full faith and credit of the government of the country that issues such currency.  This
test clearly requires the courts to look to the laws of the issuing country.  Recognition of a foreign
currency might be withheld where, as was the case with the Soviet Union, the United States does not
recognize the government of the country in question or the country is in a state of such political chaos that
is not possible to determine what its currency actually is.  Clearly such considerations are irrelevant in the
context of the highly organized plan for an orderly transition to EMU by some of the United States’
closest international allies.
85
In 3DUNHUY+RSSH
86 consideration was given to the depreciation of the Russian ruble prior to the
monetary reforms of 1922-1924.  The New York Court of Appeals confirmed the principle of the nominal
continuity of obligations — the court would award 100,000 rubles where the amount owing under the
contract was 100,000 rubles, regardless of the extent to which the purchasing power of the ruble and its
value on the foreign exchange markets may have depreciated in the interim period.
87  In a subsequent
decision clarifying this point, the court stated that “[t]he rubles in this case always remained, during the
times in question, the money of Russia, under its different forms of government” and that “the ruble did
not change its nature as money, nor was it debased in its intrinsic value.  If a country creates a new
monetary system, or by law debases its coinage by increasing the alloy, a different situation would
arise.”
88  The court did not expand further on how obligations are to be discharged in the event of the
establishment of a new monetary system and whether obligations are to be discharged in accordance with
the recurrent link between the old currency and the new currency.  Some light is shed on this point by the
court’s observations regarding the then recent monetary change in the  pound sterling as a result of the
pound going off the gold standard.
89  The court noted with apparent approval that notwithstanding the
depreciation of pound sterling following its break with the gold standard, English courts would only
award “the same number of pounds” as were stated to be due under contracts entered into prior to the
abandonment of the gold standard.
90  The decision by the U.K. to go off the gold standard in 1931 is
generally recognized as one of the more significant events in the U.K.’s monetary history this century.
91
The court’s apparent willingness to uphold the continuity of obligations in the event of such an important
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change to a country’s monetary system indicates that it would strive to do so in other situations.  Clearly
nominal continuity would not be possible where a country establishes a new monetary system, unless the
rate of exchange between the old currency and the new currency is one for one.  Thus, the only logical
approach would be to establish continuity on the basis of the recurrent link at which the new currency
substitutes the old one.  It is, however, unclear from the court’s decision whether it envisaged the
application of the recurrent linking rule where a country creates a new monetary system.
While many of  the Russian ruble cases that came before the New York courts involved obligations
governed by Russian rather than New York law, the cases do shed light on the willingness of the New
York courts to recognize the consequences of currency alterations for foreign currency obligations,
regardless of governing law.  The courts did not, however, always reach consistent conclusions in the
Russian ruble cases.
The first case to consider the implications of the Soviet monetary reforms from 1922-1924 for
obligations in the old ruble was5H)LUVW5XVVLDQ,QVXUDQFH&R
92There the New York Court of Appeals
permitted recovery on a debt on the basis of one old pre-war ruble equaling one new ruble.  The court
arrived at this conclusion on the ground that after the Soviet monetary reforms the new Soviet ruble “was
again on a gold basis” and therefore was equal in value to the old pre-War Imperial gold ruble.
93  In effect
the court treated the obligation undertaken before the First World War as calling for payment in gold
rather than rubles, and so “where token rubles were paid in satisfaction of a debt, the number would have
to be increased to the extent necessary to make the payment equivalent to one in gold.”
94  Clearly the
court did not attempt to follow the applicable provisions of Soviet law calling for the discharge of debts in
the new rubles at the specified conversion rates, which would have all but extinguished pre-War ruble
debts.  Instead the court sought to accomplish an equitable result based on the real economic value of the
old ruble at the time the debt was created.  F.A. Mann has criticized this case as proceeding on wrong
evidence.
95
)LUVWRussian was not followed in subsequent cases which declined to enforce a 1:1 conversion of
old rubles into new rubles.  These cases instead applied the recurrent link established under Soviet law.
In 7LOOPDQY5XVVR$VLDWLF%DQN
96  it was argued that an obligation created in the ruble as it existed
before the Soviet monetary reforms could be discharged in the new 1924 gold ruble on a ruble-for-ruble
basis.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the obligation was created under
Russian law and that it had not been demonstrated that “the rubles which the [debtor] agreed to pay were
the same currency that the Soviet decrees of 1922 and 1924 established as governmental currency or had
anything in common with the latter except the name.”
97  The court declined to apply First Russian,
holding that its application was confined to the particular facts of its case.
98
Again in.ORFKNRYY3HWURJUDGVNL0&%DQN
99 the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
held that old rubles deposited in a bank in Russia in 1919 “had become worthless” by 1924 and were not
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payable “in gold currency, ruble for ruble.”  Thus, the court followed the recurrent link established under
Russian law.
In  'RXJKHUW\ Y (TXLWDEOH /LIH $VVXUDQFH 6RFLHW\ RI 8QLWHG 6WDWHV
100 the New York Court of
Appeals applied Russian law to determine the status of an obligation in Russian rubles created prior to the
Bolshevik Revolution.  It was held that “the 1924 gold ruble was never considered or made to be on a
parity with the ruble of pre-existing obligations” because “with every shift in the currency there has been
an established ratio, according to which pre-existing obligations could be paid in the new currency”.
101
Thus, a strict application of the relevant provisions of Soviet law required that debts in old rubles needed
only to be discharged in the new rubles at the specified conversion rates, all but extinguishing debts in the
pre-War ruble.  In arriving at this conclusion, the court stated that “with the crises which come to all
nations at some time, debts must follow the ups and downs of the money market.”
102  The court indicated
that it was following a rule applicable not only to obligations governed by foreign law but also to any
obligation denominated in a foreign currency, regardless of the governing law:
Where an entirely new standard of value is adopted by the government, the amount to be paid
is found by giving such a sum in the new currency as shall be declared by law equal in value
to the amount due in the old currency.
103
That the court intended this rule to be applicable to all obligations affected by currency alterations,
and not just obligations governed by Russian law, is illustrated by its additional citation to the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in6XFFHVVLRQRI6HUUDOHVthe case arising out of the substitution of the Puerto
Rican peso for the U.S. dollar following the 1898 Spanish-American War.
104'RXJKHUW\may therefore be
cited for the broader proposition that an obligation denominated in a foreign currency must be discharged
in any successor currency at the conversion rate established between the old and the new currencies under
the laws of the relevant foreign jurisdiction.  F.A. Mann correctly cites'RXJKHUW\ as supporting the
proposition that under U.S. law it is the law of the currency that determines how, in case of a currency
alteration, sums expressed in a former currency are to be converted into the existing one.
105
'RXJKHUW\has been uniformly followed by the New York courts in subsequent cases involving
Russian ruble obligations affected by the Soviet monetary reforms of 1922-1924.
106  Thus, in 'RXJKHUW\
Y1DWLRQDO&LW\%DQNRI1HZ<RUN
107the New York Supreme Court, citing the first'RXJKHUW\decision,
held that imperial rubles deposited with a bank in 1917 could not be recovered because the imperial ruble
had become worthless and could not be converted at par into the Soviet ruble which was “a new and
different currency”, and the fact that the new ruble “happens to have the same name and statutory gold
content” as the old pre-War Imperial ruble was “immaterial”.
The recurrent link between the old rubles and the new rubles was again applied in 7LOOPDQ Y
1DWLRQDO &LW\ %DQN RI 1HZ<RUN
108 There the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, citing
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'RXJKHUW\held that rubles deposited with a bank in 1917 “were no equivalent for the other currencies of
the same name” because “the decrees under which the later currencies were issued made no provision for
paying the old obligations in the new currency, rouble for rouble, and [therefore] the old roubles in any
exchange for current roubles were valueless.”
109
In conclusion, the Russian ruble cases, and particularly Dougherty and its progeny, provide support
for the application of the recurrent linking rule whereby an obligation in an old currency will always be
converted into the new currency at the conversion rate established by the    state that issues such
currency.
110
&RQYHUVLRQRIWKH0DUNLQWRWKH5HLFKVPDUN  LQ:HLPDU*HUPDQ\
The collapse of the old German mark in Weimar Germany also triggered a number of lawsuits
before American courts.  After the First World War the Weimar Republic experienced such a drastic
depreciation in the value of its currency, the mark, that it was compelled to discontinue the currency in
1924, replacing the mark with the Reichsmark at a conversion rate of 1,000,000,000 marks to one
Reichsmark.  In the cases decided after the collapse of the Weimar mark the American courts reached
inconsistent conclusions.
In 0DWWHURI/HQGOH
111 a testator domiciled in the U.S. gave certain mark legacies to persons in
Germany by a will made in 1920.  The New York Court of Appeals held that to the testator’s mind “the
normal mark must at all times have been the mark as he knew it before the World War”, and that the
legatees were entitled to an amount of Reichsmarks corresponding to that amount of old marks which
they were given by the will.
112  While the decision prevented the legacies from being wiped out, it does
not sit easily with the court’s statement of principle that “[i]f at the time of a depreciated paper currency a
testator provides in his will for legacies in dollars, the legacy is payable in any money that is legal tender
at the time of his death”, regardless of whether “[t]he paper dollar may have shrunk in value or ¼ risen to
a parity with gold, or a gold standard may have been established.”
113
F.A. Mann has pointed out that although the decision in0DWWHURI/HQGOHmay perhaps be justified
on the ground that the testator must have intended to equiparate marks for Reichsmarks, the material
before the court suggested the opposite view.
114  Arthur Nussbaum suggests that the failure to recast the
mark debts into Reichsmark debts at the one trillion to one ratio was simply erroneous.
115  T h e
precedential value of this case is further limited insofar as the European monetary union entails an orderly
transition to a new single currency.  The collapse of the Weimar mark, on the other hand, arose out of a
violent economic upheaval as a result of which the pre-existing legal tender had become utterly valueless.
The next case arising out of the collapse of the Weimar German currency is +HLQHY1HZ<RUN/LIH
,QVXUDQFH&R
116There the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that certain insurance
policies payable in marks were governed by German law.
117  The court stated that the fact that the suit
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might be entertained by U.S. courts would not confer “enlarged rights ... over the German law” on policy
holders.
118  The case is interesting for the reason that the court, in applying the recurrent link between the
mark and the Reichsmark, cited an English case where it was held that an obligation to pay a certain sum
of German Reichsmarks in a mortgage deed governed by English law was an obligation to pay whatever
may be the legal tender at the time of repayment in the country where the Reichsmark circulates.
119  By
implication, an obligation in a foreign currency contract governed by New York law would also be
payable in whatever passes as the lawful currency at the time of repayment in the country of issue.
3RXQG6WHUOLQJDQGWKH%ULWLVK$EDQGRQPHQWRIWKH*ROG6WDQGDUG
Britain placed its currency on a gold standard during the early 18th century, and the pound sterling
continued to be redeemable in gold until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.  After the War
Britain returned to the gold standard, fixing the pound’s value at its pre-War gold parity in 1925.  The
pre-War parity proved unsustainable, and Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard in 1931,
leading to a sharp depreciation of the pound against the U.S. dollar.
120
In %RRWK	&RY&DQDGLDQ*RYHUQPHQW0HUFKDQW0DULQH
121the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, citing the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
122 held that a duty under a bill of lading to pay freight in
British sterling entered into prior to Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard “would be satisfied by the
payment of the agreed number of pounds, regardless of their depreciation in the currency of other
countries.”  The court arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that “[w]hen the contract was
entered into, Great Britain had not abandoned the gold standard, and the parties most probably believed
that sterling would not suffer any depreciation in the rate of exchange.”
123  Again citing the /HJDO7HQGHU
&DVHVthe court stated that “there may be a difference between the expectations of the parties and the
duties it imposes.”
124
This case recognizes that a foreign currency contract is necessarily subject to the power of a foreign
government over its currency.  Moreover, the fact that a monetary reform may have been unforeseeable at
the time the contract was entered into is irrelevant since the contract imposes a duty to pay that which is
recognized as lawful money in the country of issue at the time payment is to be made.
7KH*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQDQGWKH86'HSDUWXUHIURPWKH*ROG6WDQGDUG
D7KH*ROG&ODXVH&DVHV
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the *ROG &ODXVH &DVHV decided after the U.S.
abandoned the gold standard in response to the Great Depression in the early 1930s, re-confirmed the
State theory of money and its implications for private contracts.  The paper greenback currency not
backed by specie that was issued during the American Civil War had been phased out by the end of the
1870s, firmly placing the U.S. dollar on a gold standard that brought monetary stability to the United
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States for half a century.
125  The international monetary crisis that undermined one monetary system after
another during the inter-War years reached the United States in 1933, resulting in a severe depletion of
U.S. gold reserves and a decision by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to order the discontinuance of all
payments in gold.
126  In June 1933 the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed a Joint
Resolution providing that Federal Reserve notes constituted U.S. currency and legal tender for all debts,
public and private.
127  The establishment of paper notes issued by the Federal Reserve as legal currency in
the United States caused the U.S. dollar to depreciate, floating downwards until January 1934 when
President Roosevelt fixed the gold weight of the dollar at 59.06% of its former gold parity.
128  While the
dollar’s value was again linked to gold, the paper notes issued by the Federal Reserve could no longer be
redeemed in gold.
129  The issuance of paper currency as legal tender marked the end of the gold
standard.
130
As the U.S. went off the gold standard, Congress abolished the “gold clauses” that were widely
used in the financial markets which called for the repayment of debts in “gold coin of the United States”
or an amount of U.S. dollars measured thereby.
131  Because so many private financial obligations
routinely contained a gold clause, Congress felt that the existence of such clauses obstructed its ability to
regulate the value of the dollar and maintain the equal power of the dollar with dollar obligations in the
financial markets, leading to the danger of a dual monetary system comprising gold dollar obligations and
non-gold dollars.
132
In the*ROG&ODXVH&DVHV
￿￿￿the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to abolish gold
clauses in private contracts.  The Court held that the gold clauses “were not contracts for payment in gold
coin as a commodity, or in bullion, but were contracts for the payment of money.”
134  Relying on the
/HJDO 7HQGHU &DVHV, the Court reiterated that “Congress may make Treasury notes legal tender in
payment of debts previously contracted.”
135  Quoting the /HJDO 7HQGHU &DVHV the Court stated that
“contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful
authority of the government”, and “no obligation of a contract ‘can extend to the defeat’ of that
authority.”
136  To that extent contracts suffer from “a congenital infirmity.”
137  The Court repeated that the
power over the currency is vested in Congress under the Constitution, and emphasized that Congress’
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authority over the currency “is derived from the aggregate of the powers granted to Congress” which are
“appropriate to achieve the great objects for which the government was framed - a national government,
with sovereign powers.”
138
In short, the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV re-confirmed that the power to establish a monetary system is an
inherent attribute of a sovereign    state, and that every private   contract for the payment of money is
necessarily subject to that sovereign power.  The *ROG&ODXVHV&DVHV continue to be relied upon in
modern cases upholding the constitutional authority of Congress over the currency, including its power to
authorize the issue of paper dollar notes by the Federal Reserve.
139  It has been emphasized that the power
of Congress “to say what should be the medium of exchange, or money” is not derived from the
provisions of the U.S. Constitution, but rather is an “inherent right” that is possessed by the United States
“by virtue of its own sovereignty, even if it had not been mentioned in the organic law.”
140  Thus, “every
person who enters into a contract is, in law, conclusively deemed to hold in contemplation the power of
the Congress to alter and change the nature and so-called value of the medium of exchange or money of
the nation.”
141  It is a logical corollary of this that every contract denominated in a foreign currency is also
necessarily subject to the sovereign power of a foreign    state over its currency.  Thus, in one case  
upholding Congress’ authority to alter the weight and fineness of the gold dollar, attention was drawn to
“the numerous instances in history, from early times to the present, of such revaluation by practically
every country in the world.”
142
This power of a sovereign over its currency extends    to the use of the   sovereign’s currency by non-
nationals outside the sovereign’s jurisdiction in contracts governed by the laws of third countries.  This
point is well demonstrated by a New York case decided in the aftermath of the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV.
In &RPSDxtDGH,QYHUVLRQHV,QWHUQDFLRQDOHVY,QGXVWULDO0RUWJDJH%DQNRI)LQODQG
143 a Finnish
corporation issued bonds to a Colombian corporation denominated “in gold coin of the United States of
America of the standard of law of the weight and fineness as it existed” at the time of issuance.  New
York law was the governing law of the contract.
144  The New York Court of Appeals held that the
Congressional prohibition on the use of gold clauses in private contracts applied to foreign debtors as well
as U.S. citizens since “to enforce gold clauses in foreign dollar bonds and not in domestic bonds would, in
effect, be the equivalent of maintaining, in some degree at least, a dual monetary system.”
145  The court
declined to enforce the gold clause, stating that in view of the important public policy of the United States
implicated by the Congressional abolition of the gold clauses (i.e., “to establish a uniform currency, and
parity between different kinds of currency, and to make that currency, dollar for dollar, legal tender for
the payment of debts”), it was “immaterial whether the obligations of these bonds would otherwise be
governed by some foreign law.”
146
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Significantly, the court pointed out that “decisions in foreign jurisdictions have likewise affirmed
the joint resolution as a defense in actions” brought to enforce gold dollar obligations based on gold
clauses, and the court cited to court decisions in the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Germany and
England refusing to enforce gold dollar obligations based on the U.S. Congress’ prohibition of the gold
clause.
147  The court highlighted in particular a decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal at the Hague in
$PVWHUGDP 6WRFN ([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ Y %DWDDIVFKH 3HWUROHXP 0DDWVFKDSSLM
148 where the U.S.
Congressional resolution was held to be a defense to an attempt to collect in Holland the gold value of
U.S. dollar bonds issued by a Dutch corporation to Dutch bondholders.
149
Thus the Congressional resolution was applied notwithstanding the fact that the Netherlands
appeared to have sufficient contacts for Dutch law to be the governing law of the contract.
150  The clear
implication here is that the New York courts would similarly recognize and enforce the laws of foreign
countries regulating private contractual relationships pursuant to the exercise of the sovereign power of a
foreign country to establish and regulate its own monetary system.  Such laws enacted by foreign
jurisdictions would be enforced by the New York courts regardless of whether the contracts in question
are governed by New York law and regardless of whether they involve U.S. contracting parties.
U.S. courts also accept that the constitutional power of a sovereign over its currency extends not
only to the regulation of monetary obligations denominated in that sovereign’s currency in accordance
with the recurrent link, but also to the regulation of private contractual obligations that are inextricably
linked to such monetary obligations denominated in the sovereign’s currency.  This point can be
demonstrated by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in *XDUDQW\7UXVW&RY+HQZRRG.
151  There an
aggregate principal amount of $100 million forty-year bonds denominated in U.S. gold dollars were
issued in 1912.  The bonds contained a multiple currency provision permitting the bondholders to elect to
be paid in any one of four alternative foreign currencies (Pound sterling, Dutch guilders, German marks
or French francs) in lieu of U.S. dollars at the exchange rate between each of those currencies and the
dollar at the time of the issue of the bonds.
152  Following the depreciation of the U.S. dollar after the break
with the gold standard, bondholders asserted their option to be paid in Dutch guilders at this fixed
exchange rate, resulting in a payment in guilders with a foreign exchange value in dollars greater than the
face amount of the bonds.  The Supreme Court held that the multi-currency payment option fell afoul of
the Congressional resolution proscribing gold clauses because
the admitted purpose of the multiple currency provision supplementing the gold clause was
the same as the gold clause itself, that is, to afford creditors of United States debtors on
domestic money obligations contractual protection against possible depreciation of United
States money.  It was a plan . . . specifically designed to require debtors to pay 1912 gold
dollars or fixed amounts in foreign currencies which were the exact equivalents of gold
dollars in 1912.
153
Thus the Supreme Court held that “these promises [to pay] in alternative currencies were not
separate and independent contracts or obligations, but were parts of one and the same monetary obligation
of the debtor”, an obligation that was denominated in U.S. dollars.
154  Concluding that the bonds were
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“dischargeable in the same United States legal tender which other creditors in this country must accept”,
the Court reiterated that “contracts between private parties . . . [are] created subject not only to the
exercise by Congress of its constitutional power to coin money, . . . but also to the full authority of the
Congress in relation to the currency.”
155
This case is important because it establishes that ancillary obligations that are inextricably linked to
monetary obligations denominated in a particular currency are subject to the power of a sovereign
government over its currency.  Thus, interest rate obligations linked to a particular currency are subject to
regulation by the government of the country that issues the underlying currency.  This is because interest
rates are inextricably linked to monetary obligations.
156  As stated by the Supreme Court in +HQZRRG
157
“interest is not paid on commodities but on monetary obligations.”  The intimate relationship between
interest rates and money is amply demonstrated by the fact that on the foreign exchange markets the
differential between the spot and forward exchange rates for any two currencies will be largely dictated
by the different interest rates obtainable with respect to an investment in each currency.
158
In %HWKOHKHP&RY=XULFK,QVXUDQFH&R
159 the Supreme Court took the logic of its +HQZRRG
decision one step further, holding that the Congressional resolution proscribing gold clauses also applied
to the same bonds with a multiple currency option held by foreign corporations, some of whom had
purchased the bonds in transactions subject to the laws of foreign countries.  The court below had held
that the Congressional resolution was not applicable to such bonds, relying on a decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which applied the law of the place of performance of the contract
(in this case non-American law) to the question of whether payment under such bonds would be
inconsistent with the resolution.
160  Because the Congressional resolution was not known to the law of the
place of performance, the court had concluded that it would have been an invasion of the prerogative of
other countries to apply the Congressional resolution.
161  The Supreme Court overturned this decision,
rejecting the argument that the Congressional resolution was inapplicable to bonds not subject to the laws
of the United States.
162  The Supreme Court held that the multiple currency provisions in the bonds could
not be enforced by U.S. courts “irrespective of their place of making.”
163  The Supreme Court held that in
the absence of any international treaty between the United States and another country which provided
otherwise, the Congressional resolution would be applied because “it is enough that [the] bonds are
obligations payable in the money of the United States.”
164  The Supreme Court was unwilling to enforce
gold clauses in contracts governed by foreign laws not just because it would be contrary to the public
policy of the United States to do so, but simply because the contract involved “obligations payable in the
money of the United States.”
165   As pointed out in a subsequent New York case, the Supreme Court in
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%HWKOHKHP “held that the obligation was subject to the will of Congress since it was a duty to pay in
American money.”
166  Thus, the Supreme Court held that the monetary sovereignty of the United States
over its currency extends to the regulation of monetary obligations contained in private contracts
governed by the laws of foreign countries.  This sovereignty extends to ancillary obligations that are
inextricably linked to such monetary obligations.  By analogy, the Court can also be reasonably expected
to recognize the same exercise of sovereignty by foreign countries over monetary obligations
denominated in the currencies of such foreign countries that are governed by the laws of American
jurisdictions.
E,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH*ROG&ODXVH&DVHV
In the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV the U.S. courts asserted a broader sovereignty on the part of the United
States over the U.S. dollar than has been recognized pursuant to the State theory of money by many
foreign jurisdictions.  In +HOOHUPDQY&,5
167 it was noted that the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV “further extended
the power of Congress with respect to the currency.”
168  Mann suggests that the application of the law of
the currency is confined to the determination of the character (LH, the definition) of foreign money, and
that the effect of a currency change on the quantum of an obligation, including whether and under what
circumstances redress against the effects of a currency change may be obtained, are questions of contract
law to be determined in accordance with the governing law of the contract.
169  Thus, Mann argues that
although the abrogation of a gold clause is a measure of monetary policy, the question of whether a gold
clause is invalidated by legislation is purely a matter of contract law to be determined in accordance with
the governing law of the contract rather than the law of the currency.
170  Both Mann and Nussbaum point
out that it is the prevailing tendency in most foreign countries to submit the question of the effect of the
abrogation of gold clauses to the governing law of the contract.
171  Nonetheless, it appears that some
foreign courts applied U.S. law as the law of the currency when enforcing the Congressional abrogation
of the gold clause in the context of U.S. dollar contracts governed by foreign law.
172
This issue goes to the question of how to distinguish between the law of the currency and the
governing law of the contract.  According to the recurrent link, all monetary obligations denominated in
the old currency must be discharged in the new currency at the conversion rate established by the law of
the currency.
173  Thus, private contracts are necessarily subject to the application of the recurrent link
established under the law of the currency.  It is in this sense that the Supreme Court held in the /HJDO
7HQGHU&DVHV
174 that every contract for the payment of money is necessarily subject to the power of the
government over the currency.
175  Legislation enacted by the    state issuing the currency (e.g., German law
in the case of the   Deutsche mark) that provides for the continuity of all obligations in accordance with the
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recurrent link forms part of the law of the currency and is applicable regardless of the governing law of
the contract (e.g., New York law).  Thus, the EU Council regulations providing for the continuity of all
monetary obligations after EMU, including interest rate obligations, should be recognized by U.S. courts
pursuant to the exercise of the    monetary sovereignty of the European Union over the currencies   of EU
member states.
It appears that U.S. courts have defined the State theory of money even more expansively than this,
permitting a country to exercise its monetary sovereignty so as to require not only the discharge of all
monetary obligations in accordance with the recurrent link but also to alter or abrogate contractual rights
in the aftermath of a currency change.  Thus, in the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV the Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals were willing to countenance the application of U.S. law as the law of the currency
to invalidate gold clauses in contracts governed by foreign laws.
176
F*ROG&ODXVH&DVHVDQG(08
The expansive interpretation of the State theory of money enunciated in the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV is
relevant to the question of the application of certain provisions in the EU Council regulation relating to
the performance of obligations during the proposed 3-year transitional period and the redenomination of
outstanding bonds in transactions governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
With respect to the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle, the general rule laid down by the EU
Council regulation is that during the transitional period, prior to the introduction of euro banknotes, acts
to be performed under legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in a national currency unit
shall be performed in that national currency unit, while acts to be performed under legal instruments
stipulating the use of or denominated in the euro unit shall be performed in that unit.
177  By  way of
exception to this general rule, any amount denominated either in the euro unit or in the national currency
unit of a given participating    member   state and payable within that    member state by crediting an account
of the creditor can   be paid by the debtor either in the euro unit or in that national currency unit.
178  The
amount shall be credited to the account of the creditor in the denomination of his account, with any
conversion being effected at the applicable conversion rate.
179
Under the narrow interpretation of the State theory of money it might be argued that an obligation
originally denominated in an EU national currency such as the Deutsche mark that is governed by the
laws of a U.S. jurisdiction and performable by way of credit transfer to a creditor’s account located in
Germany may not be performed by the debtor by way of a payment in the euro unit in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the EU regulation.  The performance of obligations in the euro unit during the
transitional period is not strictly necessary in order to facilitate the performance of obligations originally
denominated in the EU national currencies.  This is because such obligations may continue to be
performed in the relevant national currency units until the introduction of euro banknotes.  Therefore, the
performance of obligations in the euro unit during the transitional period is not essential to the
performance of obligations in accordance with the recurrent link.  Rather, the payment by a debtor in the
euro unit during the transitional period involves an alteration of the unit in which the obligation is
performable that is not necessitated by the introduction of the single currency.  This is so even though the
amount must be credited to the account of the creditor in the denomination of his account at the
applicable conversion rate.
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Moreover, the use of the euro unit in credit transfers does not affect the character or definition of
the euro as the single currency.  This is because bank money held on deposit at a financial institution is
not money but rather represents indebtedness owed by a financial institution to a depositor for the amount
deposited.
180  Thus, a funds transfer does not involve a transfer of money but rather entails a process
whereby a creditor’s bank becomes indebted to the creditor for the amount by which the indebtedness of
the debtor’s bank to the debtor is debited or reduced.
181  On Mann’s view, it might be argued that because
the provisions of the EU Council regulation permitting credit transfers to be made in the euro unit do not
affect the character or definition of the euro as a currency, these provisions do not form part of the law of
the currency but rather relate to the law governing the performance of the contract.  On this argument, the
“no compulsion, no prohibition” provisions are inapplicable to transactions the performance of which are
governed by the laws of a U.S. jurisdiction.
It is submitted however that under the broader interpretation of the State theory of money
articulated in the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle enshrined in the EU
Council regulation is applicable to transactions governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.  Firstly, the
monetary sovereignty of the European Union with respect to the currencies of EU member states extends
to the regulation of ancillary obligations that are inextricably linked to monetary obligations denominated
in the member states’ currencies.
182  The provisions of the EU Council regulation permitting obligations
denominated in the member states’ currencies that are performable by way of credit transfer to be paid in
the euro unit involve the regulation of credit transfer obligations that are inextricably linked to underlying
monetary obligations.  Secondly, the alteration of the unit in which a debtor may perform a monetary
obligation payable by way of credit transfer involves the alteration of a contractual obligation that is
directly linked to the introduction of the euro.  While the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle is not
strictly necessary in order to facilitate the performance of obligations in accordance with the recurrent
link, it is an integral element in the changeover to the single currency.  The conversion of the large stock
of book-entry money on deposit with financial institutions into the euro unit during the transitional period
is designed to play a vital role in the evolution of the euro as the single currency of the participating
member states.
183  It is therefore submitted that the provisions of the EU regulation permitting obligations
performable by credit transfer to be paid in the euro unit in accordance with the “no compulsion, no
prohibition” principle are, under the logic of the *ROG &ODXVH &DVHV, applicable to obligations the
performance of which are governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
The expansive interpretation of the State theory of money advanced in the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV is
also relevant to the question of the application to bonds issued under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions of the
provisions of the EU Council regulation permitting the redenomination of outstanding debt.  Under the
EU Council regulation private issuers may during the transitional period redenominate in the euro unit
outstanding debt denominated in the national currency unit of a member state that has redenominated all
or part of its outstanding general government debt originally denominated in such national currency.
184
The EU Council regulation contemplates that this provision should be applicable in the jurisdictions of
third countries such as the United States.
185  On a narrow view of the State theory of money it would seem
difficult to argue that this provision is applicable to bonds issued under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
The redenomination of bonds is not necessary in order to facilitate the performance of obligations after
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the introduction of the single currency.  This is because during the transitional period it will be possible to
perform contractual obligations denominated in the existing EU national currencies in the relevant
national currency units or, if permitted under the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle, in the euro
unit by way of credit transfer.
186  Therefore, the redenomination of bonds is not necessary for the
application of the recurrent link but rather involves an alteration of the unit in which the debt is stated that
is not essential to the accomplishment of the changeover to the single currency.  On Mann’s view, bond
redenomination would therefore appear to involve a change to the terms of the contract that may only be
accomplished in accordance with the governing law of the contract (i.e., New York law in the case of a
eurobond governed by New York law).
Under the logic of the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, however, the provisions of the EU Council regulation on
bond redenomination may be regarded as permitting an alteration of contractual terms that is closely
related to the introduction of the euro.  The provisions on bond redenomination may therefore be regarded
as having been enacted pursuant to the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union over EU   national
currencies.  On this broader view of the State theory, issuers of bonds governed by New York law may
rely on the EU Council regulation to redenominate outstanding bonds denominated in EU national
currencies.
The expansive interpretation of the State theory suggested by the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV could also be
relevant to EMU if any EU member states introduce legislation   revalorizing interest rates after EMU.  It
has been suggested that member states that have experienced high interest rates in recent years might
legislate to revalorize coupons after EMU in order to alleviate any economic hardship that might be
wrought upon the holders of long-term fixed rate obligations negotiated on the basis of a high interest rate
climate.
187  While such hypothetical legislation might be primarily enacted for the protection of
consumers (i.e., mortgagors), it could have important implications for financial markets.
188  On the broad
view of the State theory of money articulated in the *ROG &ODXVH &DVHV, such legislation could be
presented as an alteration of contractual rights effected pursuant to a state’s sovereign   power over its
currency in times of monetary change, analogous to the abrogation of the gold clause after the U.S. dollar
was taken off the gold standard.
It is instructive to note that an English court adopting the narrower view of the State theory of
money declined to apply German revalorization legislation to an insurance policy denominated in German
marks and governed by English law where the German legislation sought to revalorize debts after the
collapse of the Weimar German mark at a different rate from the rate at which the new Reichsmark
substituted the old mark.
189  In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in %HWKOHKHP and the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in &RPSDxtDGH,QYHUVLRQHV, it appears that American courts have
taken a broader view of the monetary sovereignty of a country over its currency.
$XVWUR*HUPDQ$QVFKOXVV
In March 1938 Germany annexed Austria, and immediately afterwards issued a decree introducing
the German reichsmark as legal tender in Austria at the rate of one reichsmark to 1.5 Austrian schillings.
In April 1938 Germany issued a decree providing for the cessation of the legal tender status of notes
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issued by the Austrian National Bank and for the redemption of such notes in reichsmarks until the end of
1938 at the ratio of 3 schillings to 2 reichsmarks.
190
In 2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV1HZ<RUN,QFY8QLWHG6WDWHV
191 the U.S. Customs Court considered
the legal implications under U.S. customs legislation of these developments for the valuation of
merchandise exported from Austria to the U.S. after the Anschluss.  The collector was required to convert
the appraisal value for merchandise denominated in Austrian schillings into U.S. dollars, and did so by
converting the Austrian schilling amount into U.S. dollars on the basis of the 3:2 ratio between the
schilling and the reichsmark.
192 The Customs Court rejected the argument that there was no justification
under the U.S. tariff law for “the conversion of foreign currency on the basis of an exchange rate adopted
by foreign authorities”, holding that “the German decrees may be recognized under the doctrine of
comity.”
193  In reaching this conclusion the court cited to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
+LOWRQY*X\RW,
194 where the doctrine of comity was defined as “the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.”
This case recognizes that foreign legislation providing for a monetary union such as occurred
following the Austro-German Anschluss will be recognized under U.S. law.  The same conclusion was
reached in another customs case involving the exportation of merchandise after the Anschluss.
195
-DSDQHVH0LOLWDU\&XUUHQF\8VHGLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV'XULQJWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU
U.S. courts have recognized the application of the State theory of money to foreign currencies
issued by belligerent occupants in the course of an international conflict.  In $ERLWL]	&RY3ULFH,
196 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah analyzed the legal status of military pass money issued by the
Imperial Japanese government during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second
World War.  Under Japanese law the money, popularly known as “Mickey Mouse” money in the
Philippines, was issued as legal tender for the payment of all debts at par with the pre-existing Philippine
peso.
197  The court held that the Japanese war notes were a legal medium of exchange, and that “the
power of a military occupant to issue a fiat currency for use in occupied territory is fully established and
recognized by the United States, as well as in international law, and history, and practice.”
198  In reaching
this conclusion, the court outlined the expansive nature of the power of a military government in occupied
enemy territory to issue military currency.  Citing with approval the study of a respected scholar, the court
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stated that the occupant may exercise this power “in at least one of three ways”:  (1) by reorganizing the
local currency, including the creation of new types of currency or the supply of additional coverage for
the currency (i.e., additional gold reserves); (2) by using the occupant’s own currency in the occupied
region; or (3) by creating new types of money.
199  The court held that the belligerent occupant’s currency
decrees were entitled to recognition because they were in the interests of the welfare of the inhabitants
and “[g]reat inconvenience and disruption of most of the ordinary pursuits and business of society would
have followed a failure to provide some medium of exchange.”
200  The court took into account the
extensive historic evidence demonstrating the existence of an occupant’s power to issue currency,
alluding to the currency issued by the Continental Congress during the American War of Independence
for use in British territory occupied by the colonial troops before the Declaration of Independence in
1776, the war currency issued by the rebel government of the Confederate states during the American
Civil War, the occupation   currencies issued by the United States and her allies in Italy, Germany and
Austria towards the end of the Second World War, and innumerable occupation currencies issued by
foreign powers going right back to the siege of Tyre in 1122.
201
The case is also interesting insofar as it reiterates that a foreign currency owes its monetary status to
the fact that it is backed by a sovereign power.  In $ERLWL]  an American prisoner of war had borrowed the
Japanese war currency from a local bank, promising to repay in U.S. dollars at the rate of exchange of one
U.S. dollar to two units of the Philippine military pass money.
202  The court rejected an argument that the
contract was unenforceable because it involved the repayment of a loan of  “Mickey Mouse”  war money
in “good hard American dollars,” emphasizing that the war notes “were guaranteed by the Japanese
Imperial government” which stated in its proclamation that it took “full responsibility for their usage,
having the correct amount to back them up.”
203
The case also provides implicit support for the proposition that a debt denominated in an old foreign
currency may be discharged in a new currency at the rate established for the conversion of the old
currency into the new currency.  In upholding the enforceability of the war currency loan, the court relied
on a decision by the Supreme Court of the Philippines that a mortgage loan originally denominated in the
pre-invasion Philippine peso had been validly discharged during the occupation by payment of the debt at
par in the Japanese military fiat currency.
204
Again, in %DQNRIWKH3KLOLSSLQH,VODQGVY5RJHUV
205 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia recognized that one of the rights that a belligerent occupant may exercise in an occupied
country is that it “may regulate currency and may make the money it issues legal tender.”  Thus, it was
held that the Japanese military notes issued during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in the
Second World War were valid legal tender.
206
These cases provide direct support for the application of the State theory of money under U.S. law.
As explained by F.A. Mann, these cases reflect the principle that circulating media of exchange only
constitute money in law if they are created by or with the authority of the    state or such other supreme
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206,Glxix
authority as may   temporarily or de facto exercise the sovereign power of the    state.
207  In addition,   Mann
points out that $ERLWL] supports the recurrent linking rule that a sum of money expressed and payable in
the lawful currency of an occupied    state may be discharged   by the payment of so many military currency
notes as, under the belligerent occupant’s legal tender legislation, express the nominal value of the
debt.
208
&RQYHUVLRQRIWKH*HUPDQ5HLFKVPDUNLQWRWKH'HXWVFKH0DUN
U.S. courts have also had occasion to consider the legal status of obligations denominated in the
former German Reichsmark after the introduction of the Deutsche mark as the currency of the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1948.  The Allied Commanders occupying the three western zones of the Federal
Republic after the end of the Second World War issued an ordinance in 1948 converting the Reichsmark
into the Deutsche mark at the rate of one Reichsmark for one Deutsche mark and converting Reichsmark
debts generally at a rate of one Deutsche mark for ten Reichsmarks.
209  In 1949 the American authorities
in West Berlin issued a regulation providing for the conversion of all pre-occupation bank accounts
(which had been blocked since the 1948 ordinance) at a rate of 20 Reichsmarks to one Deutsche mark.
210
In (LVQHUY8QLWHG6WDWHV
211 the U.S. Court of Claims held that the task of the occupying powers
“included the power to establish a rational monetary system.”  The court stated that “[t]he currency
reform here in question was a sovereign act.”
212  Based on this, it was held that a U.S. citizen whose pre-
occupation Reichsmark bank account in Berlin had been converted into a smaller amount of Deutsche
marks by the currency reforms had no claim for recovery against the United States.
213
&KLQHVH0RQHWDU\5HIRUPV
A number of cases have come before American courts regarding the implications for private
contracts of the Chinese monetary upheavals from 1933-55 and also regarding the legal status of the
Chinese monetary system prior to these reforms.  Before 1933 the Chinese monetary system was based
around a number of regional units known as the tael (i.e., the Shanghai tael, the Chefoo tael, the Tien Tsin
tael and various other taels).
214  The tael was a currency unit defined by reference to a specified weight in
silver.  Each regional tael was the only standard of value in that region and served as the sole currency in
which all accounts were kept in the region.  The tael was not issued as a coin by a governmental
authority, but rather lumps of silver were melted down by private parties and presented to an official
appointed by the financial community for certification as to their weight and fineness in terms of taels
(e.g., as containing five taels and two-tenths, or three taels and one-seventh or whatever the case might
be).
The U.S. courts recognized the monetary status of these silver coins, and in *RUGRQY0DJRQH,
215
the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York held that “[i]t is not essential to a coin that ... it
should bear the name or insignia of the sovereign” and that while the officer certifying the silver pieces
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was “not directly an appointee of the government,... it [i.e., the government] seems to acquiesce in his
discharging his functions.”  The court noted that once certified, the silver pieces “circulate as the only
money of account” and “being of a substance intrinsically valuable” are “as readily comparable with our
standard as are the various gold and silver tokens of other countries.”
216  This case involves an interesting
application of the State theory of money insofar as it holds that a medium of exchange can be legal
currency where it is issued by private parties and circulates with the acquiescence of the government of
the country of circulation.
In 1933 the Chinese government decided to establish a centralized monetary system.  The
government called in the regional taels and issued the silver dollar, a new currency whose value was also
tied to the price of silver.  In 1935 the Chinese Kuomintang Government issued a new paper currency not
backed by silver, prohibiting the use of silver dollars or bullion for currency purposes and providing for
the discharge of all contractual obligations expressed in terms of silver by the payment of paper notes in
the nominal amount due (i.e., a 1:1 conversion).  After the Second World War, the Government of the
Republic of China introduced a new paper currency based upon the Gold Yuan which replaced the then
heavily depreciated paper currency at the rate of 3 million dollars to 1 Gold Yuan.  The Gold Yuan, in
turn, rapidly depreciated, and after the Communists came to power two new currencies were introduced,
successively replacing the pre-existing currency at conversion rates of 100,000:1 and 10,000:1,
respectively, leaving the old currencies completely worthless.
217  In a majority of the cases that came
before American courts following the collapse of the Chinese currency the State theory of money was
applied.  In one case, however, a contrary decision appears to have been reached.
.UHQRYY:HVW&RDVW/LIH,QVXUDQFH&R
218 concerned an insurance policy whose benefits were
payable in silver dollars “of the present weight and fineness” in 1933.  The Supreme Court of Washington
held that the policy did not call “for the payment of benefits in . . . silver dollars or their present
equivalent in value”, but rather called “for the payment of premiums in the medium of exchange current
at the time of each payment.”
219  The court stated that while the beneficiary would be harmed by the
enforcement of the policy “as an ordinary insurance contract payable in the currency circulating legally at
the time of payment”, this is “a type of loss which falls alike on all who deal in any given currency, and
the risk of such loss is one normally incident to any transaction which involves a monetary
investment.”
220  Thus, while the insurance policy at issue may have been governed by Chinese law, the
principle that foreign currency obligations must be satisfied in the currency legally circulating in the
foreign country at the time of payment is applicable to all monetary transactions, regardless of governing
law.  This case supports the application of the State theory of money to foreign currency obligations.
6WHUQEHUJY:HVW&RDVW/LIH,QVXUDQFH&R
221 was another case involving an insurance policy
whose benefits were payable in a pre-1933 Shanghai silver currency “of the present weight and fineness.”
The California District Court of Appeals refused to treat the policy “as a commodity contract for silver”,
holding that the beneficiary could “recover only an amount equal to the cash surrender value of the policy
in the current Chinese currency determined as of the date of requested payment.”
222  Relying on the /HJDO
7HQGHU&DVHV and the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, the court whole-heartedly endorsed the State theory of money:
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When parties name a specified currency for the payment of an obligation, they know that such
a currency falls under the control of the government that issues it.... The pages of economic
history are filled with the annals of fallen currencies of the past and with accounts of the rise
and demise of media of exchange.  Inherent in the idea of money itself lies the power of the
sovereign to change its value....  Thus the courts have held that acceptance of a particular
monetary symbol for the discharge of the debt constitutes an implied acceptance of the issuing
government’s control of the value of that symbol; the contract itself contains a ‘congenital
infirmity’ equated to that control.
223
The court rejected as irrelevant an argument based on California law being the applicable law as the
place of performance, stating that the place of performance “cannot change the selected monetary media
of payment.”
224  This case represents a comprehensive endorsement of the State theory of money as
applied to foreign currency obligations.
225
Finally,  -XGDK Y 'HODZDUH 7UXVW &R
226 concerned preferred stock calling for the payment of
dividends and the redemption price in a pre-1933 Shanghai local currency unit or, in the event that such
currency unit ceased to be used or was substituted by another unit, in silver of the successor currency unit
in an amount equal to the then current price of silver per currency unit.  While the Supreme Court of
Delaware accepted that the 1935 decree prohibited the use of silver for currency purposes, the court
remanded the case to the lower court for a determination, LQWHUDOLD, “whether the 1935 Decree is a
revenue law not usually given extraterritorial effect.”
227  Whatever the impact of the 1935 decree on the
state of the Chinese government’s revenues, it is difficult to understand why the court failed to grasp that
the decision to take the Chinese dollar off a silver standard was linked to the exercise of China’s
monetary sovereignty in the same way as the decision by the United States to take the dollar off the gold
standard during the same period.  It is submitted that the earlier cases regarding the implications of
China’s monetary reforms are to be preferred.
7KH&DQDGLDQ'ROODUDQGWKH&ROODSVHRI%UHWWRQ:RRGV
From the end of the Second World War until the early 1970s the international monetary system was
based upon a system of near fixed exchange rates revolving around the official price of gold established
for the U.S. dollar.  This system, which was set up at the Bretton Woods conference towards the end of
the War, depended for its stability on the convertibility of international dollars into gold.  With the dollar
glut in the late 1960s it became increasingly apparent that the United States would no longer be able to
redeem international dollars in gold.  The Bretton Woods system began to disintegrate, culminating in
President Nixon’s suspension of the dollar’s convertibility in August 1971 and the advent of floating
exchange rates.
228  The Canadian government responded to the    unraveling of Bretton Woods by removing  
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the fixed par value of 0.925 Canadian dollars to U.S. $1.00 in May 1970.  As a result, the Canadian dollar
appreciated against the U.S. dollar.
229
In ,77$UFWLF6HUYLFHVY8QLWHG6WDWHV
230 a U.S. government contractor entered into a 3-year fixed
price contract in 1969 with the U.S. Air Force under which it agreed to provide various services to Air
Force operations in the Arctic Circle.  Because the contractor was required under the terms of its
agreement to hire Canadian labor and to pay such labor in Canadian dollars, the upward fluctuation in the
Canadian dollar following its unpegging from the U.S. dollar necessitated the exchange of a greater
number of U.S. dollars in order to meet the contractor’s Canadian dollar obligations.  The U.S. Court of
Claims refused to allow the contractor to adjust the contract price based on a provision in the contract that
permitted an adjustment to reflect labor cost increases required and approved by the Canadian
government.
231  Citing the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV, the Court stated that “in [fixed price contract] situations
the payee party, absent a specific contract provision, assumes the risk of currency valuation changes.”
232
In addition, the court stated that “'[w]here one agrees to do, for a fixed sum, a thing possible to be
performed, [one] will not be excused ... because unforeseen difficulties are encountered.'”
233
The approach taken in this case was also adopted in a subsequent case enforcing a long-term
contract notwithstanding the incurrence of increased costs as a result of the significant appreciation of the
Swiss franc against the U.S. dollar following the collapse of Bretton Woods after the contract’s execution
in 1971.
234
([FKDQJH&RQWURO5HJXODWLRQV
That the State theory of money is accepted by the New York courts is demonstrated by several
cases upholding the application of exchange control regulations imposed by foreign governments.
In (FNY191HGHUODQVFK$PHULNDDQVFKH6WRRPYDDUW0DDWVFKDSSLM
235 the New York Supreme
Court upheld the application of German exchange control regulations imposed during the Second World
War to restrict the exchange of German reichsmarks for foreign currency to a contract payable in German
reichsmarks.  Rejecting an argument that German law was inapplicable because payment was to be made
outside Germany, the court, citing the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, stated that “in currency legislation the policy
of the sovereign governs the medium of payment, even though such payment is provided for outside the
territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign.”
236  This case recognizes that monetary obligations are subject to
the monetary sovereignty of the issuing    state, regardless of what law   governs the contract.
In  )UHQFKY %DQFR1DFLRQDOGH&XED
237 a case concerning the validity of a Cuban exchange
control regulation introduced after Fidel Castro’s accession to power in 1959 to prevent the exchange of
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Cuban pesos into foreign currency, the New York Court of Appeals, citing the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, stated
that “[a] currency regulation which alters either the value or the character of the money to be paid in
satisfaction of contracts is not a ‘confiscation’ or ‘taking’”.  Quoting F.A. Mann, the court stated that
“'[e]xpectations relating to the continuing intrinsic value of all currency or contractual terms such as the
gold clause are, like favorable business conditions and goodwill, transient circumstances, subject to
changes, and suffer from the ‘congenital infirmity’ that they may be changed by the competent
legislator.'”
238
This language has been cited and relied upon in several more recent decisions upholding various
exchange control regulations, including Mexican exchange controls introduced in response to the global
debt crisis in the early 1980s.
239
3ULQFLSOHRI0RQHWDU\1RPLQDOLVP
According to the principle of monetary nominalism a monetary obligation involves the payment of
so much money as has a nominal value equal to the amount of the debt.
240  Thus, an obligation to pay $10
is discharged if the creditor receives what at the time of performance are $10, regardless of the extent to
which the intrinsic value or the functional value of the dollar may have changed in the meantime, either
through an alteration in the metallic backing for the currency (e.g., when the dollar went off the gold
standard) or a change in the dollar’s purchasing power through inflation, depreciation or devaluation.
241
The principle of monetary nominalism is closely related to the State theory of money and the recurrent
link insofar as a change in the nature of money effected by the    state such as taking a   currency off the gold
standard or devaluing a currency on the foreign exchange markets will not result in any change in the
nominal amount of debts due under private contracts.
242
The principle of monetary nominalism is widely accepted under U.S. law.  Thus, in the /HJDO
7HQGHU&DVHV
243 the U.S. Supreme Court held that debts originally denominated in gold dollars could be
validly discharged at their nominal value in paper dollars.  Again, in (IILQJHU
244 a Confederate dollar
case, the Supreme Court stated that the normal rule is that “[w]here a contract is payable in a specified
currency, the rule is ... clear that such currency is demandable and receivable at the maturity of the
contract, whatever change in its value by increase or depreciation may have taken place in the mean
time.”  A striking application of the nominalistic principle occurred in %DWHVY8QLWHG6WDWHV.
245  There a
taxpayer was assessed for capital gains based on a nominal gain realized on the sale of securities sold in
1935 that were purchased before the depreciation of the dollar following the abandonment of the gold
standard.  It was held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that a taxable gain had been
realized because under the U.S. monetary system there could be no inequivalency of value, dollar for
dollar, between dollars of “cost money” and dollars of “selling price money”.
246  Again, in +HOOHUPDQQ9
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&,5
247 the U.S. Tax Court, relying on the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV and the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, held that a
nominal gain attributable solely to inflation is taxable income.  Applying the principle of monetary
nominalism, the court stated that “[d]ollars have constant legal value under the uniform monetary system
created by Congress.”
248  This case has been followed in subsequent tax rulings.
249
The principle of monetary nominalism has also been applied by the Supreme Court in the context of
sharp depreciations of foreign currencies.  Thus in 'HXWVFKH%DQNY+XPSKUH\
250 the Supreme Court,
citing the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV, held that a bank deposit of German marks
was and continued to be a liability in marks alone and was open to satisfaction by the
payment of that number of marks, at any time, with whatever interest might have accrued,
however much the mark might have fallen in value as compared with other things.  An
obligation in terms of the currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations and
whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes no account of it.  Obviously, in
fact a dollar or a mark may have different values at different times but to the law that
establishes it is always the same.
This case follows the principle of monetary nominalism and also recognizes that the nature of all
money, including foreign money, is derived from the law that establishes such money.
The principle of monetary nominalism articulated in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV and 'HXWVFKH%DQN
has been repeatedly applied by American courts in cases involving foreign currencies, including the
rapidly depreciating Russian, German and French currencies following the First World War,
251 the
depreciating pound sterling following Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard in 1931,
252 the
depreciating Italian currency during the Second World War,
253 and the depreciating German currency
after the Second World War.
254
The principle of monetary nominalism has also been applied in the context of the more recent
hyper-inflationary conditions experienced by many Latin-American economies.  In 7UDPRQWDQDY6$
(PSUHVDGH9LDFDR$HUHD5LR*UDQGHQVH,
255 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held  that
where a person becomes entitled to 100,000 Brazilian cruzeiros which have, as a result of hyper-inflation
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in Brazil, depreciated by more than 600 per cent, this would not “warrant a result different from that we
would reach had the value of the cruzeiro in terms of the dollar remained unchanged.”  The court
emphasized that “an unpredictable and virtually immeasurable factor would be imported into the
decisions of international conflict of laws cases if the otherwise applicable law were subject to being
displaced because of the recent history of the relative values of the currencies involved.”
256
Nominalism was again applied in the context of the appreciation of the Canadian dollar following
its unpegging from the U.S. dollar during the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system of near fixed
exchange rates.  Thus, in ,77$UFWLF6HUYLFHV,
257 where a U.S. government contractor sought to be relieved
from a fixed price contract as a result of higher costs incurred following the Canadian dollar’s
appreciation, the U.S. Court of Claims, citing the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV and 'HXWVFKH%DQN, held that in
fixed price contracts “the payee party, absent a specific contrary contract provision, assumes the risk of
currency valuation changes.”
Courts have supported the application of nominalism to foreign currencies because “when all
jurisdictions ... share that philosophy and concept, we achieve uniformity of decision from one
jurisdiction to the next and thus remove any incentive to forum shop.”
258
Nominalism as applied to foreign currencies has acquired greater significance in recent years
because of legislative reforms permitting American courts to award judgments in foreign currencies.
259
Traditionally at common law American courts could only render judgment in U.S. dollars, and damages
with respect to a breach of a foreign currency obligation that was governed by    the laws of a U.S.
jurisdiction   would be converted from the relevant foreign currency into U.S. dollars based on the
exchange rate prevailing on the date of breach of contract.
260  The result of this was that there was no
exchange rate risk with respect to the foreign currency between the date of breach and the date of
judgment or satisfaction.  An increasing number of    state legislatures, including the New York, California
and Illinois Legislatures, have   passed legislation in recent years providing for the award and payment of
judgments in foreign currencies.
261  Thus, in these jurisdictions the principle of nominalism will apply to
all foreign currency obligations through to the date of judgment or payment, as the case may be.
There is one American decision that explicitly rejects the principle of monetary nominalism.  In
$OXPLQXP&RRI$PHULFDY(VVH[*URXS,QF
262 performance of a long-term service contract was held
to have been rendered commercially impracticable where the price had been tied to a wholesale price
index that completely underestimated the impact of inflation during the 1970s.  In reaching this
conclusion the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania criticized “as reprehensible
the nominalist rule that a dollar’s a dollar no matter how small.”
263  The court condemned “[t]he injustice
of the nominalist position” as reflected in an English case, $QGHUVRQ Y (TXLWDEOH /LIH $VVXUDQFH
6RFLHW\
264 where an insurance policy benefit for 60,000 marks was rendered worthless by German
hyperinflation.
265  Citing F.A. Mann and the experience of the American Civil War, the court stated that
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when “the problem [of serious sustained inflation] has arisen, here and abroad, courts and legislatures
have repeatedly acted to relieve parties from great and unexpected losses.”
266  The court concluded that it
would reform (i.e., rewrite) the contract so as to prevent performance from being rendered commercially
impracticable as a result of the unforeseen losses flowing from the draconian pricing formula.
267
The suggestion that hyperinflation might render performance of a fixed price contract commercially
impracticable is implicitly supported by 3XEOLFNHU,QGXVWULHV,QFY8QLRQ&DUELGH&RUS
268  There is was
held that a contract to supply ethanol at a fixed price had not been rendered impracticable by the dramatic
price rise in ethanol that followed the energy crisis of the early 1970s.  The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that “the mere fact that the cost of performance has doubled does not make
performance impracticable”, and the court was “not aware of any cases where something less than a
100% cost increase has been held to make a seller’s performance ‘impracticable’”
269 The implication here
is that hyperinflationary conditions giving rise to inflation in excess of 100% might be sufficient to render
performance impracticable.
Mann suggests that the $OXPLQXP decision is a wholly isolated one and entirely out of favor.
270  The
$OXPLQXP decision does, however, enjoy some academic support insofar as certain commentators have
argued, based on decisions made by American courts during the American Civil War (including the
Confederate dollar cases
271 and certain decisions handed down prior to the Supreme Court decisions in
the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
272), that in the event of an utter collapse of money American courts might not
follow the nominalistic principle but rather adopt a revaluation device of some kind or develop other
judicial relief.
273  Nonetheless, even such commentators accept that a dramatic rise in prices would not of
itself be enough
274 and that the nominalistic concept of money should prevail except in emergency
situations arising out of a monetary collapse.
275  Moreover, American courts have not accorded relief to
aggrieved parties in a significant number of cases arising out of the collapse or rapid depreciation of
foreign currencies.
276  The $OXPLQXP decision would therefore appear to contradict the greater weight of
established authority.
The courts do, however, sometimes take fluctuations in the value of money into account in
calculating damages.
277  In other respects, it has been suggested that American courts will in general only
give consideration to the nominal value of money as laid down by legislation.
278  In conclusion, therefore,
the principle of monetary nominalism appears to be well established under U.S. law.  Nominalism is
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consistent with the State theory of money and should therefore contribute to the continuity of contracts
after EMU.
&RPLW\DQGWKH$FWRI6WDWH'RFWULQH
The State theory of money may be properly regarded as flowing from the doctrine of comity.
279
Comity has been judicially defined as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.”
280  U.S. courts will not enforce foreign laws contrary to U.S. public policy by virtue of the doctrine
of comity.
281
The State theory of money is also analogous to the act of state doctrine.  The classic statement of
the act of state doctrine is the Supreme Court’s formulation in 8QGHUKLOOY+HUQDQGH]
282 that “[e]very
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done, within its own territory.”
Thus, in the context of government expropriations, the Supreme Court has stated that “the Judicial Branch
will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.”
283
Significantly, in 6WHLQJXWY*XDUDQW\7UXVW&RRI1HZ<RUN
284 a case involving the depreciation of
the Russian ruble by the Soviet government during the 1920s, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, citing the *ROG &ODXVH &DVHV, stated that the “pursuit of a policy of avowed
monetary depreciation by a state is an act of state” and is “not subject to ... scrutiny” by American courts.
In (LVQHU,
285 it was held that the introduction of the Deutsche mark in substitution for the Reichsmark in
Germany following the end of the Second World War “was a sovereign act.”  In &DOOHMRY%DQFRPHU
6$
286 the issuance of exchange control regulations “in response to a national monetary crisis” was
recognized as an act of state because “the power to issue exchange control regulations is paradigmatically
sovereign in nature.”
287  Again, in *UDVV Y &UHGLWR 0H[LFDQR 6$
288 it was held that a “[foreign]
government’s currency control decisions plainly are beyond inquiry by this court under the act of state
doctrine.”  Similarly, the establishment of a new currency by a country is also an act of state free from
scrutiny by American courts.  This is consistent with the general recognition under international law of
the sovereignty of a    state with respect to the regulation of its own currency.
289
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Traditionally, the act of state doctrine has been regarded as resting upon   notions of international
comity,
290 but in more recent times the major underpinning of the doctrine has been viewed as the policy
of foreclosing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that
might embarrass the Executive Branch of the Federal Government in the conduct of foreign relations.
291
In essence, the doctrine operates as a super-choice-of-law rule, requiring that foreign law be applied in
certain circumstances even where the foreign law may be contrary to U.S. conceptions of public policy.
292
As a    federal rule, the act of state   doctrine supersedes conflicting    state law, including conflicting    state
legislation.
293
Under the act of state doctrine the sovereign act of a foreign    state modifies   a contractual obligation
where the location or situs of the obligation is located inside the foreign sovereign’s territory.
294  Various
tests have been proffered for a determination of the situs of an intangible obligation such as a debt.  One
test that has been adopted for determining the situs of an obligation for act of state purposes is whether
the relevant act of state was able to come to complete fruition within the dominion of the acting    state.
295
This test has emphasized the place of payment of an   obligation such as a debt.
296
A more prevalent test holds that for purposes of the act of state doctrine a debt does not have its
situs in a foreign    state unless the    state has the power to enforce   or collect it, a power which is often stated
to be dependent upon jurisdiction over the debtor or the debtor’s assets.
297  It has also been suggested
under this test that when a debt or other obligation is not payable at all in the foreign    state, the act of state  
doctrine is inapplicable because the foreign sovereign has no power to enforce or collect the debt.
298
A third test is to fix the situs where the incidents of the debt, as a whole, place it.
299  Under this
more flexible test a wide variety of factors may be taken into account in order to determine whether the
ties of the debt to the foreign country are  sufficiently close that the U.S. courts would antagonize the
foreign government by not recognizing its acts.
300  This approach is consistent with the fact that the courts
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have in practice taken a wide variety of factors into account in determining debt situs,
301 including the
place of payment,
302 the place of performance generally,
303 the domicile, state of incorporation and/or
place of business of the obligor,
304 the place where the obligor’s assets are located,
305 the intent of the
parties regarding the applicable law,
306 the jurisdiction whose courts the parties have submitted to,
307 the
currency in which the payment is to be made,
308 the place where the negotiations take place and/or the
contract is entered into,
309 the involvement of the American banking system in the transaction,
310 and a
country’s interest in maintaining a stable economy.
311  Thus, while the governing law of the contract may
provide an indication as to where the situs of the obligation is located, the governing law is not dispositive
and an obligation that is expressly stated to be governed by the law of a particular    state may find its situs
in a different    state.
312
The introduction of the euro is an act of state, and under the act of state   doctrine the EU Council
regulations relating to the introduction of the single currency are therefore applicable to all contractual
obligations whose situs are located in EU    member states.
313  Thus, the EU Council regulations may be
applicable to   obligations denominated in EU national currencies that involve obligors based in EU 
member states and/or payments that are to be discharged within EU    member states.
314 The fact that such
obligations may be stated to be governed by New York law would   not necessarily preclude such an
application of the act of state doctrine, particularly where the ties between the transaction and the EU 
member states are especially   strong.  Conversely, the act of state doctrine would not of itself trigger the
application of the EU Council regulations where the nexus between the transaction and the EU    member
states is weak (e.g., a US$/DM cross-currency swap between   U.S. and Japanese counterparties).
Where the EU Council regulations are applicable to obligations whose situs are located in    EU
member states, such obligations will enjoy the benefit of all the   applicable provisions of the EU Council
regulations concerning the introduction of the euro.  Thus, a eurobond whose interest and principal is
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payable in an EU    member   state would, by virtue of the act of state doctrine, be entitled to the full benefit
of the EU Council regulation’s provisions on bond redenomination during the transitional period.
More broadly, the act of state doctrine provides indirect support for the exercise of the monetary
sovereignty of the    European Union with respect to all   contractual obligations denominated in EU national
currencies, regardless of whether such transactions are governed by the laws of American jurisdictions.
6XPPDU\
To sum up, the State theory of money enjoys widespread support among U.S. courts.  As previously
stated, 
315 the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that
which the law shall recognize as money at the time the payment is to be made.
316  The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that every contract for the payment of money is necessarily subject to the constitutional
power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties
is therefore assumed with reference to that power.
317  This power has been recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court as an attribute of sovereignty both in Europe and America.
318  The U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that legislation fixing the conversion rate at which an old currency is substituted by a new
currency and providing for the discharge of debts originally denominated in the old currency at the fixed
conversion rate in the new currency is derived from this power of a sovereign government over its
currency.
319  Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals have recognized that the
monetary sovereignty of a country over its currency extends    to the use of the country’s currency by non-
nationals outside the country’s jurisdiction in contracts governed by the laws of other   countries.
320  The
U.S. Supreme Court has applied the State theory expansively, holding that the monetary sovereignty of a
government over its currency extends not only to the regulation of monetary obligations contained in a
private contract, but also to the regulation of ancillary contractual obligations that are inextricably linked
to such monetary obligations.
321   Thus, the monetary sovereignty of a foreign government over its
currency can be regarded as extending to the regulation of interest rate obligations.
322
In a small number of cases resulting from the collapse of foreign currencies, American courts did
not always strictly adhere to the State theory, sometimes seeking to revalorize contractual obligations
denominated in collapsed currencies so as to ascribe a real economic value to such obligations.
323  It
appears that the State theory was not always applied in such cases because the currencies in question were
not issued by a legitimate government (as in the case of the Southern Confederacy) or perhaps because of
the harshness involved in strictly applying the State theory to obligations denominated in collapsed
currencies.
324  These cases have little or no relevance to the highly organized plan by some of the United
States’ closest international allies for an orderly transition to a single European currency.  Moreover, the
State theory of money has been generally applied by American courts to obligations denominated in
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collapsed currencies (including the Russian ruble and former Chinese currencies), notwithstanding any
harshness involved.
325
&86&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKH6WDWH7KHRU\RI0RQH\
The State theory of money has constitutional underpinnings.  Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress
is vested with the power “To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the
Standard of Weights and Measures.”
326  This clause draws a clear distinction between the powers of
Congress with respect to the domestic currency on the one hand and foreign currencies on the other.
While Congress’ powers with respect to the establishment of the U.S. currency are plenary,
327 Congress’
powers with respect to foreign currencies are confined to the regulation of the value of foreign coin.
Historically, the power to regulate the value of foreign coin was    thought necessary because of the high
circulation of foreign coins in the American colonies prior to the U.S. Declaration of Independence.
328
Pursuant to this power Congress enacted legislation in 1793 providing for the recognition of foreign gold
and silver coins as current money in the United States and establishing rates against the U.S. dollar at
which British, French, Portuguese and Spanish coins would pass as legal tender for the payment of all
debts.
329  All of these foreign coins had been gradually phased out as legal tenders by 1857.
330
Clearly, the Constitution does not permit the U.S. Congress to coin foreign money, since this is a
sovereign power vested in the governments of foreign countries.  Congress’ only power with respect to
foreign currency relates to the regulation of the exchange rate of foreign currencies in terms of U.S.
dollars.  Thus, the U.S. Constitution implicitly recognizes that it is the law of the currency that determines
what things are money in a foreign country.  By logical extension, it is the law of the currency that must
determine how, in case of a currency alteration, sums expressed in the former currency are to be
converted into the new one.  
331
In addition, the fact that the State theory of money has constitutional underpinnings provides further
support for the proposition that the State theory of money is rooted in federal common law. In
6DEEDWLQR
332 the Supreme Court concluded that the act of state doctrine “must be treated exclusively as
an aspect of federal law” partly because the doctrine has “constitutional underpinnings.”  By analogy, the
State theory of money should also be treated as part of federal common law.
'/HJLVODWLYH$GRSWLRQRI6WDWH7KHRU\8QLIRUP&RPPHUFLDO&RGH
8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\
Significantly, the State theory of money has also been endorsed by the Uniform Commercial Code
(the “UCC”).  The UCC is a code of laws governing various commercial transactions that has been
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adopted in all 50    states of the United   States (except Louisiana in part).
333  The Code was adopted in New
York State in 1962.
334  It has been suggested that the Code, by comprehensively enacting a whole field of
commercial law, thereby replacing the pre-Code common law constructed around judicial precedents,
“displaces the legal method of the Anglo-American common law and substitutes the legal method of the
civil law”, the legal system prevailing in most continental European jurisdictions.
335  As a result many
courts have utilized analogy to fill gaps, relying on the policies of the UCC rather than resorting to the
common law for authoritative guidance.
336  Nonetheless, the common law tradition is so deeply
embedded in the American legal system that judicial precedents have inevitably been accorded significant
weight in the interpretation of Code provisions.
337
The definition of money adopted by the UCC is of great significance to the analysis of the legal
implications of EMU under the laws of New York State and other U.S. jurisdictions.  Section 1-201(24)
of the UCC defines “money” as “a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government as a part of its currency.”
338  The New York version of section 1-201(24) of the UCC defines
“money” in similar terms as “a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government as a part of its currency except that it does not include rare or unusual coins used for
numismatic purposes” which “shall be considered goods”.
339  This definition of money as “a medium of
exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government” has been uniformly adopted in all
50    states of the United States, Washington D.C. and the U.S. territories   of Guam and the Virgin
Islands.
340
The legislative history preceding the adoption of the UCC sheds considerable light on the intentions
of the Code drafters with respect to the definition of money.  The official comments, which were written
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HAWKLAND, VXSUD note    181, §§ 1-102:02-09 (Art. 1).   
3366HH HAWKLAND, VXSUD note    181, §§ 1-102:06-07; 1-102:10-11 (Art. 1).   
3376HHLG § 1-102:08 (Art. 1).
338U.C.C § 1-201(24), 1 U.L.A. 65 (1989).
339N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (McKinney 1993).
340 $ODEDPD ALA. CODE § 7-1-201(24) (1993); $ODVND ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.201(25) (Michie 1996); $UL]RQD ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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 CAL. U.C.C. § 1201(24) (West
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 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-201(24) (West 1990);
'HODZDUH DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-201(24) (1993); 'LVWULFWRI&ROXPELD: D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1-201(24) (1996); )ORULGD FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 671.201(24)  (West 1993); *HRUJLD G A. CODE ANN. § 11-1-201(24) (1994); *XDP 13 GUAM CODE ANN. § 1201(24) (1996);
+DZDLL HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-201(24) (1993); ,GDKRIDAHO CODE § 28-1-201(24) (1995); ,OOLQRLV ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 810, para. 5/1-
201(24) (West 1993); ,QGLDQD I ND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-1-201(24) (West 1995); ,RZD I OWA CODE ANN. § 554.1201(24) (West 1995);
.DQVDV KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 84-1-201(24) (1996); .HQWXFN\ KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355-1-201(24) (Michie 1996); /RXLVLDQD LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:1-201(24) (West 1993); 0DLQH ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1-201(24) (West 1995); 0DU\ODQG MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW §  1-201(24) (1997); 0DVVDFKXVHWWV MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 106, § 1-201(24) (Law Co-op. 1984); 0LFKLJDQ M ICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.1201(24) (Callaghan 1990); 0LQQHVRWD M INN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-201(24) (West 1966); 0LVVLVVLSSL M ISS. CODE ANN. §  75-1-
201(24) (1972); 0LVVRXUL MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.1-201 (West 1994); 0RQWDQD MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-1-201(24) (1995); 1HEUDVND
NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) § 1-201(24) (1992); 1HYDGDNEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.1201(24) (Michie 1994);  1HZ+DPSVKLUH N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 382-A:1-201(24) (1994); 1HZ-HUVH\ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-201(24) (West 1962); 1HZ0H[LFR N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-
201(24) (Michie 1993); 1HZ<RUN N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (McKinney 1993); 1RUWK&DUROLQD N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(24) (1995);
1RUWK'DNRWD N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-11(24) (1983); 2KLR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STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(24) (West 1963); 2UHJRQOR. REV. STAT. § 71.2010(24) (1995); 3HQQV\OYDQLD 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1201 (West 1984); 5KRGH,VODQGR.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-1-201(24) (1992); 6RXWK&DUROLQD S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(24) (Law Co-op.
1977); 6RXWK'DNRWD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-1-201(24) (Michie 1988); 7HQQHVVHH TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-201(24) (1996); 7H[DV
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(24) (West 1995); 8WDKUTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-201(24) (1990); 9HUPRQWVT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9A, § 1-201(24) (1994); 9LUJLQLD VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-201(24) (Michie 1991); 9LUJLQ,VODQGV V.I. CODE ANN tit. 11A, § 1-201(24)
(1995); :DVKLQJWRQ W ASH. REV. CODE ANN.  § 62A.1-201(24)  (West  1995);  :HVW 9LUJLQLD W.VA. CODE §  46-1-201(24) (1993);
:LVFRQVLQ WIS. STAT. ANN. § 401.201(24) (West 1995); :\RPLQJWYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-1-201(xxiv) (Michie 1991).lxxxiii
by the Code drafters and have been extensively utilized by the courts in construing the provisions of the
UCC,
341 state as follows with respect to the definition of “money”: “The test adopted is that of sanction of
government, whether by authorization before issue or adoption afterward, which recognizes the
circulating medium as a part of the official currency of that government.  The narrow view that money is
limited to legal tender is rejected.”
342
Further light is shed on the thinking of the Code drafters regarding the definition of money by the
comments and notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 of the Code.
343  In explaining why “francs, sterling, lira or
other recognized currency of a foreign government” are included within the definition of money, the
Code drafters noted in particular that the definition “adopts the view of such cases as ,QFLWWL Y
)HUUDQWH”.
344  In this case a New Jersey court stated that “[m]oney is purely a legal institution; it is
impossible without law.”
345  Quoting Aristotle’s 3ROLWLFD, the court defined money as follows: “Money by
itself is but a mere device.  It has value only by law and not by nature.  So that a change of convention
between those that use it is sufficient to deprive it of its value and of its power to purchase our
requirements.”
346
The legislative history preceding New York’s adoption of the UCC also helps to clarify the concept
of money embraced by the UCC.  The New York Law Revision Committee, which reported to the New
York State Legislature in 1956 on the changes that the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code
would make to New York law, noted that “[t]he Code definition test of governmental backing is in accord
with a New York case involving the statute of frauds”, 5HLVIHOGY-DFREV,
347 where “the court emphasized
the necessity of money’s being issued under the authority of and backed by the credit of a responsible
government”.
348  The Commission concluded that it was “[t]his idea of governmental sanction” that “is
carried over into the Code definition of money.”
349  This interpretation of the Code definition of money
was reiterated by the Commission on Uniform State Laws in its 1961 report to the New York State
Legislature regarding the changes which the UCC would effect to New York law.
350
It is therefore with much justification that commentators, including F.A. Mann and Arthur
Nussbaum, have pointed to the UCC definition of money as evidence of the recognition of the State
theory of money under American law.
351  The definition of money in the UCC defines foreign money to
be whatever medium of exchange is circulating with the sanction and backing of the government in the
foreign country in question.  This clearly requires American courts to look to the laws of the relevant
jurisdictions issuing foreign currencies when seeking to determine the legal nature of such currencies.
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3436HHAMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL CODE: COMMENTS AND NOTES TO TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.1- ARTICLE III 37-39 (1946).
344,G at 39 (citing Incitti v. Ferrante, 175 A. 908 (Bergen    Cty. Ct. 1933)).  
345Incitti, 175 A. at 910 (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLITICA).
346,G.
347176 N.Y.S. 223, 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919), discussed VXSUD pp. 45-46.
348STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ARTICLE 3 - COMMERCIAL PAPER, 2
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349,G
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351MANN, VXSUD note 20, at 14-15; NUSSBAUM, VXSUD note    31, at 9 n.32.  lxxxiv
6FRSHRI8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\
The definition of money is relevant not only to the provisions of the UCC but is applicable for other
legal purposes.  Indeed, the UCC definition of money can be properly regarded as a general legislative
definition of money which has been adopted by all 50 U.S.    state legislatures, including the New York
State Legislature.   Thus Article 2 of the Code is applicable to transactions in “goods”.  The term “goods”
is in turn defined to exclude the money in which the price is to be paid in a contract of sale.  It must
follow that an obligation to deliver money in which such a price is to be paid is governed by some set of
rules outside the UCC.  These rules are of course contained in the general common law principles that
form the law of contracts.  It follows, DIRUWLRUL, that the definition of money in the UCC can be regarded
as the applicable definition for common law purposes, as well as for purposes of the UCC.
The argument that the definition of money used in the UCC is a general legislative definition of
money is further supported by the purposes and policies underlying the UCC.  In keeping with the civil
law spirit of the Code, Article 1 provides that the Code “shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies.”
352  The “[u]nderlying purposes and policies” of the UCC
are, LQWHUDOLD, “to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions” and “to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”
353  In this vein Official Comment 1 to Section 1-
102 of the UCC states as follows:
Courts … have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-
matter which was not expressly included in the language of the Act.  They have done the
same where reason and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been
intentionally excluded from the Act in general.  They have implemented a statutory policy
with liberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory text.
354
Clearly, this approach to statutory interpretation strongly suggests that the UCC definition of
“money” would be regarded by U.S. courts as a general definition of money applicable for all legal
purposes.  This would simplify and clarify the law governing commercial transactions by confirming the
uniform application of the State theory of money for all legal purposes and in all jurisdictions of the
United States.  This would also serve to modernize the law governing commercial transactions by
ensuring that American law remains consistent with the widespread international acceptance of the State
theory of money.
355
7KH8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\DQGWKH(XUR
The euro will be authorized or adopted by the EU Council (comprising representatives of the
governments of the EU member states) as the single currency of the EU member states participating in
EMU.  The euro will be recognized under the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro as the
single official currency of the participating EU    member states beginning on January 1, 1999.
356 Thus, the
euro will be issued    on behalf of participating member states under the   authority of the European Central 
Bank.
357  The euro will be adopted by the    EU   Council as the sole medium of    exchange.  Legally, the euro
will therefore be    a perfect   substitute for the EU national currencies in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the EU Council regulation which will be directly applicable in    EU member states.
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(/HJLVODWLYH$GRSWLRQRI6WDWH7KHRU\  8QLIRUP)RUHLJQ0RQH\&ODLPV$FW
The State theory of money has also been expressly incorporated into the laws of the 20 U.S.
jurisdictions (including California and Illinois) that have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims
Act.
358  Approved in 1989 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Act
was designed to change and clarify the law regarding judgments or obligations denominated in a foreign
currency.  Section 12(a) of the Act contains a provision regarding the “effect of currency revalorizations”
which provides as follows:
If, after an obligation is expressed or a loss is incurred in a foreign money, the country issuing
or adopting that money substitutes a new money in place of that money, the obligation or the
loss is treated as if expressed or incurred in the new money at the rate of conversion the
issuing country establishes for the payment of like obligations or losses denominated in the
former money.
359
This provision has been included in the adopting legislation of all 20 adopting jurisdictions (19 
states and the U.S. territory of the Virgin Islands).
360  The Uniform   Act defines foreign money in terms
similar to the UCC as “a medium of exchange for the payment of obligations or a store of value
authorized or adopted by a government or by inter-governmental agreement.”
361  The drafters’ comments
to the Uniform Act shed further light on these provisions.  Comment 1 to Section 12 of the Act notes that
the provision relating to the effect of currency revalorization
refers to situations in which a country authorizes the issue of a new money to take the place of
the old money at a stated ratio.  An example is Brazil’s recent abolition of cruzieros for
cruzados.  The subsection mandates that foreign money claims should be subjected to the
same ratio.
362
Comment 2 to Section 12 further notes that:
The Act takes no position on the effect of money repudiations or revalorizations so drastic as
to be, in effect, confiscations.  Remedy, if any, for these is usually found through diplomatic
channels.  Equally, the Act takes no position on the effect of exchange control laws.  The
effect, if any, on obligations to pay is left to other law.
363
The Chairman and Reporter of the drafting committee of the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act
have equated the effect of the provision to Mann’s “recurrent linking”.
364
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There can be no doubt that this provision of the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act expressly
incorporates into obligations denominated in EU currencies the irrevocably fixed conversion rates at
which the euro will be substituted for currencies participating in EMU.  This provision applies to all
obligations (including interest rate obligations) expressed in a foreign currency, and by necessary
implication requires the full application of legislation enacted by the issuing countries with respect to the
continuity of obligations in the aftermath of the substitution of the EU national currencies by the euro.
Interestingly, the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act will be applied by all courts sitting in the
adopting jurisdictions regardless of the governing law of the contract.  Section 2(b) of the Act provides
that the Act applies to foreign-money issues even if other law applies under the conflict of laws rules of
the    state in which   the court is located to other issues in the action or proceeding.
365  T h u s  i f  l e g a l
proceedings are instigated before the courts of California or Illinois by or against a foreign exchange
dealer in San Francisco or Chicago with respect to a contract governed by New York law, the courts of
California and Illinois will be required to apply local law to foreign money issues covered by the Uniform
Foreign Money Claims Act such as the rules regarding the treatment of foreign currency obligations after
the substitution of a new currency for an old one by a foreign country.
)6WDWH7KHRU\RI0RQH\DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
6WDWH7KHRU\DQG&XVWRPDU\,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ
The State theory of money is widely recognized under the laws of other countries.
366  Indeed, the
recognition of the theory is so universal that it appears to form part of customary international law.  In the
6HUELDQDQG%UD]LOLDQ/RDQV cases the Permanent Court of International Justice held that even though
French gold franc bonds issued by the governments of Brazil and Serbia were not governed by French
law, this “does not prevent the currency in which payment must or may be made in France from being
governed by French law.”
367  This is because it is
a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own currency.  The
application of the laws of such State involves no difficulty so long as it does not affect the
substance of the debt to be paid and does not conflict with the law governing such debt.
368
The recognition of the State theory of money under customary international law and its widespread
acceptance by foreign    states should help to convince   American courts that the State theory is universally
recognized and forms part of U.S. law.
369
86,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ODLPV&RPPLVVLRQ
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The State theory of money has also been applied by U.S. international claims tribunals established
by Congress to resolve disputes under international law.  The best example of this is the adoption of the
State theory by the U.S. International Claims Commission which dealt with many international claims by
the U.S. and its nationals against the United States’ war-time allies after the Second World War.  The
Commission was established by Congress in 1940 to adjudicate claims against foreign governments
arising out of nationalizations and other takings of property.
370  The Commission adjudicated claims
according to “the applicable principles of international law, justice and equity.”
371  While the decisions of
the Commission (and the successor U.S. Foreign Claims Commission) are not binding precedents, they
are of legal interest insofar as they rely on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the /HJDO7HQGHU
&DVHV and the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV in concluding that the State theory of money is generally recognized
under international law.  The Commission upheld the sovereign powers of a country over its currency in a
number of different contexts.
D5XVVLDQ5RXEOHVDQGWKH%ROVKHYLN5HYROXWLRQ
The International Claims Commission held that losses sustained as a result of the conversion of the
old Russian rouble into the new Soviet rouble at the rate of one 1924 Soviet rouble for 50 billion pre-1922
roubles did not give rise to a valid claim against the Soviet government under international law.
372  In
=XN¶V&ODLP
373 the Commission held that “[i]t is universally recognized that all matters pertaining to
currency are inherently within the jurisdiction of the State.”  Quoting from the decision of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the 6HUELDQDQG%UD]LOLDQ/RDQ&DVHV the Commission stated that “[i]t is
indeed a generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own currency.”
374  T h e
Commission also relied on the “domestic law” of the United States, quoting from the U.S. Supreme Court
in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV.
375
E<XJRVODY'LQDUDQGWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU
In 1945, the Yugoslav government passed legislation on the settlement of pre-War obligations
denominated in the old Yugoslav dinar, providing for their settlement at the rate of 10 old Yugoslav
dinars to one dinar of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia.  In 7DEDU¶V &ODLP
376 the Foreign Claims
Commission held that Yugoslavia had not violated international law “in providing, as part of the re-
establishment of its monetary system, for the payment of obligations” at such rate.  The Commission,
citing the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV, noted that “[o]ur own country abrogated contracts providing for payment in
gold coin”, and the Commission also quoted from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 'HXWVFKH
%DQN.
377
F+XQJDULDQ0RQHWDU\5HIRUPV
In 1925 the Hungarian government introduced a new currency, the pengö, at a rate of one pengö for
12,500 units of the old currency, the korona.  With the collapse of the pengö the Hungarian government
                                                
370International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, ch. 54, 64 Stat. 12 (1950) (current version at 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 1621-1627 (1982 &
Supp. 1997)).
371,G § 4(a).
372Zuk’s Claim, Int. L.R. 1958, 284.
373Int. L.R. 1958, 284 at 285.
374Zuk’s Claim, Int. L.R. 1958, 284 at 285 (quoting Serbian and Brazilian Loan Cases, discussed VXSUD p. 87).
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376Int. L.R. 1953, 211 at 213.
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established a new currency in 1946, the forint, at a rate that completely destroyed the value of the pengö.
Again the Foreign Claims Commission held that no claim existed against the Hungarian government for
these monetary reforms.
378
G5RPDQLDQ/HLDQGWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU
In 1947 the Romanian government introduced the stabilized lei for which one old lei could be
exchanged at the rate of 20,000 to 1.  The Foreign Claims Commission again held that the destruction of
the economic value of obligations denominated in the old lei resulting from this monetary reform did not
give rise to any claim against the Romanian government.
379
The cases described in (a) to (d) above demonstrate that the State theory of money enunciated by
the U.S. courts is fully consistent with the legal theory of money that is generally accepted under
international law.  Moreover, the State theory is also applied by the vast majority of foreign countries.
380
The widespread international acceptance of the State theory helps to support the conclusion that the
sovereign power of a    state over its currency is universally recognized and that foreign   currency contracts
governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions are necessarily subject to the monetary sovereignty of foreign
countries.
*(XURDVWKH,GHDO8QLW
Every modern monetary system is built upon what Nussbaum calls an “ideal unit” and upon a
number of corporeal money types coordinated around this unit.
381  Thus in %DWHV,
382 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that in the United States “[t]he standard unit of computation is the
money dollar, an abstract or ideal unit of account.”  The court noted that “[t]his standard unit of money
has not changed in money value throughout the existence of our monetary system”, notwithstanding the
fact that “[t]here have been changes from time to time in the form of the physical representatives of
money.”
383  Thus, the court recognized a distinction between money as the ideal unit of account and legal
tender as the physical manifestations of such money.  Because currencies are no longer convertible into
gold or silver, this idea of money as an ideal or abstract unit provides the most adequate explanation of
money to fit modern conditions.
384  This ideal unit establishes the nominal value of money
385 and thus
provides the basis for the principle of monetary nominalism.
386
Whether the unit around which the monetary system is built is actually represented by specific
money is of no consequence.  This point is clearly demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in
&UDPHUY$UWKXU.
387  There, duties payable on goods imported from Austria were assessed based on the
value of the Austrian silver florin.  Although there was evidence that the Austrian silver florin coin was
no longer in circulation, the Supreme Court held that “the florin is the standard money of account of
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Austria.”
388  The Court stated that whether the florin was “represented by a corresponding coin of equal
amount is of no consequence,” noting that “[i]t was only since the beginning of the present century that
the pound sterling was thus represented” and that the pound’s “value was as fixed and certain before the
sovereign was coined as since.”
389
Also, in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
390 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the gold dollar
constituted the standard of value in the U.S. monetary system, stating that “the gold or silver thing we call
a dollar is, in no sense, a standard of a dollar.  It is a representative of it.  There might never have been a
piece of money of the denomination of a dollar.”
Thus, the existence of a distinct unit of account with reference to which all money is denominated is
a characteristic feature of all monetary systems.
391  A legal tender is only money in law insofar as it
represents the embodiment of this ideal unit of account - its fraction or multiple.
392  While coins or notes
represent decimal fractions or multiples of the ideal unit in most monetary systems, Nussbaum has noted
that irregular features frequently appear during the infancy of a new monetary system.
393
After the introduction of the single currency on January 1, 1999 the euro will be the ideal unit
around which EU national legal tenders will be coordinated.  The fact that the euro will not be represented
by a corresponding note or coin of equal value until the introduction of euro notes and coins at the end of
the transitional period is of no consequence.  The euro will be the single currency of the EU    member  
states and the national legal tenders will be mere denominations of the euro that will be valued in terms of
the euro at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.
This point is also supported by the UCC definition of money.  The UCC definition of money
defines money broadly as “a medium of exchange”.
394  The official comments to the UCC confirm that
this definition “rejects the narrow view of some early cases that ‘money’ is limited to legal tender.  Legal
tender acts do no more than designate a particular kind of money which the obligee will be required to
accept in discharge of an obligation.”
395
Indeed, the Code drafters also pointed out in their notes and comments to Tentative Draft No. 1 of
the Code that this “is illustrated by the fact that until 1933 Federal Reserve notes, . . . although issued
under the authority of an act of Congress, were not legal tender in the United States.”
396
The legal distinction between currency and legal tender is also confirmed by the legislative history
preceding the adoption of the UCC in New York when the view was expressed by the New York Law
Revision Committee and the Commission on Uniform State Laws that the Code definition of money
reflects the concept of money articulated by the New York courts at common law, as evidenced by
5HLVIHOGY-DFREV.
397  In 5HLVIHOG
398 it was noted that “the word ‘money’ may be used in a strict sense as
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denoting only ‘legal tender in payment of a debt’, or it may be used broadly to denote any token of
value.”  What confers monetary status on a token of value is not the form of such token (i.e., legal tender
notes or some other medium of exchange) but rather whether the token is “issued under the authority of a
responsible government.”
399  The pivotal issue is not whether the medium of exchange constitutes legal
tender, but whether a government has recognized the medium as part of its official currency.
400  In this
sense, money is ultimately a creature of law which may be altered or redefined by the sovereign issuer.
Clearly, the euro will be used as a medium of exchange prior to the introduction of euro notes and
coins no later than 2002.  Before the introduction of euro legal tender the euro will be the single currency
of which the national legal tenders will be denominations or expressions.
401  The fact that euro notes will
not exist does not affect the legal status of the euro as money because the UCC rejects the narrow view
that money is limited to legal tender.  During the three-year transitional period preceding the introduction
of euro tender the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro will designate particular kinds of
money as legal tender (e.g., the Deutsche mark will be legal tender within the territorial limits of
Germany, the French franc within the territorial limits of France, etc.).  All of these national legal tenders
will be mere expressions of the sole medium of exchange used in the participating EU    member states
during the transitional period   – the euro.
402  Thus, each transaction involving the use of a national legal
tender as a medium of exchange is in reality a transaction involving the use of the euro as a medium of
exchange.  Each national legal tender will have an unchangeable countervalue in terms of the euro during
the transitional period.
403  There will be no foreign exchange rate risk between the national legal tenders.
404   Thus, the euro will   be the only medium of exchange in the participating EU    member states during the  
transitional period.
+)RUHLJQ&XUUHQFLHVDV&RPPRGLWLHV
In this section the classification of foreign currency as a commodity will be examined.  In
particular, this section will consider whether the euro will be regarded as the same commodity as the
existing EU national currencies from a legal perspective.
&RPPRGLW\7KHRU\RI)RUHLJQ
Foreign currencies have long been classified as commodities under New York law.
405  Two strands
of thinking can be discerned in the classification of foreign money  as a commodity.  According to one
line of authority, foreign currencies are only to be regarded as commodities where they are purchased and
sold in foreign exchange transactions.
406  This approach draws a sharp distinction between the use of
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foreign currency as a commodity on its barter and sale in the foreign exchange markets and the use of
foreign currency as a medium of payment for the discharge of debts (i.e., in loan transactions and bond
issues).
Thus in +HQZRRG
407 a “gold clause” case involving a bond which permitted repayment in any one
of five different currencies,
408 the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he foreign currencies promised were not
bartered for as commodities, but their function was that of money to be paid in countries in which they
were legal tender”.  Again in :HEEHUY$PHULFDQ8QLRQ%DQN
409 it was emphasized that “[f]oreign
money in this country, on its barter and sale, is generally treated as a commodity, though it may be treated
as money having a monetary value fixed by the exchange value.”  According to these cases, a foreign
currency’s status as a commodity depends entirely on the use to which such currency is put (i.e., whether
it is used in foreign exchange transactions or whether it is used to discharge a debt in a loan or a
commercial transaction).
According to a second strand of thinking, foreign currency is generally treated as a commodity in
the United States, regardless of the kind of transaction in which it is used.
410  Thus, it was held in
9LVKLSFR   /LQHY&KDVH0DQKDWWDQ%DQN1$
411 that “in actions brought to recover sums expressed in
foreign money, the obligation—whether characterized as an unpaid debt or a breach of contract—is
treated as a promise to deliver a commodity.”  Again in .DQWRUY$ULVWR+RVLHU\&R
412 it was stated that
“[t]he obligation to deliver pounds sterling in return for hosiery is essentially the same as the obligation . .
. to deliver francs in return for dollars.”  To hold otherwise “is to lose sight of the economic fact that
foreign currency is a commodity.”
413  The Supreme Court stated in one of the Confederate dollar cases
that the Confederate dollar was a commodity.
414  In %DUUHGDY0LOPR1DWLRQDO%DQN
415 the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals held that Mexican dollars deposited at a bank in a border town on the U.S. side of the
Mexican border “were not in fact and truth money, but a commodity varying and fluctuating in value as
often and as disastrously as the price of cotton or wheat.” According to these cases a foreign currency is a
commodity purely because it is not the domestic currency of the United States.
The idea that foreign currency is only treated as a commodity when used in foreign exchange
transactions appears to have found favor with the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Article 2-
102 of the Code specifically limits the applicability of Article 2 “to transactions in goods”.
416  “Goods” in
turn have been defined by the Code as “all things¼ which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8)
and things in action.”
417  At first blush it might appear, in view of this exclusion of the money in which
the price is to be paid from the definition of goods, that foreign currencies are not goods/commodities for
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purposes of the UCC.  However, Official Comment 1 to Section 2-105 of the UCC states that “[t]he
exclusion of ‘money in which the price is to be paid’ from the definition of goods does not mean that
foreign currency which is included in the definition of money may not be the subject matter of a sales
transaction.  “Goods” is intended to cover the sale of money when money is being treated as a commodity
but not to include it when money is the medium of payment.”
418  Official Comment 1 to Section 2-105
thus contemplates a distinction between the use of foreign currency as a commodity and the use of foreign
currency as a medium of payment.  Relying on this comment the New York courts held without argument
in a series of decisions that the UCC is applicable to foreign exchange transactions.
419  This view has been
reiterated in 5H.RUHDJ&RQWUROHHW5HYLVLRQ6$.
420  Invoking Official Comment 1 to Section 2-105, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that money is excluded from the UCC’s definition of
“goods” “only when it is used as the medium of exchange.  In a currency exchange contract, however, the
money is not the medium of exchange, but rather the object of exchange.”
421
If we try to unravel the logic of Official Comment 1 and the cases decided thereunder, the UCC
appears to be applicable to foreign exchange transactions such as FX forwards, cross-currency swaps and
currency options.  An FX forward is an agreement by one party to deliver a specified amount in one
currency on a specific date in the future against delivery of a specified amount in another currency.
422  A
cross currency swap is a bilateral agreement in which each of the parties promises to make periodic
payments to the other in two different currencies, which amounts are calculated as one would calculate
interest on a debt obligation.
423  A currency option is an arrangement whereby the seller of the option, in
exchange for the payment of a fee, grants the purchaser of the option the right to buy a specified amount
of a given currency at a specified “strike” price expressed in another currency -- a currency call option --
or the right to require the seller of the option to buy a specified amount of a given currency at a specified
strike price in another currency -- a currency put option.
424
With respect to interest rate swaps, the better view appears to be that they remain subject to the
application of the common law and are not governed by the UCC.
425  This is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s view that “[i]nterest is not paid on commodities but on monetary obligations”,
426 and that
“interest must follow the character of the principal.”
427  Similarly, payments under interest rate swaps are
made on notional principal amounts and the interest payments must follow the notional character of the
principal amounts.
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Eurobond and loan transactions involving debt obligations to make payments in foreign currencies
clearly fall into the category of transactions where money is not the object of exchange but rather the
medium of exchange.  This would mean that the legal principles governing the performance of such
transactions can be found in the common law rather than the UCC.
The rulings that foreign exchange contracts are covered by the UCC have aroused considerable
academic controversy and have been subjected to serious criticism.
428  An examination of these criticisms
is outside the scope of this study.  Suffice it to note that there is some doubt regarding the applicability of
the UCC to foreign exchange transactions.  Nonetheless, there has been some support for the application
of the UCC in this context
429 and even among the critics there has been general agreement that UCC
provisions should be applied by analogy to foreign exchange transactions where appropriate.
430  In view
of the decisions of the New York courts regarding the application of the UCC to foreign exchange
transactions,
431 it would be prudent for the purposes of this study to assume that the UCC is applicable to
all foreign exchange transactions and that foreign currencies are therefore to be treated as commodities
when used in currency swaps, currency options and FX forwards.
,PSOLFDWLRQVRI&RPPRGLW\7KHRU\RI)RUHLJQ0RQH\
The notion that foreign currencies are commodities has been relied upon by courts to undermine the
State theory of money.  Thus, in 0DWWHURI/HQGOH
432 the case where a bequest in old German marks was
held to be a bequest in the same number of new Weimar Reichsmarks, notwithstanding the fact that a
different conversion rate was established under German law for the conversion of old marks into
Reichsmarks, the New York Court of Appeals held that the marks were “to be regarded, not as a measure
of value, but as a commodity .... to be satisfied in kind.”
433
It might be argued that the Deutsche mark is a different commodity from the euro because the
Deutsche mark is issued by the Deutsche Bundesbank whereas the euro will be issued by or under the
authority of the newly established European Central Bank.  Also, it might be argued that the Deutsche
mark is a different commodity from the euro because the value of the euro will be affected by different
economic considerations from the value of the Deutsche mark.  Foreign currencies have been compared
to commodities insofar as their value fluctuates on the international currency markets.  “In other countries
[money] is a commodity bought and sold in the market and its value fluctuates in the market like that of
other commodities.”
434  Thus in has been stated that “[i]n New York and elsewhere, foreign money ¼ is a
commodity of fluctuating market value dependent upon the principles of supply and demand.”
435  I f
foreign currencies are like other commodities in that their value fluctuates on the open market according
to the laws of supply and demand, then a currency like the Deutsche mark can be viewed as a commodity
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whose value fluctuates on the currency markets according to the supply of and demand for Deutsche
marks.  The supply of and demand for Deutsche marks is in turn influenced by economic factors such as
the monetary policy pursued by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the use of the Deutsche mark as an
international reserve currency, Germany’s balance of payments and the overall performance of the
German economy, actual and perceived.  On this analysis of the Deutsche mark as a commodity, the new
euro could be classified as a fundamentally different commodity from the Deutsche mark.  The supply of
and demand for the euro will be influenced by the monetary policy adopted by the new European Central
Bank, the economic performance of the single European economy underpinning the new currency and the
confidence of the international markets in the new currency.  The new currency will be issued by or under
the authority of the new European Central Bank which will define and implement the monetary policy of
all EU    member states   participating in EMU, while national central banks like the Bundesbank will lose
their power to direct monetary policy.
436
Interesting as these theories might be, foreign money is defined under the Uniform Commercial
Code as a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by the  government of a foreign country. This
definition is applicable to foreign currency both when used as a commodity and therefore subject to the
sale of goods provisions in Article 2 of the Code, and also when foreign currency is otherwise used as a
medium of payment and therefore exempt from the provisions of Article 2 of the Code.  The fact that
foreign currency may be used as a commodity does not in any way alter its definition or essential
attributes.  This point is amply demonstrated by the UCC itself, by the Official Comments to the Code
and by the case law.  Article 2 of the Code does not exclude all money from its application, but only “the
money in which the price is to be paid.”
437  Thus, when money is used to purchase anything other than
money Article 2 does not apply, but when money is used to purchase money it is used as a commodity
and Article 2 applies.  The definition of money is the same regardless of whether it is subject to regulation
by the Code.  The main significance of money being treated as a commodity is that it is thereby subject to
regulation by the UCC, which could have practical consequences for issues such as the level of damages
to be awarded for a breach of contract.  Regard may be had to the depreciation of a currency in
calculating the level of damages to be awarded for a breach of a foreign exchange contract under the
UCC, whereas it appears that such depreciation may not be considered when calculating damages for
breach of a foreign currency debt obligation at common law.
438
That the treatment of a foreign currency as a commodity in foreign exchange transactions has no
bearing on the definition or essential characteristics of foreign currency is further demonstrated by the
Official Comments to the Code.  The Comments clearly state that foreign currency “which is included in
the definition of money” may be the subject of a sales transaction when treated as a commodity.
439  Thus
the definition of money remains unchanged—it is the legal regime to which the money is subject that is
affected by its treatment as a commodity.  This point is also implicitly accepted in .RUHDJ
440 where the
court focused on the use to which the currency is put in concluding that foreign exchange transactions
involve the sale of goods.  The only situation where the use of money as a commodity may influence a
court’s view of that money’s definition and essential attributes concerns the sale of legal tender coins
having an appreciated numismatic value.
441
                                                
4366HHJHQHUDOO\ Kaufman, VXSUD note 314, at 8.
437U.C.C. § 2-105(l), 1 U.L.A. 198-99 (1989).
4386HH NUSSBAUM, VXSUD note    31, at 319-20; Paul H. Vishny, 0RQH\DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO7UDQVDFWLRQV,   C395 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 631, 633
(1989); VHHLQIUD pp. 132-34.
439U.C.C. § 2-105, off. cmt. 1, 1 U.L.A. 199 (1989).
440961 F.2d at 355.
4416HH Re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193, 197 (E.D. Mo. 1967).xcv
The UCC definition of foreign money recognizes that the essential characteristics of a foreign
currency, whether used as a commodity or as a medium of payment, are delineated by the laws of the 
state issuing such currency.  Since    the   EU Council    regulations (which are directly applicable in EU
member states such as   Germany) will recognize the euro as the successor currency to    EU national
currencies like the Deutsche mark, the euro should be treated as both the same commodity and the same
medium of payment as the Deutsche mark in accordance with the applicable provisions of    EU law.  Thus,
in accordance with the State theory of money, all   foreign currency transactions that are governed by the
laws of U.S. jurisdictions are subject to the monetary sovereignty of the governments of foreign countries.
This analysis ensures that the definition of foreign money will be consistently applied, regardless of
whether foreign money is being used as a commodity or as a medium of exchange.  To quote the Supreme
Court in +RO\RNH3RZHU&RY3DSHU&R
442 “[t]he fact is of little moment that currency is characterized
as a commodity in the verbiage of the covenant as long as it is currency.  Weasel words will not avail to
defeat the triumph of intention when once the words are read in the setting of the whole transaction.”
443
Thus in %URZQY3HUHUD
444 it was held that
foreign money in its nature and inherent qualities is not different from domestic money.
Whether it is received under sanction of a legal tender statute, or in border transactions, or by
certain merchants in accordance with a special practice, or by money changers in exchange
for American money at prevailing rates, it is received, not as an article useful or valuable in
itself, but merely as a token or representative of value issued by a responsible government.
Another variation on the State theory of money would be to argue that the commodity we call the
Deutsche mark underwent a fundamental alteration at the time of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty by
the then 12    member states of the European   Economic Community in 1992.  From Maastricht onwards the
Deutsche mark became a currency that was capable of being transformed into a single European currency
at the time and in the manner contemplated by the Treaty.  The fact that the Treaty provides for a gradual
and phased introduction of the single currency would bolster this argument that existing EU national
currencies are gradually converging into a single currency.  First of all, the interest rates, inflation rates
and debt ratios of countries seeking to participate in EMU begin to converge in an effort to comply with
the Treaty’s economic convergence criteria.  Several months before the commencement of EMU the EU
Council decides which currencies will participate in EMU.  EMU then starts on January 1, 1999 with the
irrevocable fixing of the conversion rates of currencies participating in EMU, at which point the euro
becomes a currency in its own right.  While the euro is the single currency of the participating    member
states, the old national currencies survive as legal tenders that are   denominations of the single currency.
Finally, after a period lasting no longer than three years from the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates,
the national tenders are withdrawn from circulation altogether and replaced by new euro bank notes and
coins.
445  This phased introduction of the single currency will make it difficult for a litigant to pin-point
any single moment in the changeover to the single currency where there is such a fundamental alteration
in the nature of the currencies participating in EMU as to cause the euro to be classified as an altogether
different currency from the participating national currencies.  If key economic indicators in the countries
participating in EMU converge in the manner contemplated by Maastricht and a smooth “Glidepath” to
EMU is reasonably assured, it will be extremely difficult to argue that the euro is a different commodity
from existing national currencies.  While the Deutsche mark, for example, will have ceased to exist in law
as a currency in its own right after the fixing of conversion rates, the fact that it will survive as a legal
tender will also make it difficult on a practical level to persuade the courts that the mark is a
fundamentally different commodity/ currency from the euro.
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The statements by the New York courts regarding currencies being like other commodities with
fluctuating market values are not dispositive in any respect and may be viewed as descriptive of how the
foreign exchange markets work in practice.  The fact that the values of foreign currencies fluctuate on the
open market says nothing about the legal definition of such currencies.  Whether they fluctuate or not, the
legal definition of a particular currency is laid down by the laws of the issuing    state.  
,&RQFOXVLRQ
F.A. Mann has pointed out that the State theory of money is firmly established under U.S. law.
446
This is borne out by the fact that the State theory of money has been accepted by    federal and state
courts.
447  The State theory of money   has constitutional underpinnings insofar as the U.S. Constitution
implicitly recognizes that the power to establish foreign currencies is vested in foreign countries.
448
Moreover, the State theory has been incorporated into the laws of every U.S. jurisdiction by virtue of the
Uniform Commercial Code which defines money as the medium of exchange that has been authorized or
adopted as currency by the government of a country.
449  Deviations from the State theory have only been
permitted in a small number of cases involving the complete collapse of foreign currencies.  
450   While the
legal classification of foreign currency can differ depending   on whether foreign money is being used as a
commodity or as a medium of payment, this does not in any way affect the inherent quality of foreign
currency as money.
451  The legal definition of foreign currency as the medium of exchange authorized or
adopted by a foreign government is applicable regardless of whether foreign currency is used as a
commodity on the foreign exchange markets or as a medium of payment on the debt markets.
452
Applying the State theory of money to EMU, the euro will be recognized by the governments of    the
EU member states as the circulating medium of exchange and   official currency of    EU member states
participating in EMU.  Obligations denominated in EU national currencies participating in EMU that are
governed by New York law or the laws of other U.S. jurisdictions are subject to the sovereign powers of
the European Union over the currencies of EU member states.  These sovereign powers extend to the
substitution of EU national currencies for the euro at   the irrevocably fixed conversion rates established by
the Council.     These powers also   include the enactment of legislation by the EU Council    providing for the
continuity   of obligations denominated in or by reference to EU currencies and ancillary interest rates in
the aftermath of the introduction of the single currency.  In view of the broad view that has been taken by
U.S. courts with respect to the monetary sovereignty of a    state over its currency, strong arguments can
also be made that additional   provisions in the EU legislation permitting credit transfers to be made in, and
bonds to be redenominated into, the euro unit prior to the introduction of euro banknotes are also
applicable to transactions governed by U.S. laws.
453
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9&2175$&7/$:
The acceptance by American courts of the State theory of money would ensure the continuity of
contracts denominated in EU national currencies after EMU.  Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the
possible application of various legal doctrines that might be invoked in an effort to terminate or otherwise
discharge contractual obligations by virtue of the occurrence of EMU.  The three main doctrines that
could be relevant here are the doctrine of commercial impracticability (which is applicable under the
Uniform Commercial Code) and the common law doctrines of impossibility and frustration.
$8QLIRUP&RPPHUFLDO&RGH
'RFWULQHRI&RPPHUFLDO,PSUDFWLFDELOLW\
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs transactions in goods, including transactions
involving the exchange of foreign currency.
1  The doctrine of commercial impracticability is contained in
Article 2, Section 615 of the UCC, which is captioned ([FXVHE\)DLOXUHRI3UHVXSSRVHG&RQGLWLRQV, and
provides in relevant part as follows:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding
section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty
under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
2
Section 2-615 of the UCC has been uniformly adopted in all adopting jurisdictions.
3  There is a
three-step test to determine the applicability of the Section:  “(1) a contingency has occurred; (2) the
contingency has made performance impracticable; and (3) the nonoccurrence of that contingency was a
basic assumption upon which the contract was made.”
4
Official Comment 1 to Section 2-615 states that “[t]his section excuses a seller from timely delivery
of goods contracted for, where his performance has become commercially impracticable because of
unforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting.”
5  In the context of EMU, the question which arises is whether the continued existence of the
currency in which a contractual obligation may be denominated is a basic assumption on which a contract
is made, and whether the disappearance of the currency of the contract renders performance
impracticable.  This study will consider these issues in some detail below.
It should also be noted that Section 2-615, by its terms, is only available for a “seller”.  Official
Comment 9 to Section 2-615 states, however, that “where the buyer’s contract is in reasonable
commercial understanding conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assumption ... the reason of
the present section may well apply.”
6  One commentator notes that given the language of Official
Comment 9, “in proper circumstances . . . buyers, too, could use this excuse” (LH, of impracticability
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under Section 2-615).
7   Even if the provision is applicable only to sellers, foreign exchange contracts
present a unique situation insofar as “a participant in such [a currency] exchange is both a seller with
respect to the currency it is delivering, and a buyer with respect to the currency it is receiving.”
8  This
raises the question of which seller should bear the risk.  It would appear logically that the seller of the
currency being converted into euros is the “seller” to which Section 2-615 refers.  Alternatively, this
appears to be an example of one particular situation in which Section 2-615 is applicable to both buyers
and sellers.
&RPPHUFLDO,PSUDFWLFDELOLW\DQGWKH8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\
The definition of foreign money in the UCC requires that consideration be given to whether the
euro will be circulating as the medium of exchange with the sanction of  the governments of the EU 
member states participating in EMU.
9  Since      the EU Council regulations,    which are directly applicable in
EU member states such as France and Germany, will define the euro to be legally identical to the
Deutsche mark and the French franc, respectively, the doctrine of commercial impracticability would be
unavailable.  Performance as agreed can be accomplished by delivery of the good — in this case by
delivery of the medium of exchange or currency that is circulating in Germany and France with the
sanction of the governments of Germany and France, the euro.
Notwithstanding the availability of the euro it might still be argued that performance as agreed has
been rendered commercially impracticable for other reasons.
10  In support of this argument it might be
suggested that while the law of the currency applies to the definition of foreign money in accordance with
the State theory of money, the question of whether the introduction of the euro can operate to discharge
contractual obligations is a question of contract law to be resolved in accordance with the governing law
of the contract.
11  Indeed, F.A. Mann appears to implicitly support this argument by suggesting that there
is no reason to assume that a serious and sudden depreciation of a currency can never be regarded as a
supervening change of circumstances within the scope of doctrines such as commercial impracticability.
12
Mann believes that forceful arguments to this effect can be made where a currency collapses so
completely as to render the currency worthless, thereby destroying the consideration altogether.
13 Thus,
some American commentators have argued, based on decisions made by American courts during the
American Civil War (including the Confederate dollar cases
14 and certain decisions handed down before
the decisions of the Supreme Court in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
15), that in the event of an utter collapse of
money American courts would adopt a revaluation device or develop some judicial relief on the ground of
unforeseen monetary changes.
16  It has been suggested that this argument is particularly forceful with
respect to long-term obligations.
17  Moreover, in one isolated case a U.S. court has actually held that the
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impact of inflation can render performance commercially impracticable under a long-term contract with a
price tied to an index that underestimated the impact of inflation.
18
It is submitted, however, that the invocation of the doctrine of commercial impracticability is
inconsistent with the State theory of money as reflected in the UCC and articulated by American courts.
The State theory of money requires that every contract for the payment of foreign money is necessarily
subject to the monetary sovereignty of a foreign country over its currency.
19  This sovereignty includes
the power to introduce a new currency in substitution for an old currency, and to specify the conversion
rate at which the substitution will take place and monetary obligations will be discharged.
20  Thus,
American courts can be expected to recognize the EU Council regulations providing for the continuity of
monetary obligations after EMU as an exercise of the monetary sovereignty of the    European   Union over
the currencies of EU member states.  Indeed, American courts have defined the State theory more
expansively than is necessary for the recognition of the provisions of the EU Council regulations ensuring
the continuity of contracts after EMU, permitting a country not only to require the discharge of monetary
obligations in accordance with the recurrent link but also to alter or abrogate contractual rights in the
aftermath of a currency change.
21  In either case, the State theory of money as articulated by American
courts prevents the invocation of contractual doctrines such as commercial impracticability as a means of
excusing obligations after EMU in contravention of the applicable provisions of the EU Council
regulations.
In addition, Mann’s suggestion that the collapse of a currency and concomitant destruction of the
consideration may render performance impracticable is not supported by various American authorities
involving the collapse of currencies such as the Russian ruble and successive Chinese currencies.  Indeed,
in these cases it was held that monetary obligations are afflicted with the “congenital infirmity” that they
are subject to the issuing government’s control over its currency.
22  In any case, arguments based on the
collapse of foreign currencies have no relevance to the highly organized plans of the    European Union for
an orderly transition to a single European   currency.  Finally, the isolated U.S. case that permitted a
reformation of a monetary obligation the performance of which had been rendered commercially
impracticable based on a fall in the real value of the U.S. dollar appears to contradict established
authority.
23
That the State theory of money prevents parties from raising doctrines like commercial
impracticability in order to excuse performance is also supported by the case law.  As previously noted,
the doctrine of commercial impracticability excuses performance rendered impracticable by unforeseen
supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.
24  As
discussed in some detail below,
25 the unforeseeability of a contingency is an integral element in the
doctrine of commercial impracticability.  The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that the fact that
a monetary change may have been unforeseeable at the time of contracting will not excuse performance
under a contract for the payment of money.
Thus, in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
26 where obligations originally denominated in gold dollars were
held to be dischargeable in paper dollars, the Court stated as follows:
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The expectation of the creditor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the
contract would be discharged by the payment of coined metals, but neither the expectation of
one party to the contract respecting its fruits, nor the anticipation of the other constitutes its
obligation.  There is a well-recognized distinction between the expectation of the parties to a
contract and the duty imposed by it .... [T]he obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay
that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made.
This language has been relied upon in a subsequent case upholding the continuity of a payment
obligation following the British abandonment of the gold standard.
27  Again, the appreciation of the
Canadian dollar following its unpegging from the U.S. dollar during the collapse of Bretton Woods, even
though giving rise to “unforeseen difficulties”, did not excuse performance under a fixed price contract.
28
These cases make it clear that doctrines permitting contracts to be terminated or otherwise discharged due
to the occurrence of unforeseeable events may not be invoked based on a change in a country’s monetary
system.
Even assuming for the purpose of argument that the doctrine of commercial impracticability can be
invoked after EMU it is still unlikely that the performance of contracts affected by EMU would be
rendered impracticable by the introduction of the euro.  It is to this subject that this study will now turn.
&RQFHSWRI)RUHVHHDELOLW\
Section 2-615 of the UCC excuses performance if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made.  The foreseeability of a contingency is an essential element in the doctrine
of commercial impracticability, and the Official Comments to the Code repeatedly emphasize that the
doctrine may not be invoked to excuse performance where the contingency was foreseeable.
Á Official Comment 1 to Section 2-615 states that the section is concerned with instances where
“performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.”
29
Á Official Comment 4 states that “[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the
rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the
performance.”
30
Á Official Comment 8 states that the excuse from performance provided by Section 2-615 does
“not apply when the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of
contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be regarded as part of
the dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial interpretation
from the circumstances.”
31
Consistent with this, courts have stated that “[i]f a contingency is foreseeable, it and its
consequences are taken outside the scope of U.C.C. § 2-615, because the party disadvantaged by fruition
of the contingency might have protected himself in his contract.”
32  The excuse on which commercial
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impracticability is based, however, must be “due to factors beyond the party’s control.”
33 A New York
case affirms that the UCC “reflects the common law standard of impracticability” and suggests that “[t]he
foreseeability requirement does not entail contemplation of a specific contingency; rather it is sufficient
that the contingency that eventually occurred could have been foreseen as a real possibility that would
affect performance.”
34  The common law standard will be considered in more depth below when we
consider the common law doctrines of frustration and impossibility.
35
American courts will take a broad view of the foreseeability of international political and economic
developments.  This point is demonstrated by several decisions upholding commercial contracts following
the eruption of the oil crisis during the 1970s.  In (DVWHUQ$LU/LQHVY*XOI2LO&RUS
36 it was argued that
a long-term contract to supply jet fuel from 1972 to 1977 at a controlled price had been rendered
commercially impracticable by the eruption of the oil crisis in 1973, which led to a 400% increase in the
price of foreign oil during the period from September 1973 to January 1974 alone.  The U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that “the events associated with the so-called energy crises
were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was executed” in June 1972, and in reaching this
conclusion the court highlighted “the volatility of the Middle East situation” (e.g., the interruption in the
flow of Mid-East oil during the 1967 “Six-Day War”, Libya’s nationalization of its oil industry during the
same period and the formation of OPEC in 1970 for the avowed purpose of raising oil prices).
37  The
court stated that “[e]ven without the extensive evidence present in the record, the court would be justified
in taking judicial notice of the fact that oil has been used as a political weapon with increasing success by
the oil-producing nations for many years, and Gulf was well aware and assumed the risk that the OPEC
nations would do exactly what they have done.”
38
In  3XEOLFNHU ,QGXVWULHV ,QF Y 8QLRQ &DUELGH &RUS
39 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that a three-year contract entered into in 1972 for the supply of ethanol, the
major cost component of which is natural gas, had not been rendered commercially impracticable by a
near doubling in costs due to the energy crisis.  It was argued that at the time of the contract it was
completely    unforeseeable that the oil producing nations would bring about such exorbitant price  
increases.  The court agreed, however, with the contention that “because the oil producing nations had
joined together in 1971 to effect a 25% price increase, further price increases of the same kind were not
unforeseeable at the time of the contact.”
40
Again, in +HOPV&RQVWUXFWLRQ 	'HYHORSPHQW&RY6WDWHRI1HYDGD
41 the Supreme Court of
Nevada held that the performance of contracts entered into in 1972 had not been rendered commercially
impracticable by the dramatic increase in the cost of petroleum-based products following the imposition
of the oil embargo by the Arab nations.  “The Arab oil embargo, although perhaps not within the
contemplation of the parties, [was] ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”
42
Another line of cases touching upon the foreseeability of geopolitical events arose out of the closure
of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian government in late 1956.  In *OLGGHQ&RY+HOHQLF/LQHV/WG,
43 it was
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argued that shipping contracts for the transportation of goods from India to the east coast of the United
States had been frustrated by the closure of the canal because the alternative routes – via the Cape of
Good Hope or the Panama Canal – were not economically feasible.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that performance of the charter parties had not been frustrated because at the time of
the negotiations leading to their signing “the Egyptian government had already nationalized the Suez
Canal and the possibility of war in the Sinai Peninsula and the closing of the Canal were discussed in the
public press and were recognized by the parties.”
44
Again, in    7UDQVDWODQWLF)LQDQFLQJ&RUSY8QLWHG6WDWHV
45 the U.S. Court of   Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that a shipping contract entered into after the canal’s nationalization in early 1956 had not
been rendered commercially impracticable by its subsequent closure, the court assuming “that the parties
were aware, as were most commercial men with interests affected by the Suez situation, that the Canal
might become a dangerous area.”
46
In conclusion, American courts can be expected to take an expansive view of the foreseeability of
international political and economic developments.
)RUHVHHDELOLW\RI(08
While the occurrence of EMU is undoubtedly “beyond a party’s control” in a contract between two
private parties, its long-standing foreseeability would appear to preclude the availability of the UCC
doctrine of commercial impracticability.  At the very latest, EMU became a foreseeable event when the
Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993, or earlier when the Treaty was signed by the heads
of    state and government of the then 12    member states of the European Community in   February 1992, at
which time the world was put on notice that the    member states   intended to establish a monetary union.
47
Strong arguments can also be made that EMU became foreseeable earlier still when it was decided at the
Madrid summit meeting of the European Council in 1989 to launch the first stage of EMU or when it was
decided at the Hanover summit in June 1988 to commission the Delors report on monetary union.
48  It can
also be argued that some form of monetary union has long been a goal of the European Community,
going right back to the publication of the Werner Report in 1970 and the establishment of an exchange
rate mechanism and later the European Monetary System in response to the collapse of Bretton Woods
during the 1970s.
49
More broadly, in view of the widespread acceptance of the State theory of money and the fact that
all countries have, at various times in history, changed their currencies, it may be argued that all manner
of currency alterations are generally foreseeable.  Parties may therefore be said to assume the risk of a
currency alteration when they enter into a contract.
It is possible that arguments might be advanced that EMU was not foreseeable, perhaps even after
the Maastricht Treaty came into effect.  Such  arguments might emphasize the high degree of skepticism
that has permeated the financial markets regarding the EMU project, especially in the aftermath of the
ERM currency crisis in 1993 and the related teething pains involved in shepherding the passage of the
Maastricht Treaty through the EU    member states.
50  It might also be   pointed out that by year-end 1996 a
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majority of the    member states did not appear to   satisfy all of the Maastricht Treaty’s economic
convergence criteria.
51  Furthermore, there can be no certainty as to which    member states will qualify for
EMU until the   decision is finally made by the European Council, currently expected to take place in May
1998.
It is submitted, however, that the fact that considerable skepticism may have pervaded international
financial markets is irrelevant.  A prudent court would refuse to accept that EMU was unforeseeable after
the political decision had been made to proceed with EMU and the Maastricht Treaty had been signed.  It
is not necessary to show that EMU may have appeared implausible in the financial markets, particularly
in the United States.  U.S. courts take a broad view of the concept of foreseeability when considering the
application of the UCC doctrine of commercial impracticability, especially in the context of the
foreseeability of international political and economic developments.
52  Thus, in order to demonstrate the
foreseeability of EMU it is not necessary to show that its occurrence was probable, but rather that the
occurrence of EMU was a real possibility.
53  It is submitted that the decision by the heads of    state and
government to launch the first stage of EMU in   1989 placed the global financial markets on notice that
EMU had become a real possibility.  In addition, the introduction of a new currency by DQ\ country is
arguably always a real possibility in view of the experiences of history and the long line of currencies that
have come and gone in so many countries.
Another factor to be borne in mind is that it is possible for parties to include provisions in their
contracts guarding against the possibility of EMU.  The case law makes it clear that the failure to include
such provisions counts against the party suffering from the event in question, who could have included
protective clauses in the relevant contract.
54  In this regard it is instructive to note that a large number of
U.S. issuers and counterparties have taken account of EMU in their legal documents since the Maastricht
Treaty came into force in late 1993.
55
([SDQVLYH9LHZRI&RPPHUFLDO,PSUDFWLFDELOLW\
There is a line of authority that has taken an expansive view of the doctrine of commercial
impracticability, suggesting that there may be circumstances where Section 2-615 of the UCC may be
invoked notwithstanding the foreseeability of the contingency in question.
In  7UDQVDWODQWLF )LQDQFLQJ,
56 the court stated that in any attempt to define impossibility or
impracticability, “[t]he doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully
responsive to commercial practices and mores, at which the community’s interest in having contracts
enforced according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring
performance.”  While the need to deviate from the normal shipping route due to the closure of the Suez
Canal may have been foreseeable, the court stated as follows with respect to the concept of foreseeability:
Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation  .  .  .
Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the possibilities of which they are
aware, sometimes because they cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy.
Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily
establish an allocation of the risk of the contingency which actually occurs.
57
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In $OXPLQXP&RRI$PHULFDY(VVH[*URXS,QF,
58 it was stated that this
approach is more in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code
than is the strict approach.    . . .   Courts must decide the point at which the community’s interest
in predictable contract enforcement shall yield to the fact that enforcement of a particular
contract would be commercially senseless and unjust.
59
This more expansive view of commercial impracticability has been echoed by certain commentators
who have argued that the basic problem in every discharge case is to decide who should bear the loss
resulting from an event that has rendered performance by one party uneconomical
60 and that “the case for
excuse, at bottom, rests on notions of justice”.
61  This broad view of the doctrine of commercial
impracticability cannot, however, remove foreseeability as an element of impracticability.  Taken
together, the case law and the Official Comments to Section 2-615 of the UCC demonstrate that
foreseeability of a contingency is an integral element in the doctrine of commercial impracticability.  The
long-standing foreseeability of EMU should preclude the availability of the doctrine as excusing
performance under the vast majority of contracts denominated in EU currencies.  Moreover, it would be
unjust as a general matter to excuse performance based on EMU.  Exchange rates and currency values are
subject to the vagaries of all kinds of macroeconomic and political factors.  These factors fall into the
category of risks which all contracting parties must be taken to have assumed from the outset.
In addition, courts are generally slow to relieve parties from the terms of their bargains, particularly
when the parties obtain exactly what was contracted for.  This is demonstrated by one case arising out of
the introduction of Japanese exchange control regulations after the collapse of Bretton Woods.  In 8QLWHG
(TXLWLHV&RY)LUVW1DWLRQDO&LW\%DQN
62 the parties entered into a six month forward contract in April
1971 for the purchase of Japanese yen with U.S. dollars at a pre-determined rate with settlement taking
place in October 1971.  President Nixon announced in August 1971 that U.S. dollars would no longer be
convertible into gold.  This announcement caused the Japanese government to impose various currency
and foreign exchange regulations which had the effect of severely restricting the ability of non-Japanese
residents to hold yen bank accounts.  Because the yen purchaser was unable to make satisfactory
arrangements to obtain delivery of the yen on the maturity date as a result of these regulations, the seller
liquidated the account by offsetting the contract price of the April contract against the spot or market
price of the yen on the maturity date and crediting the difference to the yen purchaser’s account in U.S.
dollars, the yen purchaser realizing a profit as a result of the dollar’s depreciation following the
demonetization of gold.  The yen purchaser was not satisfied with his profit, however, arguing that he had
a right to delayed delivery of the yen for a three-month period under a force majeure clause in the contract
because the contract had been frustrated.  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
there had been no frustration of the reasonable expectations of the parties because the yen purchaser had
received and the yen seller had paid “exactly what the parties had contracted for, the profit due to the
increased value of the Yen on October 14, 1971.”
63  The court emphasized that there can be no frustration
of the expectations of the parties where  the yen purchaser “has realized and been paid the full benefit and
profit contracted for.”
64  The court arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the yen
purchaser did not in fact obtain the yen but rather the U.S. dollar equivalent of the yen on the maturity
date, thereby depriving the purchaser of the opportunity to hold the yen beyond the maturity date for
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investment purposes.
65  This case demonstrates that the courts will not lightly treat performance under a
foreign exchange contract as frustrated or commercially impracticable due to the introduction of exchange
controls.  The case also demonstrates that parties will be held to the terms of their agreement, especially
where they have obtained what has been contracted    for (i.e., the lawful currency of   the country designated
in the contract).
&RPPHUFLDO,PSUDFWLFDELOLW\DQG&HUWDLQ6ZDS7UDQVDFWLRQV
This study will next consider several kinds of transactions whose performance might be argued to
have been rendered commercially impracticable after EMU.
D&URVV&XUUHQF\,QWHUHVW5DWH6ZDSV
Because so many U.S. counterparties select New York law as the governing law for their swap
contracts,
66 New York law is the governing law for a large number of cross currency interest rate swaps
that involve obligations to make  payments in two EU currencies  both of which are eligible to participate
in EMU (e.g., a Deutsche mark/French franc swap).  If each of the currencies underlying such a swap
were to merge into the single currency the swap contract would be transformed into an obligation by one
party to make net payments to its counterparty for the remaining life of the contract, transforming the
swap into an obligation akin to an annuity.  In such a scenario it would be arguable that the survival of the
two separate currencies underlying the swap, together with the independent interest rate climates
associated with such currencies, was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made and against
which the swap was actually designed to hedge.  Notwithstanding the foreseeability of EMU, it might not
be equitable to insist on performance because the basic purpose of such a swap would arguably be
undermined by the occurrence of EMU.  As stated by ISDA to the European Commission, “[t]he swap
derives its purpose from the fact that (a) currencies may fluctuate in value as against each other, and (b)
different interest rates apply to different currencies.  Neither of these reasons would continue to apply
following conversion of the underlying currencies to a single currency.”
67
Moreover, a cross currency swap between two participating currencies could be subjected to
different tax treatment after EMU.  The tax implications of EMU for certain derivative transactions such
as cross-currency swaps involving two participating currencies is currently being examined by the
financial markets as there is a concern in certain jurisdictions that the removal of any currency risk
between participating currencies upon the fixing of conversion rates may cause profits to be capable of
recognition earlier than would otherwise be the case.
68  Under the U.S. income tax regulations the general
rule is that gains, profits and income are to be included in gross income for the taxable year in which they
are actually or constructively received by the taxpayer unless includible in a different year in accordance
with the taxpayer’s method of accounting.
69  Under an accrual method of accounting, income is includible
in gross income when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the
amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.
70  Clearly a strong argument can be made
that upon the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates all the events have occurred which fix the right to
receive a readily determinable amount of income under a cross-currency swap between two currencies
both of which have been irrevocably converted into the single currency.  The outcome of the contract can
be calculated with certainty and the exchange difference may be realized for a determinable amount of
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money that only changes because of the time value of money.  The tax exempt treatment of foreign
exchange gains under a cross-currency swap might be regarded as a basic assumption of the contract.  It
does not appear that this issue has been considered yet by the U.S. tax authorities.
71
E&XUUHQF\2SWLRQV
With respect to currency options involving two participating currencies, ISDA has noted as follows:
The commercial essence of the contract is the unpredictable volatility of currency exchange
rates - the value of the contract to the optionholder derives from the possibility that, by the
exercise date, the currency the optionholder is entitled to receive will be worth more than the
deliverable currency.  If both currencies are converted into a single currency then the
exchange rate between them is effectively frozen.  The optionholder loses the volatility from
which the option value derives.
72
In addition, the income tax treatment of such currency options might be affected by the irrevocable
fixing of the conversion rates because, as with cross currency swaps between two participating currencies,
the outcome of the contract can be predicted with certainty from the moment the rates have been fixed.
F&RQWLQXLW\RI&XUUHQF\6ZDSVDQG2SWLRQV
Strong arguments can be made that, assuming currency swaps are not subjected to different tax
treatment after EMU, performance of all relevant currency swaps and options should be required because
each party will obtain exactly what they have contracted for.  The irrevocable fixing of conversion rates
and the merger of the two currencies underlying the swap or option was one of the risks assumed by the
parties at the time they entered into the transaction.  Moreover, there is no guarantee, even today, that
particular    member states will satisfy the necessary   conditions for adoption of the single currency.  Also,
in view of the continuing importance of the nation    state in European politics, there has been speculation
in the   financial markets that    member states initially participating in EMU might   subsequently withdraw
and re-establish their national currencies which would then float against the euro.  The belief (however
irrational) that this might occur would provide a rationale for cross currency swap transactions between
participating currencies after the introduction of the single currency, particularly during the transitional
period when the national legal tenders will still be in circulation and a withdrawal from EMU might still
be believed possible.  For all of these reasons it is submitted that the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates
should not be viewed as rendering the performance of such currency swaps or options commercially
impracticable.  In this regard, it is instructive to note that several English lawyers considering this issue
from the perspective of the common law doctrine of frustration have arrived at the same conclusion.
73
Perhaps most important of all, the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the euro provides that the introduction of the euro will not have the effect of altering any
term of a legal instrument (which would of course include a swap contract) or of discharging or excusing
performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate a legal
instrument, subject to anything which the parties may have agreed with reference to the introduction of
the euro.
74 The Preamble to this regulation makes it clear that the EU authorities anticipate that this
provision will be recognized in non-EU jurisdictions as part of “the monetary law” of the European
Union, that “the recognition of the monetary law of a state is a universally accepted principle”; and   that
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“the explicit confirmation of the principle of continuity should lead to the recognition of continuity of
contracts and other legal instruments in the jurisdictions of third countries”.
75  Clearly this provision
prevents the invocation of doctrines like commercial impracticability to excuse performance under
currency swap or option contracts involving two currencies participating in EMU.  With respect to swaps
and options that are governed by New York law, the sovereign power of the    European   Union to establish
a new monetary system permits the EU    Council to enact   legislation stipulating the manner in which
monetary obligations contained in currency contracts are to be discharged    after EMU.
76  In the absence of
U.S. federal legislation to the contrary, all swaps and options governed by New York law and
denominated in EU currencies are necessarily subject to the sovereign powers of the    European Union in
this respect.
,QFUHDVHG&RVWRI3HUIRUPDQFH
Official Comment 4 to Section 2-615 of the UCC states that “[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse
performance unless the rise is due to some unforseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the
performance, and a rise or a collapse in the market is not in itself a justification for that is exactly the type
of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.”
77  Thus, the fact that
performance has been rendered costly should not in general afford an excuse from performance.
78
([SLU\RI([FOXVLYH6RXUFHRI6XSSO\
Official Comment 5 to Section 2-615 of the UCC states that the doctrine of commercial
impracticability is available “[w]here a particular source of supply is exclusive under the agreement and
fails through casualty”, or “where a particular source of supply is shown by the circumstances to have
been contemplated or assumed by the parties at the time of contracting.”
79  Official Comment 5 further
states that “[i]n the case of failure of production by an agreed source for causes beyond the seller’s
control, the seller should, if possible, be excused since production by an agreed source is without more a
basic assumption of the contract.”
80  Applied to EMU, the somewhat aggressive argument might be made
that the Deutsche Bundesbank, for example, provides the exclusive source of the supply of the Deutsche
mark commodity and that the continued issuance by the Bundesbank or some other German governmental
authority of the German currency is without more a basic assumption on which the contract was made.  If
Germany transfers its sovereign powers to issue currency and to implement and define monetary policy to
a new supranational European Central Bank, the exclusive source of the supply of the Deutsche mark will
have expired.
This argument is inconsistent with the concept of money adopted by the UCC.  The definition of
money does not require that money be issued by a particular government, but rather that it be authorized
or adopted by a government as its medium of exchange.
81  The    EU Council will adopt the euro as    the
currency of   participating EU member states.  Moreover, national central banks such as the Deutsche
Bundesbank    will issue    the new currency under the authority of the   European Central Bank and will
continue to influence the direction of monetary policy through their participation in the decision-making
process of the European Central Bank.
82  To that extent it would be inaccurate to suggest that national
central banks like the Bundesbank will    cease to provide a source of supply for the new   currency.  In any
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case, it appears counter-intuitive to suggest that a central bank’s issuance of currency provides the source
of supply for the production of a commodity within the meaning of Section 2-615 of the UCC.
&RPSOLDQFHZLWK$SSOLFDEOH)RUHLJQ*RYHUQPHQWDO5HJXODWLRQV
Section 2-615 of the UCC excuses performance if performance as agreed has been made
impracticable by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental
regulation or order whether or not it later proves to  be invalid.
83  Official Comment 10 states that
“governmental interference cannot excuse unless it truly ‘supervenes’ in such a manner as to be beyond
the seller’s assumption of risk.”
84  The EU Council regulations confirming the continuity of contracts
after EMU will not hinder performance but will actually facilitate the performance of contracts.  This is
another factor that would prevent any party from raising the doctrine of commercial impracticability as
excusing performance under swap and foreign exchange contracts.
6XEVWLWXWHG3HUIRUPDQFH
Section 2-614(1) of the Code provides that “[w]here without fault of either party . . . the agreed
manner of delivery . . . becomes commercially impracticable but a commercially reasonable substitute is
available, such substitute performance must be tendered and accepted.”
85  Section 2-614(2) of the Code
provides that “[i]f the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign
governmental regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or
manner of payment which is commercially a substantial equivalent.”
86  If there was any doubt regarding
the legal continuity between the euro and the national currencies participating in EMU, these provisions
would clearly facilitate the discharge of obligations in the euro as a commercially reasonable substitute
and substantial equivalent for the pre-existing national currencies.
%'RFWULQHRI,PSRVVLELOLW\
There are many financial obligations denominated in EU currencies that are not governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code, particularly payment obligations under interest rate swaps, Eurobonds,
international loans and cross-border commercial transactions.  The legal implications of EMU for such
contracts must be considered under common law doctrines such as the doctrines of impossibility and
frustration, and in the case of many cross-border commercial transactions under the U.N. Convention for
the International Sale of Goods.
&RQWRXUVRI'RFWULQHRI,PSRVVLELOLW\
Under the doctrine of impossibility nonperformance of a contract is typically excused “only when
the destruction of the subject matter of the contract or the means of performance renders performance
objectively impossible.”
87  Thus, performance is excused where performance becomes impossible
because of a change in the law or action taken by the government.
88  The doctrine is available in the event
of the destruction of the subject matter of the contract: “[i]n the absence of an express contract provision,
if the act to be performed is necessarily dependent on the continued existence of a specific thing, the
perishing of that thing before time for performance, without the fault of the promisor, will excuse a
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breach of the contract . . . .  [T]he contingency which has arisen is treated as one about which no bargain
at all was made.”
89  It has been suggested that the question of whether a contract is dependent on the
continued existence of a given thing “must be gathered from the intention of the parties as expressed in
the instrument as a whole.”
90  It is important to emphasize that “where impossibility or difficulty of
performance is occasioned only by financial difficulty or economic hardship, even to the extent of
insolvency or bankruptcy, performance of a contract is not excused.”
91
A court may consider that there is, given the nature of a specific contract, an implied condition of
impossibility by which a party will be relieved from his or her unqualified obligation when it inherently
appears from the contract to have been known to the parties and contemplated by them when it was made
that its fulfillment would be dependent upon the continuance of or existence at the time for performance
of certain things or conditions essential to its execution.
92
Foreseeability is a consideration in determining whether the defense of impossibility applies.  The
excuse of impossibility of performance must be the result of an unanticipated event that could not be
foreseen or protected against in the contract.
93  This principle has been repeatedly reiterated by the New
York courts.
94  The prevailing view in other American jurisdictions seems to be that where the event
which causes the impossibility might have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract, an
unqualified undertaking is to be construed as an absolute contract to perform the things which
subsequently become impossible or to pay damages for their non-performance.
95
Common law courts have traditionally been slow to relieve a party of obligations entered into by
contract and have traditionally been wary of excuses proffered after the fact.  This has led over the years
to a strict standard of foreseeability.  One explanation is typical:
It is clear that a person who makes an absolute promise to pay may not be excused from
performance because of the happening of a contingency which destroys the value of the
stipulated consideration for such payment where inference is reasonable that an express
condition so providing would have been inserted in the contract had the parties so intended.
Where the promisor has knowingly chosen to make an absolute promise, he may not
afterwards claim relief because subsequent events show that the choice was ill-advised.  The
test seems to be whether the event¼was or might have been guarded against.
96
Parties are meant to be hard bargainers and to think about possible contingencies preventing
performance before they sign a contract.  One court denying that a governmental change of policy was
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foreseeable noted that both parties to a contract “were surely aware that theirs is a business subject to
governmental approval and regulation.”
97
,PSRVVLELOLW\DQG(08
Applying the doctrine of impossibility to EMU, it might be argued that the performance of a
financial contract denominated in an existing EU national currency has been rendered impossible where
that currency disappears and is replaced by a new single European currency.  Thus, one commentator has
suggested that if the currency promised is wholly withdrawn from circulation by government action so
that it is no longer a medium of exchange, the case should be regarded as one in impossibility of
performance by act of the law.
98  On this argument, the contract is necessarily dependent on the continued
existence of the currency in which the obligation was denominated, and the introduction of the euro by
the governments of the countries participating in EMU may render performance impossible by destroying
the subject matter of the contract.  A variation of this theory would be to argue that the continued
existence of separate European national currencies was an implied condition of the contract, and the
contract was therefore dependent upon the continuance of a monetary system in Europe that is linked to
the nation    state.
99
This argument would not persuade American courts to disturb the continuity   of European currency
contracts.  In accordance with the State theory of money, the subject-matter of the contract is not a
particular national currency issued by a particular government but rather whatever money passes as
lawful currency at the time and place of payment.  This is firmly established at common law and under
the UCC.
100  Thus, the subject-matter of the contract will be the euro substituted for the national
currencies at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.  Commentators like Mann and Nussbaum agree that
it can never be impossible to perform monetary obligations because monetary obligations are
indestructible.
101  In the event of the extinction of a currency the recurrent link, connecting the new
currency with the old currency, will always define the amount payable.
102
An additional reason why the defense of impossibility will not be open to litigants after EMU is that
the defense is only available where performance is rendered impossible by the occurrence of an
unanticipated event.  As previously discussed,
103 EMU has long been a goal of the European Community
and has been foreseeable  since the decision to commission the Delors Report at the European Council
summit in Hanover in June 1988, followed by the decision in 1989 to launch the first stage of EMU.  At
the very latest EMU became foreseeable after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in early 1992.  More
broadly, in view of the widespread acceptance of the State theory of money and the long history of
currency changes, a compelling argument can be made that the introduction of a new currency by a
country is always inherently foreseeable.  In addition, the standard of foreseeability is explicitly based on
whether the parties could or should have allocated risks in their contract.
104  The long-standing
preparations by the financial markets for EMU, including the decision by many operators in the financial
markets to revise legal documentation in anticipation of EMU, will provide ample evidence for American
courts that the risks arising out of the introduction of the single European currency could have been
guarded against in financial transactions.
105
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&RQWRXUVRI'RFWULQHRI)UXVWUDWLRQ
The common law doctrine of frustration stems from a series of English cases known as the
“coronation cases”.  Purchasers of tickets to a British coronation parade in 1902 sought their money back
when the parade was delayed because of the monarch’s illness, arguing that their purpose in contracting
was “frustrated” because the object of the contract was to see the parade.  Beginning with .UHOO Y
+HQU\,
106 English courts accepted this doctrine, holding that “the coronation procession was the
foundation of this contract” and that “the object of the contract was frustrated by the non-happening of the
coronation and its procession on the days proclaimed”.  American courts adopted the doctrine of
frustration of purpose soon thereafter.
107
It has been held that in order to establish the defense of frustration, “the inducing circumstance
which no longer exists must be ‘the foundation of the contract’.”
108  Again, it has been stated that
“frustration of purpose refers to a situation where an unforeseen event has occurred, which, in the context
of the entire transaction, destroys the underlying reasons for performing the contract, even though
performance is possible, thus operating to discharge a party’s duties of performance.”
109  The concept of
the “underlying reasons” for performance may be stated differently using another term from contract law:
the “benefit of the bargain.”  Thus the doctrine of frustration
focuses on events which materially affect the consideration received by one party for his
performance.  Both parties can perform but, as a result of unforeseeable events, performance
by party X would no longer give party Y what induced him to make the bargain in the first
place.  Thus frustrated, Y may rescind the contract.
110
The application of the doctrine of frustration is narrow.  “Discharge under this doctrine has been
limited to instances where a virtually cataclysmic, wholly unforeseeable event renders the contract
valueless to one party.”
111  The courts have repeatedly emphasized that the supervening event must be one
which was not foreseeable by the parties and therefore could not have been guarded against in the
contract.
112  Indeed it has been suggested that it is this factor “more than any other upon which New York
cases have generally focused, i.e., whether or not the supervening event was within the contemplation of
the parties and might have been guarded against.”
113  There appears to be general agreement under the
laws of all American jurisdictions that the common law doctrine of frustration does not apply where the
risk of the event that has supervened to cause the alleged frustration was reasonably foreseeable and could
have been anticipated by the parties by making provision therefor in the contract.
114  It has also been
emphasized that the doctrine of frustration does “not permit a party to abrogate a contract, unilaterally,
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merely upon a showing that it would be financially disadvantageous to perform it; were the rules
otherwise, they would place in jeopardy all commercial contracts.”
115
A more expansive view of the doctrine of frustration has been advanced in one case where it was
stated that “New York, to a large extent, follows the principle of commercial frustration, as outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 285” which, like the doctrine of commercial impracticability under
the Uniform Commercial Code, speaks of a contract being frustrated “by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made”.
116   Working from
this premise, the court characterized the doctrine of frustration as a way for courts to allocate risk not
allocated between the parties in their contract.
Essentially, the principle of commercial frustration affords a means by which courts allocate
risk in order to decide who is to bear the burden of any event not provided for by the parties’
agreement.  And, although the courts have attempted to outline its components, it actually
involves the balancing of interests in light of the facts involved and society’s customs and
mores.  The basic test is whether the parties contracted on a basic assumption that a particular
contingency would not occur.
117
A contract may be frustrated by unforeseen government orders.
118  The applicability of the doctrine
of frustration has been examined in the context of the introduction of exchange control regulations.  In
8QLWHG(TXLWLHV a forward contract for the purchase of yen with dollars was discharged by payment of the
U.S. dollar equivalent of the yen owing under the contract on the maturity date.
119  Although payment of
the yen had been prevented by the introduction of supervening exchange control regulations, it was held
that payment of the U.S. dollar equivalent value of the yen did not frustrate “the reasonable expectations
of the parties” because the purchaser of yen received and the seller paid “exactly what the parties had
contracted for, the profit due to the increased value of the yen” on the maturity date.
120
In  %DQN RI $PHULFD Y (QYDVHV 9HQH]RODQRV 6$
121 a Venezuelan company entered into an
agreement with an American bank for the restructuring of certain loans made by the American bank to
enable the Venezuelan company to make repayments through the Venezuelan Central Bank at a favorable
exchange rate under a scheme established by the Central Bank to subsidize Venezuelan companies with
foreign currency debts.  It was held that the revocation of this scheme by the Central Bank did not
frustrate the purpose of the loan restructuring agreement because the agreement contemplated the
possibility of a change in the applicable Venezuelan currency regulations.
122
)UXVWUDWLRQDQG(08
In view of the requirement that the frustrating event be unforeseeable, there are few transactions
that could be dischargeable under the common law doctrine of frustration after EMU.
123  In any case,    in
accordance with the State theory of money   all obligations denominated in EU currencies must be
discharged in the single currency in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU Council
regulations.
124  The financial obligations which are most likely to be relevant in the context of the
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doctrine of frustration concern interest rate obligations.  It might be argued that the fundamental purpose
underlying interest rate obligations has been undermined as a result of the overhaul of the existing system
of interest rates linked to separate European national currencies.  This argument must be considered from
the perspective of both fixed and floating interest rates.
D)ORDWLQJ,QWHUHVW5DWH2EOLJDWLRQV
There are many rate swaps governed by New York law involving floating interest rates that are
linked to existing EU national currencies.  A rate swap is a bilateral agreement in which each of the
parties promises to make periodic payments in the same currency to the other, calculated as one would
calculate interest payments on the principal amount of a debt obligation using fixed to floating interest
rate bases or floating to floating bases (i.e., basis swaps).
125  In addition,  there may also be floating rate
obligations linked to debt obligations denominated in EU national currencies that are governed by New
York law.  Following the introduction of the single currency, price sources relating to specific national
currencies may disappear or be substantially modified and may be replaced with new price sources
relating to the single currency.  In addition, existing panels of banks in particular countries that quote
national currency rates may cease to quote any rates after EMU and may instead be replaced by a single
pricing panel drawn from throughout the euro area to provide euro rate quotations.  
126
i.  Frustration and Floating Rates
In the context of the doctrine of frustration, the question arises whether the possible disappearance
of a price source and/or related pricing panel for a floating interest rate linked to an existing national
currency would either destroy the underlying reasons for performing a contract or undermine a basic
assumption upon which a contract is made.
127
There is older common law authority supporting the proposition that contracts may be frustrated
where the price source for the contract has become unavailable.  In ,QWHUVWDWH3O\ZRRG6DOHV&RY
,QWHUVWDWH&RQWDLQHU&RUS
128 a supply contract containing an option to purchase certain quantities of
plywood provided that plywood would be sold at “Market price”, which was defined as “the published
market price” for five specified mills.  The five-mill pricing formula became unworkable shortly after the
contract was executed because some of the listed mills went out of business, and others did not publish
prices.
129  It was held that “[p]rice is an essential contractual element:  it cannot be supplied by the court,
and when the price cannot be determined in the manner in which the parties intended, the contract is
unenforceable.”
130  Again in /RXLVYLOOH6RDS&RY7D\ORU
131 the parties to a contract were relieved of
their obligations where the price of goods sold was to be determined by the official closing price of a
Board of Trade on the day an order was received and there were no closing prices during the last part of
the contract period.  In 7XUPDQ2LO&RY6DSXOSD5HI&R
132 a contract for the sale of oil at a price
determined by a particular company terminated when the company began to post several prices depending
upon the grade of oil.
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Taken together, these cases clearly indicate that the disappearance of price sources for floating rates
linked to national currencies might be regarded as destroying the underlying reasons for performing a
contract.
133  However, insofar as these cases involved contracts for the sale of goods, they have been
supplanted by Section 2-305(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code.  Section 2-305(1) of the UCC provides
that where the price in a contract of sale is not settled because “the price is to be fixed in terms of some
agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or
recorded”, then “[i]n such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time of delivery.”
134  In 1RUWK
&HQWUDO$LUOLQHVY&RQWLQHQWDO2LO&R
135 the parties entered into a long-term contract for the purchase
and supply of aviation fuel with the price to be determined using a benchmark price for particular crude
oil posted in a periodic bulletin.  It was held that when the U.S. Government introduced a two-tier pricing
system for new and old oil in response to the 1970s oil crisis, the agreed standard failed because there
were then two prices posted, and the contract would instead have to be enforced through the substitution
by the court of a reasonable price in the absence of the old price source.
136  This case has been followed in
subsequent decisions holding that courts should admit evidence to determine a reasonable price when a
pricing clause is ambiguous.
137  While the UCC is inapplicable to interest rate swaps, it can be reasonably
expected that its provisions would be applied by analogy by American courts so as to substitute a
reasonable price source for existing interest rate price sources after EMU.
138
There is also older common law authority supporting the proposition that courts should construe a
pricing term in a contract reasonably so as to substitute an equivalent price where the price source
unexpectedly disappears.  In 1HYDGD+DOI0RRQ0LQLQJ&RY&RPELQHG0HWDOV5HGXFWLRQ&R
139 the
parties entered into a contract for the assignment of certain mining claims with an agreement that the
assignor would be paid an annual 2½% royalty on returns (profits) resulting from the sale of ores mined
from the property. It was held that when the U.S. Government introduced ceilings on certain minerals and
paid subsidies to the mining company for ores produced from the property, the assignor was entitled to
royalty payments on the subsidies even though they were not provided for in the contract.  Cautioning
that “a contract should not be so narrowly or technically interpreted as to frustrate its obvious design or so
loosely construed as to relieve a party of an obligation or liability fairly within its scope or spirit”, the
court held that the subsidy payments “were the equivalent of returns from the production and processing
of ores extracted from the premises within the scope of the contract.”
140
By analogy, successor price sources for euro interest rates that are established after EMU should be
regarded by American courts as legally equivalent to the pre-existing national currency rate sources that
they replace.  In this regard market operators have recognized that the disappearance of existing price
sources for national currency rates may be seen as a natural consequence of the move to a unified euro
money market.  
141  Since the emergence of euro rates is an inevitable consequence of the changeover to
the single currency, successor rates established for the euro should be recognized as reasonable substitutes
for existing rates linked to EU national currencies.  This interpretation will ensure that parties are not
relieved of obligations within the scope and spirit of applicable floating rate contracts.  This approach is
also consistent with the principle that “[a] contract should be construed, if possible, so as to sustain it
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rather than convert it into something . . . unenforceable.”  
142  In this regard it is instructive to note that
certain English lawyers who have analyzed this issue under the common law doctrines of frustration and
impossibility have concluded that there should be no difficulty substituting euro price sources for existing
national currency price sources.
143
While the introduction of new price sources should not, in and of itself, affect the continuity of
contracts, questions may still arise as to the appropriate price source to employ following EMU.
144  It has
been suggested that while the replacement of a national rate calculated from national bank quotes by a
euro rate calculated from national bank sources would pose minimal legal uncertainties, the replacement
of a national rate by an international rate calculated from the quotes of banks in various countries could
lead a court to conclude that the new euro rate is not a comparable successor rate.
145  It is submitted,
however, that when a national rate is completely abolished and replaced by a successor rate calculated for
the EMU-zone as a whole, American courts could be reasonably expected to construe the contract by
substituting the EMU-zone successor rate, thereby sustaining the contract rather than rendering it
unenforceable.
ii.  State Theory of Money and Continuity of Floating Rate Obligations
The strongest argument for the continuity of floating rate obligations after EMU is based on the
State theory of money.  The EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of
the euro establishes the “generally accepted principle of law that the continuity of contracts and other
legal instruments is not affected by the introduction of a new currency”, and provides that the introduction
of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal instrument or of discharging or
excusing performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or
terminate a legal instrument, subject to anything which the parties may have agreed with reference to the
introduction of the euro.
146  The principle of the continuity of contracts clearly implies that vanishing
national rate price sources should be replaced by successor euro rate price sources.  Thus, market
operators have suggested that the recognition of successor rates may follow from the fact that the EU
Council regulation provides that the terms of contracts are not to be affected by the changeover to the
single currency   .
147
The preamble to the regulation notes that “the recognition of the monetary law of a state is a
universally accepted principle” and that “the explicit confirmation of continuity should lead to the
recognition of continuity of contracts .  .  . in the jurisdictions of third countries”.
148  Because the
replacement of national rate price sources by euro rate price sources would be a direct consequence of the
introduction of the single currency, the establishment of successor euro rate price sources should be
recognized under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions as flowing from the exercise of the monetary sovereignty
of the European Union over the currencies of EU member states.
149  This monetary sovereignty extends to
the regulation of all monetary obligations contained in private contracts, including interest rate
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obligations.
150  Thus, the continuity of floating rate obligations in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable EU Council regulation should be recognized under U.S. law.
iii.  ISDA Standard Form and Floating Rates
The plain and unambiguous terms of the ISDA standard form, under which the vast majority of rate
swaps governed by New York law are documented, make specific provision for the substitution of euro
rate sources for existing EU national currency rate sources.  Take for example the floating rates for the
Italian lire specified in the 1991 ISDA standard form definitions.
151  Most of the rates for deposits in the
Italian lire are the rates which appear on designated pages of the Reuters Screen or Telerate.
152  The ISDA
form defines the “Reuters Screen” to mean, when used in connection with any designated page and any
relevant floating rate, the display page so designated on the Reuter Monitor Money Rates Service, or such
other page as may replace that page or that service for the purpose of displaying rates or prices
comparable to such floating rate.
153  Telerate is similarly defined to mean the display page so designated
on the Dow Jones Telerate Service, or such other page as may replace that page or that service, or such
other service as may be nominated as the information vendor, for the purpose of displaying rates or prices
comparable to the relevant floating rate.
154  Thus, if after EMU a lire rate source is replaced by a
successor euro rate source that is expressly designated as such by the relevant screen service provider, the
successor rate should be regarded as a comparable rate under the ISDA form.  ISDA has indicated that it
is unlikely that a change in currency reference would, in this respect, be controversial given that the euro
is the designated successor to euro area national currencies.  
155
ISDA has suggested, however, that a court might be persuaded that an international rate calculated
from the quotes of banks in different countries that is designated by a screen provider as a successor rate
for pre-existing national rates is not a legally comparable rate where national euro rates continue to be
quoted elsewhere.
156  As against that the Banque de France has argued that maintaining a purely national
panel of bank quotes for euro rates might not be consistent with the logic of introducing a single currency
for several different countries.
157  It is submitted that the arguments on both sides of this debate are evenly
balanced and that both national and transnational panels of price sources selected by screen providers
after EMU would therefore provide comparable rates to pre-existing national rates.  Thus, the selection of
either a national or an international price source by the relevant screen provider should not raise any legal
difficulties.
In the unlikely event that successor rates do not appear on Reuters or Telerate pages for the
applicable reset date,    or in the event that the rate designated by the screen service provider is not deemed
to be legally comparable to a pre-existing national rate, the ISDA form provides that the rate will be
determined as follows:
Á in the case of London interbank rates (LIBOR), on the basis of the rates for Italian lire deposits
offered by reference banks to prime banks in the London interbank market or, in the absence of
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available quotations, on the basis of the rates quoted by major banks in Rome for Italian lire
loans to leading European banks; and
Á in the case of most Milan interbank rates (MIBOR), on the basis of the rates for Italian lire
deposits offered to prime banks in the Milan interbank market, as published in a particular
Italian publication, or in the absence of such publication on the same basis as LIBOR rates.
158
Thus, the ISDA form provides that if Italy participates in EMU, obligations based on lire rates can
be calculated on the basis of comparable rates for euros that appear on the specified Reuters or Telerate
replacement pages, or alternatively that are quoted by banks in the London or Milan interbank markets.
159
So long as Reuters and Telerate continue to provide such designated screen pages the price source for a
particular floating rate initially linked to the lire will not disappear but rather will be supplanted by a
comparable rate linked to the euro.  In any event, it is certain that substitute quotations for euro deposits
will be available from banks in the London and Milan interbank markets.
A similar approach can be taken with respect to floating rates linked to other EU currencies, so that
rates may be calculated on the basis of the applicable screen pages or alternatively on the basis of the
rates offered on the London interbank market or the interbank market in the financial center of the
relevant country (e.g., a Deutsche mark deposit rate could be calculated by reference to the euro deposit
rate offered in the London or the Frankfurt interbank market, a Dutch guilder rate by reference to the
London or the Amsterdam interbank market, etc.).
160  Performance of interest rate swaps documented
under the ISDA form will not therefore be frustrated.
  ISDA has noted that “[w]hile in most cases the courts are likely to be willing   to substitute an
alternative price source which is substantially similar, they may be reluctant to do so in cases where the
whole purpose of the contract is the difference between the price source selected by the parties.”
161  Thus,
a so-called differential swap between two floating rates linked to two separate currencies participating in
EMU might be rendered purposeless where the single currency leads to the creation of a unified interest
rate throughout the euro area.  
162
E)L[HG,QWHUHVW5DWH2EOLJDWLRQV
Concerns have been expressed regarding the implications of EMU for long-term fixed interest rate
obligations negotiated on the basis of prevailing rates for a particular national currency.
163  The economic
repercussions for some holders of such long-term fixed interest rate obligations could be particularly
severe if the euro is a hard currency with associated low interest rates.
164  It is submitted, however, that
the overhaul of the prevailing interest rate climates associated with individual national currencies would
not destroy the underlying reasons for performing a contract, or undermine a basic assumption of a
contract.  Interest rates are subject to the vagaries of all kinds of economic and political developments,
and adjustments in the interest rate climate arising out of EMU should be regarded no differently from the
frequent interest rate changes that are so commonplace in the contemporary global economy.  Moreover,
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the convergence criterion on long-term interest rates should ensure that in the run-up to EMU the interest
rates of participating countries will progressively converge.  This position has been supported by some
English lawyers analyzing this issue from the perspective of the common law doctrine of frustration,
165 as
well as the European Commission.
166
Moreover, the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro
provides that the introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of a legal
instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal instrument, nor give a party the
right unilaterally to alter or terminate a legal instrument, subject to anything which the parties may have
agreed with reference to the introduction of the euro.
167  The preamble to the regulation notes that this
principle of the continuity of contracts “implies in particular that in the case of fixed interest rate
instruments the introduction of the euro does not alter the nominal interest rate payable by the debtor.”
168
The preamble to the EU regulation also indicates that non-EU jurisdictions will recognize the continuity
principle as emanating from the exercise by the    European Union of its monetary   sovereignty over the
currencies of EU member states.
169  This legislative provision would be recognized under the laws of U.S.
jurisdictions as resulting from the exercise of the sovereign power of the    European Union to establish a
new monetary   system.
170 This sovereign power extends to the regulation of all monetary obligations,
including interest rate obligations, in the aftermath of the establishment of a new currency.
171
',QWHUQDWLRQDO6DOHRI*RRGV&RQYHQWLRQ
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
172 applicable in
the United States and over 50 other signatory    states as of   January 1996, is relevant to payment obligations
contained in international trade transactions involving the import and export of goods to and from the
United States and nine    member states of the European Union (including four of the five most   populous
EU    member states - France, Germany, Italy and Spain but not the United   Kingdom).
173  The Convention
applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different    states when
the states are contracting states   or when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a    contracting state.
174  The Convention does not apply to sales of stocks, shares,   investment
securities, negotiable instruments or money, and therefore excludes debt securities and transactions
requiring the payment of money by both parties (e.g., cross currency swaps and interest rate swaps).
175
The distinction which the Uniform Commercial Code has drawn between money as a commodity (i.e.,
where money is used as the object of exchange) and money as a medium of payment
176 appears to have
been expressly rejected by the drafters of the Convention so as to exclude foreign exchange transactions
from the Convention’s coverage.
177  The Convention’s application to American law governed transactions
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would therefore appear to be confined to cross-border transactions between parties with places of
business in different countries involving the payment of money by one party in exchange for the physical
delivery of commodities by the other party.
178
Under Article 79(1) of the U.N. Convention, a party is not liable for a failure to perform any
obligation if such party proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond such party’s control and
that such party could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of
the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided such impediment or its consequences.
179  While the U.N.
Convention offers no guidance on what is meant by an “impediment” and while there is no international
consensus on the matter,
180 it is submitted that EMU does not present an impediment to the due
performance of international sale of goods transactions governed by the U.N. Convention.  Contracts
governed by the U.N. Convention involve the delivery of goods in exchange for the payment of money.
In the interpretation of the Convention, courts in    contracting states (including, of   course, U.S. courts) are
expressly required to have regard to the international character of the Convention and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.
181  The State
theory of money which characterizes money as whatever passes as lawful currency at the time and place
of payment has been recognized as part of customary international law.
182  In addition, the State theory of
money enjoys widespread international recognition in countries that are parties to the U.N. Convention.
183
Monetary obligations contained in cross-border trade transactions governed by the Convention must
therefore be interpreted in accordance with the State theory of money applicable under U.S. law,
international law and the laws of other    contracting states.  Such monetary obligations   must therefore be
discharged in euro in accordance with the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations.
Furthermore, a strong argument can be made that foreseeability is an important element in the
concept of an impediment beyond a party’s control.  Thus, Article 79(1) of the U.N. Convention
specifically provides that this excuse from performance is not available where the party could not
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the
contract.
184  The reasonable expectations of a party to a contract may be ascertained by a consideration of
what was foreseeable at the time a contract was entered into.  It is inevitable that American courts will
emphasize the importance of foreseeability when interpreting Article 79(1) of the U.N. Convention,
consistent with the UCC doctrine of commercial impracticability and the common law doctrines of
frustration and impossibility.
185  In this regard the chairman of the Article’s drafting party has
acknowledged that there is bound to be a point at which each attempt at unifying some areas of
international trade law stops short and the governing law of the contract takes over.
186  As discussed at a
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number of points throughout this study, EMU has been a long-standing goal of the European Community
and the financial markets have been in a position to take account of its legal implications in their contracts
since as far back as the decision to launch the first stage of EMU in 1989.
187  In any case, currency
alterations have been so commonplace in history that they may properly be regarded as inherently
foreseeable events.
In conclusion, the continuity of payment obligations contained in international commercial
transactions governed by the U.N. Convention would not face any obstacles in the aftermath of EMU.
('DPDJHV
Any attempt by a contracting party to raise EMU as excusing performance of an obligation
denominated in an EU national currency would constitute a breach of contract triggering a right on the
part of the wronged party to recover damages.  This raises questions as to whether American courts may
award damages in a foreign currency or U.S. dollars, and if they may make awards in U.S. dollars how
the foreign currency is to be translated into dollars.  More generally, where damages are awarded for a
breach of a foreign currency contract it is also necessary to consider how damages are to be measured.
)RUHLJQ&XUUHQF\$ZDUGV
It has been suggested that the questions of whether damages may be awarded in a foreign currency
or in U.S. dollars and of how to convert damages with respect  to a breach of a foreign currency
obligation into U.S. dollars are issues that fall more naturally within the province of the Federal
government.
188  Nonetheless, a large number of    state legislatures have enacted legislation in this area over
the past few   years.
189  Federal courts exercising their diversity jurisdiction over cases involving questions
of    state law (e.g., private contracts) apply    state law to resolve this issue,   and    state law treats this issue
under its conflict of law rules either as a procedural   issue to be resolved in accordance with the law of the
forum    state (i.e., the    state in   which the court is located),
190 or as a substantive issue to be resolved in
accordance with the governing law of the contract.
191
Broadly speaking,    state law follows three different approaches to the question   of damages for
breach of a foreign currency obligation.
D1HZ<RUN-XGJPHQW'DWH5XOH
First, under the New York Judiciary Law it is provided that in any case in which the cause of action
is based upon an obligation denominated in a foreign currency the court will render judgment in the
foreign currency of the underlying obligation (i.e., in euros after EMU), and will convert such  judgment
into U.S. currency at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of entry of the judgment.
192  Thus, New
York law follows a “judgment-date rule” which values the foreign currency at the date of judgment.
E3D\PHQW'DWH5XOH
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Secondly, the 20 jurisdictions (including California and Illinois) that have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Money Claims Act follow a “payment-date rule”, providing that a judgment or award on a claim
upon a foreign money obligation must be stated in an amount of the foreign money of the claim, and the
judgment is payable in that foreign money or, at the debtor’s option, in U.S. dollars at the spot exchange
rate on the date immediately preceding payment.
193
F&RPPRQ/DZ
Finally, all other U.S.    states follow the common law.  The traditional position   at common law is
that American courts may only render judgments in U.S. dollars.
194  However, in recent years American
courts, following principles of common law, have shown a greater willingness to enter judgment in
whatever currency the parties have selected for their dealings.
195  To the extent that the common law has
traditionally permitted awards to be made only in U.S. dollars, courts have also held that if the payment of
foreign currency is to be made in the United States and the payment obligation is subject to American
law, the foreign currency will be valued at the date set for performance, but that if the payment obligation
arises in the country of the foreign currency and is subject to foreign law, then the currency will be valued
as of the date of judgment because such a valuation represents all that would have been obtained from a
foreign tribunal at judgment.
196  This partial “breach-date rule” will of course become obsolete as courts
begin to render judgment in foreign currencies.  It can also be reasonably expected that an increasing
number of    states will adopt the payment-date rule in the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act   over the
coming years.
197
0HDVXUHRI'DPDJHV
The general view accepted under the conflict of law rules of most American    states (including New
York State) is that the elements and measure of damages are   matters of substance rather than procedure
and therefore fall to be determined under the governing law of the contract rather than the law of the
forum    state.
198  Because   New York law is selected as the governing law for so many sophisticated
financial transactions, it must follow that U.S. courts will mostly look to the law of damages of New York
State to determine the measure and elements of damages in such financial transactions.  In currency
swaps, FX forwards and currency options, where money is treated as a commodity, damages will be
measured in accordance with the applicable provisions of the UCC.  In all other contracts for the payment
of foreign money, which will consist of debt obligations for specific amounts of principal and/or interest,
damages will be measured in accordance with the general principles accepted under New York State law.
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Under the UCC, various remedies are accorded to sellers and buyers of goods (i.e., currencies in
transactions involving the use of money as a commodity).
199  Where a buyer wrongfully rejects a currency
sold to him, then the aggrieved seller may either resell the currency and recover damages for the
difference between the resale price and the contract price, or alternatively recover damages measured by
the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender of the currency and the unpaid
contract price.
200  Similarly, where a seller wrongfully fails to deliver a currency, the buyer may choose to
“cover” by purchasing the currency elsewhere and recovering damages for the difference between the
cost of cover and the contract price, or alternatively recover damages for the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price.
201  Both buyers and
sellers may also recover incidental damages, which include any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions resulting from the breach.
202
In addition, buyers and sellers are also entitled to a measure of lost profits.  In the case of an
aggrieved seller, where the measure of damages between the market price at the time for tender and the
unpaid contract price is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have
done, then the seller can recover the profit which would have been made from full performance by the
buyer.
203  In the case of an aggrieved buyer, recovery of consequential damages is allowed, i.e. recovery
is allowed for losses resulting from general or particular requirements and needs which the seller had
reason to know of at the time of contracting and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise.
204
In the context of currency swaps, options and FX forwards after EMU, the aggrieved seller would
be any party entitled to sell euros at the favorable exchange rate specified in the contract and the
aggrieved buyer would be any party entitled to purchase euros at the favorable exchange rate specified in
the contract.  Basically, the UCC permits recovery of damages based on the difference between the
contract price for the currency and the market exchange rate of the currency at the time of breach.
205  The
UCC also allows for recovery of consequential damages (e.g., loss of profits), permitting the courts to
consider the extent to which profits may have been lost due to ancillary developments on the currency
markets.  Given that both parties are treated as buyers and sellers in a foreign exchange transaction,
206 it is
questionable  whether the courts would attribute much significance to the different wordings in the UCC
with respect to the damages remedies for buyers and sellers in the case of lost profits.
In the case of debt obligations, the measure of damages for breach of a contract to pay money at a
stipulated time is generally the sum agreed to be paid with legal interest thereon from the date of maturity
to compensate the creditor for the temporary loss of the use of his money.
207  Where one contracts to pay
a principal sum at a future date with interest, or alternatively an amount of interest based on a notional
principal amount, the interest prior to default is payable by virtue of the contract, and after default the
                                                
199U.C.C. §§ 2-701-25, 1B U.L.A. 217-646  (1989).  This discussion will only focus on those remedies that are most relevant in the
context of foreign exchange transactions.  The relevant provisions of the New York Uniform Commercial Code mirror those of the UCC.
N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-701-25 (McKinney 1993).
2006HHU.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-706, 2-708, 1B U.L.A. 232, 249, 265 (1989).
2016HH U.C.C. §§ 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, 1B U.L.A. 321-22, 344, 358 (1989).
2026HH U.C.C. §§ 2-706, 2-708, 2-710, 2-712, 2-713, 2-715, 1B U.L.A. 249, 265, 313, 344, 358, 417 (1989).
2036HH U.C.C. § 2-708(2), 1B U.L.A. 265 (1989).
2046HH U.C.C. §§ 712, 713, 715(2), 1B U.L.A. 344, 358, 417 (1989).
205This measure of damages for breach of a foreign exchange contract was also allowed by the New York courts at common law.
6HHHJ Richard v. Am. Union Bank, 170 N.E. 532, 535-36 (N.Y. 1930).
206Koreag, 961 F.2d at 355.
2076HH Avalon Const. Corp. v. Kirch Holding Co., 175 N.E. 651, 652 (N.Y. 1931); 36 N.Y. JUR. 2D, 'DPDJHV § 45 (1984).cxxiii
interest should be computed as damages for breach of the contract according to the rate prescribed by law
and not according to the rate prescribed in the contract if that is more or less.
208
Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules interest will in general be recovered upon a sum
awarded because of a breach of contract at a rate of 9% per annum from the earliest ascertainable date the
cause of action existed.
209  While many jurisdictions (including New York State) take the position that
such prejudgment interest is an element of damages and that rules for prejudgment interest are therefore
to be found in the law defining the elements of damages (in most cases the governing law of the
contract),
210 other jurisdictions treat prejudgment interest as a procedural matter to be resolved in
accordance with the law of the forum    state.
211
Two final issues regarding the measure of damages for breach of a contract   to pay foreign money
should be mentioned.  First, it has been suggested that prejudgment interest on a foreign currency
obligation should be computed based on the rate prevailing in the country issuing the money of judgment,
consistent with the practice of certain foreign common law jurisdictions.
212  In the absence of available
precedent, it must be presumed that the New York statutory rules regarding the award of prejudgment
interest apply both to foreign and domestic money, especially since the statutory 9% rate in New York
does not bear any necessary relationship to the prevailing interest rates for borrowed money in U.S.
dollars.
A final issue relating to the measure of damages for a breach of contract to pay a foreign currency
debt is whether damages may be awarded for losses incurred as a result of exchange rate fluctuations after
the time of breach and prior to judgment.  The traditional rule is that damages for delay in payment under
a debt are provided for in the allowance of prejudgment interest, which is in the nature of damages for
withholding money that is due.
213  This rule has been applied so as to deny damages for losses suffered by
reason of the dollar’s devaluation against a foreign currency between the time a contract was breached
and the time of judgment.
214  It has been suggested that this rule is no longer appropriate in a world of
free floating exchange rates, and that American courts should follow the example of other common law
jurisdictions and allow recovery for damages resulting from reasonably foreseeable losses arising out of
exchange rate fluctuations.
215  Again, in the apparent absence of supporting precedent it may be presumed
that prejudgment interest is the only form of compensation available under New York law as
compensation for the temporary loss of the use of foreign money.
In the case of foreign currency obligations governed by the laws of American jurisdictions other
than New York, the legal principles pertaining to the measure of damages to be awarded will be similar to
those applicable under New York law.  The UCC has been adopted throughout the United States and its
provisions relating to the measure of damages for foreign exchange transactions are generally
applicable.
216  It also appears that the measure of damages for breach of a promise to pay a debt is, in
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most jurisdictions outside New York, the amount of such debt with legal interest thereon from the time of
maturity.
217  The amount of prejudgment interest payable will of course vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
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Many financial transactions contain currency definitions and other contract clauses which are
relevant to the analysis of the legal implications of EMU under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.  We will
consider the meaning of these clauses in this section.
$³/DZIXO&XUUHQF\´   'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\
Many legal documents, including, significantly, the standard form documentation of the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, define currencies as the “lawful” currencies of the
relevant country of issue.
1  Thus, the Deutsche mark is defined in the ISDA standard form as “the lawful
currency of the Federal Republic of Germany”, the French franc as “the lawful currency of the Republic
of France”, the Dutch guilder as “the lawful currency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands”, and so on.
2
The use of the word “lawful” here is significant as it implies that American courts, when
considering, for example, what is meant by the term “Deutsche mark” in an ISDA swap contract, should
look directly to the laws of Germany for guidance.  German law includes the provisions of the Maastricht
Treaty and all regulations adopted by the EU Council thereunder.
3  After January 1, 1999 the Deutsche
mark will be substituted by the euro in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty and the relevant EU
Council regulations and the euro will thereafter be recognized under German law as the lawful currency
of Germany.
4  Obligations under ISDA swap contracts that are denominated in Deutsche marks can
therefore be discharged in euro after 1999.  In view of the fact that euro banknotes will not be introduced
until 2002 (at the latest), obligations originally denominated in Deutsche marks may continue to be
discharged during the three-year transitional period in Deutsche marks, which will survive as a sub-
division or denomination of the euro and a legal tender in the territorial limits of Germany.
5  Thus, the
lawful currency of Germany during the transitional period will be the euro, of which the Deutsche mark is
an expression.
It might also be argued, however, that the fact that the ‘lawful currency’ formula establishes
separate definitions for various European currencies implies that these definitions refer only to distinct
national currencies and cannot be interpreted to embrace a single European currency.  Moreover, even if
it is accepted that the euro is the lawful currency of Germany, arguments might still be advanced for
terminating or otherwise discharging contractual obligations after EMU on the ground that performance
has been rendered commercially impracticable or has been frustrated by virtue of the introduction of the
single currency.  It is submitted, however, that such arguments would not persuade American courts.
Swap contracts denominated in EU currencies are subject to the monetary sovereignty of    the European
Union over the currencies   of EU member states, a sovereignty that extends to the enactment of legislation
by      the EU Council regarding the discharge of contractual obligations in the aftermath of the establishment
of a new monetary system.
6  This is bolstered by the fact that the ‘lawful currency’ formula directs the
courts to the law of the country issuing the currency for a determination of the currency’s legal character.
  %/HJDO7HQGHU&ODXVHV
                                                
1INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION INC., 1991 ISDA DEFINITIONS Section 1.5 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ISDA
DEFINITIONS]; INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., 1992 ISDA FX AND CURRENCY OPTION DEFINITIONS Section 3.2
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21991 ISDA DEFINITIONS, VXSUD note 1, Section 1.5(e), (f) and (i); 1992 ISDA FX AND CURRENCY OPTION DEFINITIONS, VXSUD note 1,
Section 3.2(f), (g) and (j).
3For a discussion regarding the supremacy of European Community law (including Council regulations) over national law, see T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 206-10, 234-36 (3d ed. 1994).
46HHVXSUD pp. 12-17.
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Many Eurobonds contain clauses calling for payment in a national currency such as French francs
or “such coin or currency of the Republic of France as at the time of payment shall be legal tender for the
payment of public or private debts.”  This kind of clause ensures the continuity of the payment obligation
after the introduction of the single currency.  Because the euro will be a currency but not a legal tender
during the three-year transitional period, the legal tender clause may only permit discharge in the national
currency tenders until euro banknotes are introduced and replace the national banknotes.
&)RUFH0DMHXUHDQG,PSRVVLELOLW\&ODXVHV
Like the doctrine of commercial impracticability, a force majeure clause in a contract excuses
nonperformance when circumstances beyond the control of the parties prevent performance.
7  Many debt
instruments contain clauses calling for the discharge of debts in U.S. dollars where the currency in which
the debt is denominated “is no longer available for making payments due to the imposition of exchange
controls or other circumstances beyond the party’s control.”
It has been held that the term “conditions beyond control” is a term which “has by repeated use
assumed an indisputable connotation” and “refers to an unforeseeable act of God or other extraordinary
cause which could not reasonably be anticipated by the parties.”
8  Contractual force majeure clauses
excusing performance due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties provide a narrow defense at
common law because they do not apply when the event preventing performance could have been foreseen
or guarded against in the contract.
9  Ordinarily, only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the
event that actually prevents a party’s performance will that party be excused.
10 The principle of
interpretation applicable to force majeure clauses containing an enumeration of specific causes of relief
followed by a general catch-all provision relieving a party from liability where performance has been
prevented due to other causes beyond the control of such party is that the general words are not given an
expansive meaning but are confined to things of the same kind or nature as the particular matters
mentioned (the principle of ejusdem generis).
11
Applying the above force majeure clause to EMU, the U.S. dollar repayment provision would not
be triggered after EMU for a number of reasons:
Á First, EMU has been long foreseeable and such force majeure clauses do not apply to
foreseeable events.  In any case, all currency alterations may be regarded as inherently
foreseeable events.
Á Second, the general catch-all provision in this clause – “other circumstances beyond the party’s
control”– is confined to matters similar to the imposition of exchange controls.  It is not
intended that the introduction of the single currency will involve the imposition of any
exchange controls or similar restrictions on foreign exchange transactions.
12
Á Third, the clause would not be triggered after EMU because the currency of the contract – the
euro in substitution for the national currency in which the debt was originally denominated –
will still be available for making payments.  This is consistent with the State theory of
money.
13  The clause is not designed to cover monetary alterations but rather situations where
                                                
76HH Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., 3 F.3d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1993); VHHDOVR 22A N.Y. JUR. 2D, &RQWUDFWV § 385 (1996).
8Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen Constr. Co., 60 F. Supp. 555, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1945), DII¶G 155 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1946).
96HH Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Mkts., Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295, 296 (N.Y. 1987).
106HHLG at 296 (citations omitted).
116HHLG at 296-97; 22A N.Y. JUR. 2D, &RQWUDFWV § 385 (1996).
126HHLQIUD p.    186.  
136HHEuropean Commission (DG II), The Legal Framework for the Use of the Euro: Questions and Answers on the Euro Regulations
10 (Nov. 1997); VHHDOVRVXSUD pp. 102-05.cxxvii
the obligor is unable to gain access to the currency in which its obligation is denominated,
either because of exchange controls or some similar factor beyond the obligor’s control.
One clause contained in may debt instruments governed by New York law that could cause
interpretive difficulties in the aftermath of EMU is a clause which permits obligations to be statisfied in
U.S. dollars where the foreign currency in question “is no longer used by the government of the country
issuing, or authority sponsoring, such currency.”  This language appears to trigger the U.S. dollar
payment provision where the government of the relevant country is no longer issuing the currency in
question.  After the introduction of the single currency the exclusive power    to authorize the issuance of
currency will be vested in the newly-established   European Central Bank.  National central banks will be
part of the European System of Central Banks and will issue currency under the authority of the European
Central Bank.
14  If the governments of the EU    member states no longer enjoy the exclusive   authority to
issue currency in their own right, the clause calling for payment in U.S. dollars could be triggered.
Strong arguments can be made against triggering the U.S. dollar payment provision after EMU.
The EU member states, through their national central banks’ representation in the European Central Bank,
will continue to exercise the power to issue currency    after EMU.
15  It can also be argued, based on the
State theory of money, that the currency of the contract – the euro in substitution for,e.g., the   Deutsche
mark – is the currency that is used by the    governments of the participating   member states after EMU, and
therefore    is the currency in which the obligation should be satisfied.  As against    this, however, it might be
argued that the provision   is actually designed to prevent the application of the State theory.
Perhaps the most    compelling factor in the legal interpretation of this   impossibility clause is that the
continuity principle enshrined in the EU Council regulations is designed to prevent the invocation of
general contractual provisions that do not specifically refer to EMU as a means of modifying contractual
obligations after the introduction of the single currency.
16  In accordance with the State theory of money
the EU Council regulations may be regarded as an expression of the monetary sovereignty of    the
European Union over the currencies of EU member   states, and the regulations would therefore be
applicable to contracts governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions that contain such force majeure or
impossibility clauses.  Since force majeure and impossibility clauses are general clauses that do not
specifically contemplate the introduction of the euro, such clauses would not be triggered by EMU under
the EU Council regulations.  In the case of impossibility clauses objection might be made that the EU
Council regulations alter the terms of the contract insofar as such impossibility clauses are actually
designed to prevent the application of the State theory of money.  However, such an alteration of
contractual terms could be justified under the expansive view of the State theory of money articulated in
the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV.
17
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As a result of the uncertain implications of EMU for certain force majeure and impossibility
clauses, as well as possible uncertainty for the continuity of contracts under New York law, a number of
issuers of debt instruments operating under New York law began in March 1995 to adopt specific
language ensuring that their obligations would enjoy the full benefit of all EU Council regulations and
ancillary legislation dealing with the changeover to the single currency.
18  Most of these clauses follow a
similar pattern and provide as follows:
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186HHHJ MORGAN STANLEY GROUP INC., GLOBAL MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Mar. 29, 1995) (on file with
Securities and Exchange Commission), GLOBAL MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (May 1, 1996) (on file with Securities and
Exchange Commission), GLOBAL MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with Securities and Exchange
Commission); MCDONALDS CORPORATION, DM BONDS DUE 2000 OFFERING CIRCULAR (June 8, 1995) (on file with Luxembourg Stock
Exchange),  DM BONDS DUE 2001 OFFERING CIRCULAR (May 17, 1996) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange), FRENCH FRANC BONDScxxviii
If, pursuant to the Treaty establishing the European Community, as amended by the Treaty on
European Union (the “Treaty”), some or all of the currencies of the 15    member   states of the
European Union are substituted by a new single European currency (such new currency to be
named the “euro”), the payment of principal of, or interest on, Notes denominated or payable
in such currencies shall be effected in euro in conformity with legally applicable measures
adopted pursuant to, or by virtue of, the Treaty.
19
The clause is designed to ensure that all EU Council regulations (i.e., measures adopted “pursuant
to” the Treaty) and ancillary legislation adopted by the EU    member states (i.e., measures adopted “by
virtue of” the Treaty) relating to EMU   are applicable to debt instruments governed by New York law and
maturing after 1999.  Such contractual dépacage (i.e., an agreement that different laws apply to different
parts of a contract) is expressly authorized under Section 5-1401 of the New York General Obligations
Law which provides that the parties to a contract may agree that the law of New York State shall govern
their rights and duties “in whole or in part.”
20
Under the above EMU continuity clause payments will be made in euro after the euro substitutes
the national currencies in 1999.  In accordance with the    “no   compulsion, no prohibition” principle
enshrined in the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro, this clause ensures that payments
may be performed in certain circumstances either in the national currency unit or the euro unit during the
transitional period
The approach taken by the above clause serves the need for uniformity in the increasingly
integrated international capital markets by placing parties contracting under New York law in the same
legal position with respect to the implications of EMU as parties contracting under the laws of EU
jurisdictions, thereby ensuring the continuity of contracts in accordance with the EU Council’s
regulations on the introduction of the euro.  In addition, the incorporation of the EU Council regulations
into the terms and conditions of the bonds ensures that parties contracting under New York law enjoy the
benefit of any ancillary legislation that may be enacted in the aftermath of EMU (e.g., legislation
revalorizing interest rates in particular    member   states).
21
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DUE 2006 OFFERING CIRCULAR  (July 22, 1996) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange), DM BONDS DUE 2002 OFFERING CIRCULAR (Feb.
13, 1997) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange);AT&T CAPITAL CORPORATION, MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Oct.
19, 1995) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission); PITNEY BOWES CREDIT CORPORATION, MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS
SUPPLEMENT (Nov. 10, 1995) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission); DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, MEDIUM-TERM NOTES
PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission),MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS
SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 8, 1997) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission);GENERAL SIGNAL CORPORATION, MEDIUM-TERM NOTES
PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 30, 1996) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission); MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (May 8, 1996) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission); GMAC INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE B.V., GMAC AUSTRALIA (FINANCE) LIMITED AND GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION OF CANADA, LIMITED, EURO
MEDIUM-TERM NOTE PROGRAM OFFERING CIRCULAR (May 23, 1996) (on file with London Stock Exchange), EURO MEDIUM-TERM NOTE
PROGRAM OFFERING Circular (May 23, 1997) (on file with London Stock Exchange); PRUDENTIAL FUNDING CORPORATION, EURO MEDIUM-
TERM NOTE PROGRAMME OFFERING CIRCULAR (May 29, 1996) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange); AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
GROUP, INC., MEDIUM-TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (June 11, 1996) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission);
REPUBLIC OF ITALY, PRIVATIZATION EXCHANGEABLE LIRA NOTES DUE 2001 PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (June 21, 1996) (on file with Securities
and Exchange Commission); GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, GE CAPITAL AUSTRALIA LIMITED AND GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL
CANADA INC., EURO MEDIUM-TERM NOTES OFFERING CIRCULAR  (July 2, 1996) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange); PHILIP MORRIS
CAPITAL CORPORATION, FRENCH FRANC BONDS DUE 2006 OFFERING CIRCULAR (July 9, 1996) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange);
DAIMLER-BENZ NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, DAIMLER-BENZ CANADA INC. AND DAIMLER-BENZ INTERNATIONAL FINANCE B.V., MEDIUM-
TERM NOTES PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (Sept. 13, 1996) (on file with Securities and Exchange Commission); COMPANIA ENERGETICA DE SAO
PAULO, EURO MEDIUM-TERM NOTE PROGRAM OFFERING CIRCULAR (May 21, 1997) (on file with Luxembourg Stock Exchange).
196HH Memorandum from Niall Lenihan, Draft Recommendation of Wall Street Committee on the Transition to the European
Monetary Union(July 11, 1996) (on file with author).
20N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989); VHHDOVR Corporation Venezolano de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d
786, 794-95 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1980).
216HH Michael Gruson, The Introduction of the Euro and its Implications for Obligations Denominated in Currencies Replaced by the
Euro 25-27 (June 2, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with    author); see also   Alan H. Kaufman (Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue),
Overview: the U.S. and European Legal Context of the Euro Currency 4 (Oct. 23, 1997)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).cxxix
In July 1997 ISDA adopted an EMU continuity provision for use in ISDA master agreements which
confirms that EMU will not affect the continuity of contracts or give any party the unilateral right to walk
away from, or modify the terms of, any transaction governed by an ISDA master agreement unless
otherwise expressly agreed by the parties.
22  The ISDA EMU continuity provision thus provides in
relevant part as follows:
(a) The parties confirm that, except as provided in subsection (b) below, the occurrence or
non-occurrence of an event associated with economic and monetary union in the European
Community will not have the effect of altering any term of, or discharging or excusing
performance under, the Agreement or any Transaction, give a party the right unilaterally to
alter or terminate the Agreement or any Transaction or, in and of itself, give rise to an Event
of Default, Termination Event or otherwise be the basis for the effective designation of an
Early Termination Date.
“An event associated with economic and monetary union in the European Community”
includes, without limitation, each (and any combination) of the following:
(i) the introduction of, changeover to or operation of a single or unified European currency
(whether known as the euro or otherwise);
(ii) the fixing of conversion rates between a member state’s currency and the new currency or
between the currencies of member states;
(iii) ...;
(iv) the introduction of that new currency as lawful currency in a member state;
(v) the withdrawal from legal tender of any currency that, before the introduction of the new
currency, was lawful currency in one of the member states; or
(vi) the disappearance or replacement of a relevant rate option or other price source for the ...
national currency of any member state, or the failure of the agreed sponsor (or a successor
sponsor) to publish or display a relevant rate, index, price, page or screen.
(b) Any agreement between the parties that amends or overrides the provisions of this
Section in respect of any Transaction will be effective if it is in writing and expressly refers to
this Section or to European monetary union or to an event associated with economic and
monetary union in the European Community ...
23
The ISDA EMU continuity provision is designed to be consistent with the EU Council regulations
on the introduction of the euro.
24  In essence, the provision spells out the detailed implications of the
continuity principle contained in the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the euro, while at the same time preserving the parties’ freedom of contract in a manner
that is consistent with the EU Council regulation.
25
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As previously discussed, the provisions of the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro
permitting the redenomination of bonds    should be   recognized as applicable to bonds governed by New
York law.
26  It    must be   emphasized that the EU Council regulation contemplates a narrow form of
redenomination which involves no more than changing the unit in which the amount of outstanding debt
is stated from a national currency unit to the euro unit, but which does not have the effect of altering any
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other term of the debt.
27  Additional measures to amend the terms of outstanding debt, including an
alteration in the nominal amount of such debt, may only be accomplished in accordance with the
governing law of the contract.
28
Under New York law or the law of any other U.S. jurisdiction, an issuer would only be able to alter
the nominal amount of outstanding bonds (i.e., renominalize) if so permitted under the terms and
conditions of the bonds.  Under standard form indentures and fiscal agency agreements used in many debt
transactions governed by New York law it is provided that the principal amount of any outstanding note
issued under an indenture or fiscal agency agreement shall not be reduced without the consent of the
holder of each outstanding note affected thereby.
29  Other provisions modifying the rights of the
noteholders may be added to the indenture or fiscal agency agreement with the consent of the holders of
not less than 66 2/3% in principal amount of the outstanding notes, except that provisions which do not
adversely affect the interests of the noteholders may typically be added to the indenture or fiscal agency
agreement without the consent of the noteholders.
30
There is a widespread international consensus that a renominalization of outstanding debt by
rounding the amount of such debt downwards to the nearest euro would constitute a reduction in the
principal amount of the debt that could not be accomplished without the consent of the bondholders.
31
Notwithstanding the fact that the amounts involved may be quite trifling (particularly in the case of debt
issues represented by a global certificate), and that any such renominalization would be accompanied by
cash compensation for the bondholders with respect to the truncated amounts, strong concerns have been
expressed that because such renominalization would alter the economic value of the securities and the
liquidity of the issue the rights of bondholders should not be limited in any way.
32  Thus bonds governed
by New York law may only be renominalized by rounding downwards to the nearest euro if this is
explicitly provided for in the terms and conditions of the issue, and the first eurobond issued by a North
American corporation under New York law that makes provision for the possibility of such
renominalization was issued in June 1997.
33
It may remain possible for issuers to renominalize under a one-euro method without the consent of
the bondholders by rounding upwards to the nearest euro, since this would not adversely affect the
interests of the bondholders.  Alternatively, issuers operating under U.S. laws may be able to rely on the
provisions of the EU Council regulation to redenominate into the euro unit by rounding to the nearest
euro cent.
34  It has been suggested, however, that issuers should obtain bondholders’ consent for almost
any redenomination because of the impact that a redenomination would have on the liquidity of the issue
and on investors generally.
35  It is difficult to conceive how an upward redenomination to the nearest euro
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or a redenomination to the nearest cent
36 could adversely affect the interests of bondholders, particularly
if the redenomination follows an across-the-board redenomination by the benchmark sovereign issuer,
37
thereby creating an increasingly liquid bond market in the euro unit.
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Beginning in 1997 a number of international issuers have adopted contractual provisions providing
for a simultaneous redenomination in the euro unit and consolidation of two or more bond issues
denominated in different EU national currencies or the ECU.
38  These so-called “parallel” or “tributary”
bonds which will be consolidated into a single fungible issue denominated in the euro unit after EMU
have common basic features such as an identical coupon and maturity.  
39
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With the switch to the single currency the question has arisen whether harmonized market
conventions should be adopted for eurobonds and money market instruments denominated in the euro.
Such harmonized conventions would cover such matters as a day-count basis for the calculation of
accrued interest, particularly for callable bonds (i.e., actual/365 or 30/360), a definition of business days,
coupon frequency (i.e., annual, semi-annual, quarterly), the details of how reference rates are fixed and
ex-dividend periods.
40
There is a general consensus that new harmonized conventions adopted for the euro area will not be
applied to existing legacy contracts.
41  Nonetheless, issuers adopting contractual clauses permitting bond
redenomination are also introducing contractual provisions that would permit the adoption of new
conventions upon such redenomination.
42  The implications of such reconventioning clauses for potential
hedging mismatches with respect to underlying derivative instruments require careful consideration.  
43
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In order to meet the disclosure requirements of the U.S. securities laws, and in particular the
disclosure of known trends and uncertainties, an increasing number of corporate issuers registering their
securities with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have made disclosures regarding how the
introduction of the euro might affect their business operations.
44
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This study has so far considered the legal implications of EMU for obligations denominated in EU
national currencies (e.g., the Deutsche mark, the French franc) that are governed by the laws of U.S.
jurisdictions.  The study will next consider the legal status of obligations denominated in the ECU, a
basket of currencies comprising specified amounts of 12 of the 15 EU national currencies.  Many
financial obligations denominated in the ECU are governed by New York law.
1  In view of the proposed
replacement of references to the ECU basket in legal   instruments by references to the euro at the rate of
one euro for one ECU, it is necessary to consider whether ECU obligations governed by the laws of U.S.  
jurisdictions will be transformed into euro obligations on a 1:1 basis after EMU. This question will be
analyzed in several stages.
Á First, the study will consider the nature of the ECU.  In particular, the study will seek to
explain the important distinction between the “official” ECU of the European Community and
the “private” ECU used in financial transactions.
Á Second, the study will outline the    role played by the ECU in the process   of European monetary
integration.
Á Third, the study will explore the legal status of    the ECU under the laws   of U.S. jurisdictions.
Á Fourth, the study will consider the relevance of the act of state doctrine for ECU obligations.
Á Fifth, the study will examine the import of recent legislation enacted in New York and Illinois
to ensure the continuity of ECU contracts after EMU.
Á Sixth, the study will analyze the implications of various contractual definitions and clauses
used by the financial markets to define obligations denominated in the ECU.
$7KH2IILFLDO(&8RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\
The    term ECU encompasses both the “official” ECU and the “private” ECU.   The official ECU is a
reserve asset issued by the European Monetary Institute that    may be used as a means of settlement for the
payment of debts between the central   banks of the countries participating in the European Monetary
System.
2  The private ECU has no direct link with the official ECU.  The private ECU was first created
by the financial markets against the EU national currencies underlying the ECU and is used in a wide
variety of private financial transactions.
3  The official ECU may only be used by central banks, whereas
the private ECU is traded through a separate clearing system established by the financial markets.
4
&RPSRVLWLRQRIWKH2IILFLDO(&8
Known in English as the European Currency Unit and in French as the écu (so named after a long
line of French coins of like name used from medieval times until the French revolution),
5 the official
ECU was created in 1978 in connection with the establishment of the European Monetary System
(EMS).
6  The official ECU was originally defined as the sum of fixed amounts of the currencies of the
                                                
16HHLQIUD p. 152.
26HHLQIUD pp. 148-50.
36HHLQIUD pp. 152-56.
46HHLQIUD pp. 148-50, 154-55.
56HH SUE MOORE, THE ECU AS A COIN,LQ ECU: THE CURRENCY OF EUROPE 242-45 (Christopher Johnson ed., 1991) [hereinafter
ECU].
6The European Council Resolution establishing the EMS provided that the value of the ECU would be identical to the value of the
EUA (European Unit of Account), a unit of account created by the European Economic Community in 1975 as a means of calculatingcxxxiv
then nine member states of the European Economic Community (3.66 Belgian francs, plus   0.217 Danish
krone, plus 0.286 Dutch guilder, plus 1.15 French francs, plus 0.828 German marks, plus 0.00759 Irish
pound, plus 109 Italian lire, plus 0.14 Luxembourg francs, plus 0.0885 Pound sterling).
7  The essential
characteristic of the ECU basket is that the percentage composition of the ECU basket in terms of national
currencies continually changes as the market values of its component national currencies fluctuate.  This
is because the ECU basket comprises fixed sums of national currencies, and not fixed percentages of
national currencies.  The weightings attributed to the currencies in this currency basket were originally
supposed to reflect the underlying strength of the respective European economies based on GDP,
participation in intra-Community trade, etc.
8
The Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of the EMS permits revisions to be
made to the composition of the official ECU, but provides that such revisions “will, by themselves, not
modify the external value of the ECU.”
9  Maintaining the external value of the ECU means that
immediately following any revision the value of the revised ECU against the U.S. dollar or any other
currency will be identical to the value of the ECU against such currency immediately prior to such
revision.
10  This ensures a 1:1    continuity from one old ECU basket    to one new   ECU basket.
To date there have been two revisions to the composition of the ECU.  The first revision to the ECU
took place in 1984 after Greece joined the European Economic Community and the composition of the
ECU basket was revised to include the Greek drachma while the weightings of three of the other
currencies included in the basket were altered.
11  The second revision to the ECU took place in 1989 after
Spain and Portugal joined the European Economic Community and the composition of the basket was
revised to include the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo and the weightings of the existing 10
currencies included in the basket were altered.
12  These revisions did not in themselves modify the
external value of the ECU so that both immediately before and immediately after each revision the
exchange rate between the ECU and the U.S. dollar remained unchanged.  Thus the ECU was revised on
each occasion    so that one old ECU    basket was transformed into one new   ECU    basket at a 1:1    rate.  
The ECU is currently defined as the sum of the following amounts of the following components:
0.6242 German mark 0.130 Luxembourg franc
0.08784 Pound sterling 0.1976 Danish krone
1.332 French francs 0.008552 Irish pound
151.8 Italian lire 1.440 Greek drachmas
0.2198 Dutch Guilder 6.885 Spanish pesetas
3.301 Belgian francs 1.393 Portuguese escudos. 
13
                                                                                                                                                                           
development aid under the first Lomé Convention.  Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of the European Monetary
System (EMS) and related matters (Dec. 5, 1978), art. 2.1, E.C. Bulletin 1978 No. 12 point 1.1.11, UHSULQWHGLQ Monetary Committee of the
European Community, Compendium of Community Monetary Texts 45 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Monetary Compendium]; VHHDOVR JOHN A.
USHER, THE LAW OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 129-32 (1994).
7Council Regulation 3180/78 of 18 December 1978 changing the value of the unit of account used by the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, art. 1, 1978 O.J. (L 379/1).
86HH CHRIS SUNT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ECU 5, 8 (1989); DANIEL GROS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECU,LQ ECU, VXSUD note    5, at
13-14; DANIEL GROS AND NIELS THYGESEN, EUROPEAN MONETARY   INTEGRATION 204-5 (1992).
9Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and related matters, Dec. 5,
1978, art. 2.3, E.C. Bulletin 1978 No. 12 point 1.1.11, UHSULQWHGLQ 1989 Monetary Compendium, VXSUD note    6, at 45.  
106HH SUNT, VXSUD note    8, at 7-8.  
11The ECU was re-defined as the sum of 3.71 Belgian francs, plus 0.219 Danish krone, plus 0.256 Dutch guilder, plus 1.31 French
francs, 0.719 German mark, plus 1.15 Greek drachmas, plus 140 Italian lire, plus 0.00871 Irish pound, plus 0.14 Luxembourg franc, plus
0.0878 Pound sterling.  Council Regulation  2626/84 of 15 September 1984 amending Article 1 of Council Regulation 3180/78 changing the
value of the unit of account used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, art. 1, 1984 O.J.  (L 247/1).
12Council Regulation 1971/89 of 19 June 1989 amending Article 1 of Regulation 3180/78 changing the value of the unit of account
used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, art. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 189/1).
13Council Regulation 3320/94 of 22 December 1994 on the consolidation of the existing Community legislation on the definition of
the ecu following the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 350/27).cxxxv
T   he Maastricht Treaty provides that from January 1, 1994 the currency   composition of the ECU
basket shall not be changed.
14  This freezing of the ECU basket in 1994 effectively precluded the
Austrian, Finnish and Swedish currencies from forming part of the ECU basket at any time prior to EMU,
notwithstanding the fact that these three currencies may participate in EMU if their countries satisfy the
necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.  The absence of these currencies is due to the
fact that Austria, Finland and Sweden only joined the EU and acceded to the Maastricht Treaty in January
1995, after the Treaty had entered into force.
15
0RQHWDU\1DWXUHRIWKH2IILFLDO(&8
The official ECU has acquired the characteristics of a genuine currency separate and apart from its
component currencies as a result of its usage in the European Monetary System. Under the Maastricht
Treaty, ECUs are issued by the European Monetary Institute as successor to the former European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), which acted as the issuer of the ECU from the inception of the
EMS until the Fund’s tasks were taken over by the EMI upon the establishment of the EMI on January 1,
1994.
16  The Statute of the EMI empowers the EMI to issue ECUs against monetary reserves received by
the EMI from the national central banks for the purpose of implementing the March 1979 agreement
between the central banks of the    EEC member states laying down the operating   procedures for the
European Monetary System.
17  The ECUs so issued may be used by the EMI and the national central
banks as a means of settlement and for transactions between them and the EMI.
18  Prior to January 1,
1994 the European Monetary Co-operation Fund was empowered in similar terms to issue ECUs against
the receipt of monetary reserves from the monetary authorities of the member states.
19
Under the EMS operating procedures agreed between the central banks in March 1979, each central
bank participating in the ERM contributes to the EMI 20% of its gold holdings and gross dollar reserves
against which it is credited with a corresponding amount of ECUs issued by the EMI.
20  The contributions
of gold and dollars by the central banks take the form of revolving swaps.
21  Thus each central bank,
against receipt of the ECUs, enters into a three-month forward contract with the EMI for the repurchase
of the gold and dollar reserves that it has just transferred to the EMI in exchange for the ECUs thereby
issued.
22  Upon the maturity of this swap arrangement each central bank will re-contribute 20% of its
then-outstanding gold and dollar reserves to the EMI in return for a new equivalent amount of ECU and
will simultaneously enter into a new three-month forward contract for the re-purchase of the reserves in
exchange for the new amount of ECU issued, and so on.
23  Because fluctuations are not taken into
account by the EMI, the exchange rate risk passes to the central banks.
24  Because the stock of official
ECUs held by the central banks fluctuates with changes in the ECU values of the central banks’ dollar
and gold reserves, ECU creation is necessarily dependent on factors outside the control of the EMI and
the EMS central banks (i.e., the conditions of the dollar foreign exchange markets and the London gold
                                                
14EC TREATY, arts. 109g and 109e(1).
156HHVXSUD pp. 2, 10-11.
16EC TREATY, art. 109f(2); LG. Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, arts. 4.1,6.
17,G Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, art. 6.2.
186HHLG.
196HH Council Regulation 3181/78 of 18 December 1978 relating to the European Monetary System, art.1, 1978 O.J. (L 379/2).
20Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community laying down
operating procedures for the European Monetary System, art. 17.1, UHSULQWHGLQ 1989 Monetary Compendium, VXSUD note    6, at 50.  
216HH LGart. 17.3.
226HHRalph J. Mehnert, 7KH(XURSHDQ&XUUHQF\8QLW7KH(&8&XUUHQF\IRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRI(XURSH, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L
L. & ECON. 349, 376-77 (1989-90).
236HH Agreement of 13 March 1979 between the central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community laying
down operating procedures for the European Monetary System, as amended, arts. 17.3, 17.6, UHSULQWHGLQ 1989 Monetary Compendium,
VXSUD note    6, at 50; Mehnert, VXSUD note    22, at 376-77.  
246HHMehnert,VXSUD note    22, at 376; Susan B. Shulman, $5DSLGRU(YROXWLRQDU\$SSURDFK7KH  ((&¶V$GRSWLRQRIWKH(&8DVD
&RPPRQ&XUUHQF\, 12 N.W. J. INT’L L.  & BUS. 390, 394-95 (1991).cxxxvi
fixings).
25  It has been noted that in view of the three-month revolving swap arrangements neither the
EMI nor the central banks have free access to the dollar and gold reserves, which have been legally
transferred to the EMI but which are automatically subject to a three-month repurchase contract reverting
ownership of the reserves to the central banks.
26  In practice, the dollar and gold reserves are not
physically transferred to the EMI but rather are held by the national central banks in trust on behalf of the
EMI.
27
The result of these arrangements is that a significant portion of the reserve assets of EMS central
banks comprise ECU reserves.  The ECU serves as a means of settlement between the EMS central banks,
and a creditor central bank is obliged to accept settlement by means of ECUs of an amount up to 50% of
its claim against a debtor central bank, unless the creditor bank is itself a net debtor in ECU in which case
it is obliged to accept full settlement in ECUs.
28  Significantly, the EMI may grant to the monetary
authorities of third countries and to international monetary institutions the status of “other holders” of
ECU, and the first non-EU institutions that were permitted to hold the ECU were the Bank for
International Settlements and the Swiss National Bank.
29
$GGLWLRQDO)XQFWLRQVRIWKH(&8LQWKH(06
The ECU performs several additional functions in the European Monetary System.  First, in the
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, the central exchange rates of the participating currencies which
form the basis of the bands within which currencies may float are expressed in ECU.
30  This choice of the
ECU as denominator (numéraire) for the exchange rate mechanism fulfills a purely accounting function.
31
The second function performed by the ECU in the EMS is as the reference against which the so-
called divergence indicator operates.
32  The divergence indicator establishes a threshold of divergence
which is the point at which a currency’s market value against the ECU diverges from its central rate
against the ECU by more than 75% of the maximum spread of divergence permitted under the fluctuation
bands for each currency.
33  When a currency crosses its threshold of divergence there is a presumption
that the authorities concerned will intervene on the currency markets or adopt    other corrective measures.
34
Unlike the obligation of the central banks to   intervene in support of the bilateral exchange rate bands of
the EMS, intervention is at the discretion of the central banks when the divergence threshold is crossed.
35
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346HH Resolution of the European Council on the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and related matters (Dec. 5,
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The divergence indicator is essentially an early-warning system, identifying any currency that diverges
from the average of the other currencies (i.e., the ECU) before the gap grows too large.
36
The third function performed by the ECU in the EMS is that of the denominator for operations in
both the intervention and the credit mechanism—in other words it denominates the creditor and debtor
balances resulting from obligations to intervene in EMS currencies.
37
8VHRIWKH(&8LQWKH(&%XGJHW
In addition to its role in the European Monetary System, the ECU has served other functions in the
European Community.  The ECU has been used for many years as the unit of account of the EC and the
general EC budget has been drafted in terms of ECU since the early 1980s.
38  Notwithstanding the use of
the ECU as the unit of account for the EC budget, the Community has devised a mechanism that seeks to
introduce monetary stability for the EC budget by converting budgetary operations for each month into
national currencies.
39  Despite the application of this system, movements in the purchasing power of the
EC budget still occur.
40  Since January 1988 the ECU has been used not only as a unit of account but also
as a means of payment in the execution of the EC budget, accounting for 44% of total budgetary
expenditures in 1995.
41
%7KH3ULYDWH(&8
8VHRIWKH3ULYDWH(&8LQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWV
The    so-called “private ECU” has proved popular on the financial markets and   is quoted daily in the
currency markets.  Since the early 1980s the    private ECU has   been widely used to measure obligations in
many swap and bond transactions and international loans.
42  Although initially quite a modest market, the
ECU market took off in the mid 1980s with the amount of ECU bond issues increasing from 4.9 billion
ECU in 1984 to 12.1 billion ECU in 1985.
43  As of the end of September 1995 the total estimated stock of
ECU bonds amounted to ECU 119.1 billion, outstanding short-term paper totaled ECU 11.7 billion and
net ECU bank lending is estimated to have reached ECU 56.9 billion.
44  The ECU is estimated to have
accounted for 2.1% of global foreign exchange market turnover in April 1995 and the ECU’s share in the
total outstanding volume of currency swaps and interest rate swaps in all currencies for year-end 1994
was 3.0% and 1.9%, respectively.
45  In terms of aggregate amounts of assets and liabilities, the ECU
ranked third among EU currencies in the international banking market, behind the Deutsche mark and the
Pound sterling.
46  The share of non-European ECU bond issuers, mainly in the U.S. and Japan, ranged
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at 4-6 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Removing the Legal Obstacles to the Use of the ECU].
43European Monetary Institute, VXSUD note    41, Table 4.1; GROS, VXSUD note    8, in ECU, VXSUD note    5,   at 13, 18-20.
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456HHLG at 9-10.
466HHLG at 4.cxxxviii
from 2.5% to 9.2% of the ECU bond market in the five years from 1991 to 1995.
47 An ECU futures and
options market also appears to have developed in the United States, with the ECU being listed on a
number of commodities exchanges.
48
While the ECU is widely used in the financial markets, it is not yet an important vehicle for current
transactions and it is not widely used as a unit of account in non-financial transactions.
49  The ECU has
not yet developed as a legal tender.
New York law is likely to be the governing law for a significant portion of ECU swap contracts in
view of the preference of U.S. counterparties to select New York law as the governing law of their
contracts.
50  New York law is also likely to be the governing law for most ECU bonds issued by U.S.
corporations.
3ULYDWH(&8&UHDWLRQRIWKH)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWV
It is important to understand that the private ECU is a creation of the financial markets and has no
formal link with the so-called official ECU that is issued by the European Monetary Institute and is used
in the European Monetary System.
51  Private ECUs were initially created by Belgian commercial banks in
the late 1970s against the deposit by the European Economic Community of sums of money in the
component currencies of the official ECU.
52  The value of the private ECUs so created were ensured by
the banks issuing a guarantee that the ECUs could be converted into the component currencies.
53  The
private ECU is therefore not officially issued by any central banking institution.
54  Thus, assets in private
ECUs cannot be converted into official ECUs because private ECUs are created by commercial banks
against national currencies, independently from the supply of official ECUs    that are created against dollar
and gold reserves and    are only capable of being held by monetary authorities.
55  At bottom, the private
ECU has traditionally been regarded as a creature of contract that exists    purely as a matter of agreement  
between    contracting parties.
56
'HYHORSPHQWRIWKH3ULYDWH(&8DVD4XDVL&XUUHQF\
During the 1980s the private ECU began to acquire certain characteristics more closely associated
with a currency in its own right than a basket of separate currencies.  What started out as a one-way ECU
deposit market quickly developed into a two-way deposit and loan market as banks sought out ECU
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borrowers in order to avoid having to unbundle the ECU basket into its component parts.
57  Perhaps the
most significant development facilitating the expansion of the private ECU market was the adoption of
the “open basket” definition of the private ECU.  The “open basket” definition of the private ECU
expressly defines the private ECU by reference to the official ECU, denoting that a change in the
composition of the official ECU will result in a parallel change in the composition of the underlying
private ECU obligation.
58  A “closed basket” on the other hand would define the private ECU obligation
by reference to the official ECU on the date the contract was made.
59  The development of the open
basket was crucial to the emergence of a unified, liquid private ECU market because the continued usage
by the financial markets of the closed basket definition would have resulted in the creation of different
types of private ECU obligations, causing confusion in the marketplace.
60   In fact the private ECU
market boomed from the moment that the “open basket” formula became widely used,
61 and in practice
the formula was rapidly accepted in most, if not all, cases.
62
It has been suggested that the adoption of the open basket definition caused the private ECU to shift
conceptually from being a “basket of currencies” to a “basket-currency.”
63  Two developments in
particular attest to the private ECU’s emergence as a quasi-currency during this time.  Firstly, the
acceptance of the “open basket” formula greatly enhanced the direct settlement of private ECUs in ECUs
rather than the component currencies.
64  Initially ECU transactions were settled either in a third currency
or in the full basket of component currencies, leading to high transaction costs associated with bundling
and unbundling the component currencies.
65  In 1986 a comprehensive same-day private ECU settlement
system started functioning, with the ECU Banking Association (EBA) managing the system, SWIFT
(Society for Worldwide Financial Telecommunication) providing a payment transmission mechanism and
a netting center which produces the balances of each bank vis-à-vis the others, and the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) acting as agent for the clearing banks.
66  In 1988 the ECU clearing system
decided that component currencies would no longer be deliverable against the basket.
67  In 1995 the
average daily turnover in the system was ECU 46.8 billion, and it was expected that by early 1997 there
would be 48 clearing banks participating in the system.
68  While the development of the ECU clearing
system has greatly encouraged the use of the ECU as a basket currency separate and apart from the
underlying component currencies, the system is structured so that neither the BIS nor the EBA perform
the function of a lender of last resort.
69  Thus the BIS does not grant credits or loans in ECU, thereby
effecting the creation of ECU, and neither the BIS nor SWIFT are exposed to any responsibility for losses
or damage arising out of the clearing of ECU transactions.
70  The absence of a lender of last resort means
that there is systemic risk in the ECU clearing system (i.e., the failure by one bank to meet its liabilities
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would have repercussions throughout the system).
71  This provides a significant contrast with the role of a
central bank as lender of last resort in a domestic clearing system.
A second development precipitated by the use of the “open basket” formula and the resulting usage
of the ECU as a quasi-currency in its own right is that the ECU’s market value became determined by the
supply and demand for ECU as such and was no longer determined by the supply and demand for the
component currencies.
72  Similarly the interest rate for the ECU became a negotiated rate rather than a
computed rate based on the weighted interest rates of the component currencies (the so-called theoretical
yield).
73  The transaction cost of arbitrage operations in ECU through bundling and unbundling the ECU
are sufficiently high to ensure some independence for ECU market rates.
74  However, the extent of the
divergence between the market value of the private ECU and its theoretical value based on the currencies
comprising the basket has at times been so pronounced that commentators have concluded that the
divergence cannot be explained purely in terms of the arbitrage cost.
75
Thus, in 1989 actual ECU yields rose above the theoretical ECU yield as markets anticipated a
revision in the composition of the ECU basket to include the high-yielding Spanish peseta and Portuguese
escudo, whose incorporation into the basket implied an increase in the weight of currencies with higher
interest rates.
76  Again in late 1995 and early 1996 there was an unprecedented spread in terms of both
magnitude and persistence between the market and theoretical ECU exchange rates, fluctuating between
150 and 320 basis points.
77  The spread is thought to have reflected uncertainty regarding which countries
will participate in EMU and legal uncertainties concerning the continuity of private ECU contracts after
EMU.
78  The return to narrower exchange rate spreads as 1996 progressed is thought to have reflected a
more general increase in optimism in financial markets about the likelihood of EMU, as well as ongoing
work to prepare the legal framework for the use of the euro.
79  The only conclusion that can be drawn
from this is that the ECU and its underlying basket are not the same thing and that the private ECU has
acquired an independent identity as a quasi-currency based on the    role played by the   ECU    in the process
of European monetary integration.
80
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While there is no official issuer of the private ECU and no monetary authority that plays the role of
a lender of last resort with respect to the private ECU market, the institutions and    member states of the
European Union have played an important   role in fostering the development of the private ECU.  In order
to facilitate the progressive usage of the private ECU in transactions within their borders, all    member  
states had accorded the ECU the status of a foreign currency - either de jure or de facto - prior to the
signing of the Maastricht Treaty.
81  Since the coming into operation of the Maastricht Treaty, the
European Monetary Institute has been charged with a supervisory role with respect to the private ECU 
market and is required to facilitate the use of the ECU and oversee its development, including the smooth
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functioning of the ECU clearing system.
82  The EMI sees its role with respect to the smooth functioning
of the ECU clearing system as ensuring that ECU clearing operations do not pose unacceptable systemic
risks to the ECU market.
83  The EMI’s supervisory role over the private ECU market is    acquiring greater
significance as   EMU approaches and preparations are made for the    private ECU market to be   subsumed
into the new euro market.
The governments of the EU    member states have in practice played an   important role in providing
liquidity to the private ECU market through their large shares of ECU bond and commercial paper
issues.
84  Thus, in 1995 84% of new ECU bond issues were placed by EU governments and an additional
4% by EU supranational institutions (i.e., the European Community and the European Investment
Bank).
85  EU sovereigns and supranationals have accounted for over 50% of new ECU bond issues in
every year since 1987.
86  Government funding of the ECU market has long been regarded by the financial
markets as a political support mechanism to accelerate progress towards EMU    through the development
of a liquid   ECU market that will be subsumed by the single    currency.
87
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The 1989 Delors Report, whose proposed three-stage process to EMU is   largely reflected in the
Maastricht Treaty, first recognized that the ECU has the potential to be developed into the single
European currency.
88  Following the publication of the Delors Report an intense and highly publicized
debate took place within the European Community between advocates of the introduction of a single
European currency that would substitute national currencies and proponents of a dual currency approach.
The dual currency approach found expression in  the so-called “hard ECU” proposal developed by the
United Kingdom which envisaged the introduction of the ECU as a dual currency to be issued by a
European Monetary Fund and available on demand in lieu of national currencies, leaving it to market
forces to dictate the usage of the hard ECU or the various national currencies.
89  The debate was won by
the single currency theorists, and all doubt on the matter was dispelled by the declaration by the European
Council in Rome in October 1990 that “the Community will have a single currency - a strong and stable
ECU - which will be an expression and identity of its unity.”
90  The debate served to focus the attention of
the financial markets on the private ECU, and it is clear that, even before the Maastricht Treaty had been
drafted, the prospect that the ECU might one day become the currency of Europe had attracted
considerable interest in the private ECU market, with financial investors inside and outside the European
Community willing to take a strategic position in the private ECU.
91   This demonstrates that the fortunes
of the private ECU market have long been wedded to the process of European monetary integration.
92
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Under the Maastricht    Treaty it is provided that from January 1, 1994 the   currency composition of
the ECU basket will not be changed.  
93  The Treaty further   provides that at the starting date of EMU the
Council will, acting with the unanimity of    member states participating in EMU, adopt the conversion
rates at which their   currencies will be irrevocably fixed and at which irrevocably fixed rate the ECU will
be substituted for these currencies, and the ECU will become a currency in its own right.
94  The Treaty
provides that this measure (i.e., the irrevocable fixing of conversion rates) shall not by itself modify the
external value of the ECU.
95  This means that the ECU basket will    become a currency in its own right at
the rate of one   ECU basket to one unit of the single    currency.  The Treaty further provides that the  
Council will, acting according to the same procedure, also take the other measures necessary for the rapid
introduction of the ECU as the single currency of the participating    member states.
96
That the introduction of the ECU as a currency in its own right will not   modify the external value of
the ECU means that the exchange rate between the ECU basket and the currencies of non-EU countries
such as the U.S. dollar or the Japanese yen prior to EMU will be identical to the exchange rate between
the new euro currency and third country currencies at the moment the euro comes into existence.
Immediately after its introduction as a currency in its own right the euro will, of course, be subject to the
normal exchange rate fluctuations of the international currency markets.     The Treaty implies, however,
that the initial exchange rate    of the      euro will be linked to the exchange rate values of the twelve
currencies forming the basis of the existing ECU basket.  It should be noted that if, as can be reasonably
expected,    not all of the EU member states satisfy the preconditions to monetary   union, the initial
exchange rate of the euro could be influenced by the exchange rates of currencies not participating in
EMU.
Since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 1993 the institutions of the European
Community have repeatedly confirmed    that the   Maastricht Treaty requires that obligations denominated
in ECU become obligations denominated in the single currency at the rate of one ECU to one unit of the
single currency.  In April 1994, the European Commission issued a recommendation concerning the legal
treatment of the ECU and of contracts denominated in ECU in view of the introduction of the single
European currency, noting that Article 109l(4) of the Treaty “explains¼ that the decision regarding the
conversion rates shall by itself not modify the external value of the ECU” and that “this means that one
ECU in its current composition of a basket of component currencies will be exchanged, at the due time
and in accordance with the procedures described in the Treaty, for one ECU in its new composition of a
currency in its own right at a 1:1 conversion rate”.
97  Based on this, the Commission recommended that
all parties to contracts denominated in ECU ensure that “every obligation to pay a sum in the ECU basket
will be converted into an obligation to pay the same sum in ECU as single currency.”
98
In May 1995 the European Commission published its *UHHQ3DSHURQWKH3UDFWLFDO$UUDQJHPHQWV
IRUWKH,QWURGXFWLRQRIWKH6LQJOH&XUUHQF\, which re-confirmed as follows:
As the transformation of the ECU from a basket currency into a currency in its own right will
not by itself modify the external value of the ECU, the Treaty establishes that the conversion
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rate of the basket ECU into the ECU [single currency] will be 1:1.  As a consequence, the
unilateral decision of a contracting party to apply a different conversion rate should be
considered as a violation of the terms of the contract.
99
The Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European Council of December 1995 contained two
important points regarding the conversion of the ECU basket into the single currency.
100  First, the
Presidency Conclusions specified that the single currency’s name would be the “euro” and that “the
specific name euro will be used instead of the generic term ‘ECU’ used by the Treaty to refer to the
European currency unit.”
101  Second, the Presidency Conclusions stated that upon monetary union “the
official ECU basket will cease to exist” and confirmed that “[i]n the case of contracts denominated by
reference to the official ECU basket of the European Community, in accordance with the Treaty,
substitution by the euro will be at the 1:1 rate, subject to the particular terms of individual contracts.”  
102
Thus, obligations denominated in the official ECU will be transformed into obligations denominated in
euro at the rate of one ECU for one euro.
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The EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro    makes
provision for contracts denominated in ECU.
103  The regulation   provides that every reference in a legal
instrument to the ECU, as referred to in Article 109g of the Treaty and as defined in Council Regulation
(EC) No. 3320/94 (i.e., the regulation which defines the current composition of the ECU basket),
104 is
replaced by a reference to the euro at a rate of one euro to one ECU.
105  This provision confirms the 1:1
transformation of ECU obligations into    euro obligations      as from January 1, 1999.  As stated in the
Preamble, this “confirm[s] that the principle of continuity of contracts and other legal instruments shall
apply¼ between the ECU as referred to in Article 109g of the Treaty and as defined in the Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3320/94 and the euro.”
106
It is important to note that the continuity principle only applies to the ECU as defined in Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3320/94.  There are, however, many different contractual definitions of the ECU in
the marketplace, a number of which do not refer to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3320/94.  
107  The EU
Council regulation   overcomes this potential problem    by providing that “[r]eferences in a legal   instrument
to the ECU without such a definition shall be presumed¼ to be references to the ECU as referred to in
Article 109g EC and as defined in Council Regulation (EC) No. 3320/94.”
108  This presumption is
“rebuttable taking into account the intentions of the parties.”
109  Thus, where an ECU obligation is not
defined by reference to Council Regulation (EC) No. 3320/94 it is open to a party to argue that the parties
intended to contract with reference to the basket of currencies underlying the ECU rather than the official
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ECU that will be transformed into a currency in its own right on January 1, 1999.  This intention might be
demonstrated by evidence that the parties chose to denominate their obligations in ECU because of the
anticipated stability of the countervailing exchange rate fluctuations of a basket of currencies as opposed
to the more uncertain fortunes of an individual currency like the Deutsche mark or the French franc.  
However, the City of London Joint Working Group on   EMU Legislation has conducted investigations
into this issue and has concluded “that even where, in older bond issues for example, a fixed basket ECU
was used, the intention was to follow the official ECU for pricing, trading and settlement purposes.”
110
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This wealth of legal provisions and official pronouncements regarding the 1:1 replacement of
references to the ECU basket by references to the single currency in ECU contracts is mirrored by
concurrent developments in the financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic.  In June 1994, the
European Commission published an analysis of the reaction of the ECU bond markets to the entry into
force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993.
111  Based on a representative sample of 18 of the 33
ECU bonds issued on the    bond markets during the period from November   1993 to June 1994, including a
number of ECU bond issues governed by New York law, the Commission concluded that “[t]here is a
positive trend towards the acceptance in the markets of stating explicitly continuity rules between the
ECU basket and the future single currency in eurobond contracts.”
112  The first market participant to
amend the documentation of its ECU bonds was the European Community itself in its capacity as an
issuer.  Beginning in November 1993, immediately following the entry into force of the Maastricht
Treaty, the Community inserted new language in its ECU bond and loan documentation “to ensure that, in
any case, the nominal continuity of obligations to pay a sum of ECUs is guaranteed throughout the
process leading to full monetary union.”
113
The preparations of the international financial markets for the 1:1 replacement where also assisted
by the establishment in April 1993 by the European Commission and the ECU Banking Association of an
ad hoc working group on the legal definition of the ECU.
114  Arising out of this process IPMA (the
International Primary    Market   Association) and ISDA released a joint statement in December 1995
recommending a standard definition of the ECU for use in terms and conditions of securities and
derivatives contracts which was “designed to take into account the entry into force of the Treaty on
European Union and the second stage of European Monetary Union.”
115  In the meantime a number of
U.S. ECU bond issuers had, beginning in 1994, already started to follow the market trend towards the
inclusion of specific language in their ECU bond obligations ensuring that ECU bonds became single  
currency bonds after EMU.
116  In July 1996 IPMA and ISDA put out for comment an updated version of
the standard definition of the ECU which was designed to “reflect the current decision of the European
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Council on the name euro and 1:1 conversion.”
117  Following a period of consultation this updated
definition of the ECU was adopted in September 1996.
118
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As has already been noted, the proposed EU Council regulation containing certain provisions
relating to the introduction of the euro provides that as of January 1, 1999 every reference in a legal
instrument to the ECU, as referred to in Article 109g of the Treaty and as defined in Council Regulation
3320/94, will be replaced by a reference to the euro at a rate of one euro to one ECU.
119  In addition, the
regulation also provides that references to the ECU without such a definition will be presumed to be
references to the ECU as referred to in Article 109g of the Treaty and as defined in Council Regulation
3320/94, but this presumption is rebuttable taking into account the intentions of the parties.
120
The U.K. Financial Law Panel has suggested that the status of such legislation compelling private
ECU obligors to pay euros is problematical and that it is not clear why an American court should order an
ECU payer to make payments in euro simply because legislation enacted by the EU Council requires
this.
121  The basis of the Financial Law Panel’s concern is that the ECU is not a currency, but rather a
formula which produces a value in terms of the currencies of the EU member states (i.e., the basket of
currencies), and that the rules of law which apply when a country changes its currency for another might
have no application.
122  The concern that the international obligation to recognize the currencies of other
states cannot apply to obligations expressed in ECU because the ECU is not a currency in the true sense
has been voiced by other commentators considering the legal implications of EMU.
123  The Financial Law
Panel appears to suggest as an alternative that private ECU obligations could be discharged in a
recomposed ECU basket after EMU (such a basket would consist of a large euro component calculated by
reference to the conversion rates between the participating currencies that are in the basket and the euro
together with the existing national currency components for those currencies not participating in
EMU).
124  This argument raises the question whether private ECU obligations are recognized as
obligations denominated in a lawful currency under New York law and the laws of other U.S.
jurisdictions, in which case the provisions of EC law requiring a 1:1 conversion of private ECU
obligations into euro would be automatically applied by American courts.
5HYLVHG8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\DQGWKH(&8
The official ECU of the European Community is recognized as a lawful currency in the 43 U.S.
jurisdictions (including California and Illinois) that have adopted the revised UCC definition of “money”.
The definition of money contained in Section 2-105(24) of the Uniform Commercial Code was revised in
1990 so as to define “money” as follows:  “Money is a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a
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domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency and LQFOXGHV D PRQHWDU\ XQLW RI DFFRXQW
HVWDEOLVKHGE\DQLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDORUJDQL]DWLRQRUE\DJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWZRRUPRUHQDWLRQV.”
125
The significance of this amendment is that it broadened the definition of money to include the
monetary units of intergovernmental organizations such as the European Community’s ECU and the
IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR).  This revised definition of money has been adopted in 42 of the 50
states and the District of Columbia.
126  In these jurisdictions the ECU is therefore recognized as a medium
of exchange and monetary unit of account established by the European Community.  Thus, in accordance
with Official Comment 24 to the Code,
127 the ECU used in the European Monetary System is recognized
as an official currency of the European Community based on its recognition and sanction as such by the
institutions and member states of the European Community.  The official ECU will be regarded as a
creature of European Community law in these jurisdictions and the 1:1 replacement of references to the
official ECU by references to the euro will be recognized in accordance with the applicable provisions of
EC law.  Obligations denominated in the official ECU that are governed by the laws of these jurisdictions
will therefore automatically become obligations denominated in euro after EMU.
8QLIRUP)RUHLJQ0RQH\&ODLPV$FWDQGWKH   (&8
The official ECU is    also recognized as a lawful currency under the laws of the 20 U.S. jurisdictions
(including California and Illinois) that have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act.  The
Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act defines foreign money as “a medium of exchange for the payment of
obligations or a store of value authorized or adopted by a government or by inter-governmental
agreement.”
128  This definition of foreign money has been uniformly adopted in all 20 enacting
jurisdictions.
129  The drafters’ comments to the Act confirm that the ECU falls within the definition of
foreign money:
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The definition includes composite currencies such as European Currency Units created by
agreement of the governments that are members of the European Monetary System or the
Special Drawing Rights created under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund.
These are “stores of value” used to determine the quantity of payment in some international
transactions.
130
The significance of this is that the official ECU will again be regarded as a creature of European
Community law in these jurisdictions and the 1:1 replacement of all references to the official ECU    by
references to the euro will be acknowledged   by these jurisdictions in accordance with the applicable
provisions of EC law.     Indeed, the 1:1 transformation of private ECU obligations denominated in the
official   ECU into obligations denominated in euro is expressly required under the provisions of the
Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act.  Section 12 of the Act provides that if, after an obligation is
expressed in a foreign money, the country issuing or adopting that money substitutes a new money in
place of that money, the obligation is treated as if expressed in the new money at the rate of conversion
the issuing country establishes for the payment of like obligations denominated in the former money.
131
Since the official ECU falls within the definition of foreign money under the Act, all obligations
expressed in the official ECU will be treated as if expressed in the euro at the 1:1 rate established under
EC law for the payment of such private ECU obligations.
*HQHUDO8&&'HILQLWLRQRI0RQH\DQGWKH/HJDO6WDWXVRIWKH   (&8XQGHU1HZ<RUN/DZ
The revised definition of money in the UCC, which expressly broadens the definition of money to
include monetary units of account established by intergovernmental organizations, has not been adopted
in eight states.
132 Significantly, the amended definition has not been adopted in New York State, which   is
the jurisdiction whose laws govern the great majority of private ECU obligations governed by the laws of
U.S. jurisdictions.  In order to establish whether the official ECU is a lawful currency under New York
law it is therefore useful to consider the general UCC definition of money that has been adopted by New
York State: money is a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a foreign government as a part of
its currency.
133  As discussed previously, this definition rejects the narrow view that money is limited to
legal tender.
134  The test adopted is that of sanction of government, whether by authorization before issue
or adoption afterward, which recognizes the circulating medium as a part of the official currency of that
government.
135
It can be argued that the official ECU of the EC falls within the general definition of money that has
been adopted by New York State.  The official ECU is a medium of exchange insofar as it is used as a
means of settlement between the EMI, the national central banks of the EU    member states and certain
other non-EU central banks and international monetary institutions.
136  The issuance of the official ECU
by the EMI (and previously the EMCF) has been authorized by the governments of the EU member
states, pursuant to the terms of the Maastricht Treaty and as part of the operation of the European
Monetary System.  
137  The fact that ECUs circulate with official recognition between the central banks of
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EMS countries has led some commentators to conclude that the official ECU has the characteristics of a
genuine currency.
138 This view also appears to have been echoed by the European Commission, which
has noted that “[t]he monetary nature of the ECU is thus based on the EMS.”
139
As against that, however, the official ECU plays an extremely limited role as a currency.  ECUs can
only be held by EU central banks and certain other monetary authorities.
140  The fact that the official ECU
is    issued against dollar and gold   reserves means that its creation is contingent on factors that are outside
the control of the EU member states (i.e., the direction of the U.S. dollar and the price of   gold).
141  In
addition, the issuer has a very limited access to the reserves against which the ECU is created.
142  Some
commentators have argued that although the official ECU has the legal characteristics of a currency, it
should still be considered as a developing or quasi-currency in view of the restrictions on its uses and its
limited circle of users.
143
Notwithstanding these limitations on the use of the official ECU, a case can still be made that the
official ECU falls within the definition of money under the New York Uniform Commercial Code.  The
fact that the official ECU is only used as a medium of exchange between central banks and that its uses
are limited need not necessarily deprive it of its monetary status because the New York UCC only
requires that the medium be authorized by a foreign government as DSDUW of its currency.
144  It is not
essential that the medium be the sole currency of a country but rather that it be a partial currency.  The
limitations on the uses of the official ECU do not detract from its primary function as a medium of
exchange between monetary institutions that has been authorized by the governments of EU member
states.  In   addition, the fact that the official ECU is not a legal tender for the payment of all debts is
irrelevant in view of the UCC’s rejection of the narrow concept of money as legal tender.  
145
New York courts would also be impressed by the fact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
has implicitly accepted for many years that the ECU is a foreign currency.  Beginning in 1984 the IMF
began to exclude gold and dollar deposits of central banks held with the European Monetary Cooperation
Fund from countries’ assets for the purpose of making the calculations necessary to determine the
apportionment of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), instead including the ECUs created by these deposits
in countries’ foreign exchange reserves, thereby implying that the ECU is considered a currency by the
IMF.
146
In conclusion, the argument can be made that the official ECU falls within the definition of money
under New York law and that the 1:1 replacement of references to the official ECU    by references to the
euro will be recognized in accordance with the relevant provisions of EC law.  As against that, however,
it may still be argued that, in view of its limited uses, the official ECU should not be regarded as money
within the meaning of the New York UCC.  The fact that the New York State Legislature has not
amended the UCC to expressly include monetary units of account such as the ECU and the SDR within
the definition of money might be advanced as evidence that the official ECU falls outside the ambit of the
New York UCC definition.     If the official ECU is not classified as legal money within the   meaning of the
New York UCC, obligations denominated in ECU must be regarded as pure creatures of contract.  To the
extent that the private    ECU is a creation of   contract law, it is necessary to consider the legal status of
private ECU obligations governed by New York law in accordance with New York law as the governing
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law of the contract rather than EC law as the law of the currency.  Under New York law legislation has
recently been enacted that provides for the continuity of ECU contracts after EMU in a manner that is
substantially identical to the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro.  The content of the
New York legislation will be considered below.
147
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A credible argument can also be made that the ECU underwent a radical transformation at the time
the Maastricht Treaty came into operation.  According to this argument,    ECU obligations created after the
Maastricht Treaty came into force   were transformed into partial monetary obligations insofar as such
obligations might mature after the    ECU becomes a currency in its own    right.  The ECU became, in a  
sense, a contingent currency whose monetary status was dependent upon the occurrence of EMU.  Thus,
if EMU    takes place    obligations denominated in ECU will be transformed from beeing pure creations of
contract law into obligations   denominated in a currency that will be issued under the authority of the
European Central Bank.
This interpretation of ECU obligations created after Maastricht as constituting contingent monetary
obligations finds a certain degree of support in the wording of the UCC definition of money.  Official
Comment 24 to the UCC definition    of money states that the test adopted by this definition is that of
sanction of government, ZKHWKHUE\DXWKRUL]DWLRQEHIRUHLVVXHRUDGRSWLRQDIWHUZDUG.
148  This comment
by the Code drafters implies that a medium of exchange which is not sanctioned by a government at the
time of its issue can be adopted as money by that government subsequently.  Thus, the Code drafters
envisaged that in the ever-changing world of finance, media of exchange can emerge which become
increasingly acceptable in the financial markets, eventually leading to their official recognition as
currency by governmental authorities.  A plausible argument can be made that this encapsulates the
essence of the transformation of the ECU into a currency in its own right, beginning with its progressive
development as a basket currency and culminating in    the single currency.  If this argument is accepted,
private ECUs created after   Maastricht, while possibly contractual in nature at the time of their creation,
would be treated as having a monetary aspect insofar as they are capable of being transformed into 
obligations denominated in a legal currency backed by a central bank.
Appealing though this argument might be, it is difficult to predict with any certainty how much
credence it might be given by the legal community.  In the absence of any certainty, it would be prudent
to assume for the purpose of argument that all ECU obligations governed by New York law, whether
created before or after   the coming into operation of the Maastricht Treaty, are pure creations of market
convention whose legal content must be interpreted solely in accordance with    New   York law as the
governing law of the contract.  This    line of reasoning refers us to the   provisions of recent legislation
enacted by the New York State    Legislature for a   determination of the legal status of ECU obligations
governed by New York law.
149
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In addition, it might also be argued that the private ECU, based on its progressive development as a
quasi-currency, has become a medium of exchange authorized by the    member states of the European
Union in accordance with the UCC   definition of    money.  Some commentators have suggested that
because the private   ECU is in practice used as a currency by the financial markets there must be a
reasonable possibility that the private ECU can be treated as a legal currency.
150  The private ECU market
has developed to such an extent that banks operating in the interbank market can borrow, lend, buy and
sell ECUs just as they do with any currency.
151  The widespread acceptance by the financial markets of
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the “open basket” definition of the private ECU has facilitated the development of a sophisticated private
ECU clearing system that does not permit ECU settlement through the component currencies.
152  The
private ECU displays the market characteristics of an independent currency with an exchange rate and
interest rate that does not correlate to its theoretical rates based on the component currencies.
153  Most
important of all, the fortunes of the private ECU in the marketplace have become inextricably linked to
the process of European monetary integration.
154  Taking all of these factors into account, one might be
tempted to argue that the private ECU has, based on market practice,    already been transformed into a
currency in its own right. 
 In    support of this argument it might be pointed out that an American court   recognized the regional
taels issued through private financial institutions in China with the acquiescence of the Chinese
government during the late 19th century as legal money.
155  It appears, however, that these taels circulated
as the sole money of account in China at that time, which readily distinguishes them from the private
ECU.
156
It is submitted that the better view is that until such time as the private ECU is issued by a sovereign
power and enjoys the backing of a lender of last resort it cannot, of itself, be readily characterized as a
legal currency.
157  While the private ECU has always been used as a medium of exchange in the financial
markets, it lacks monetary status by virtue of the fact that no government has authorized or adopted the
private ECU as a part of its currency.  It is true that all    member states have   accorded the private ECU the
legal status, either de facto or de jure, of a foreign currency.
158  However, the UCC definition of money
requires that the medium be adopted or authorized by a foreign government as a part of LWV currency,
159
and to date no EU    member state has adopted the private ECU as a part of its domestic currency.   Thus,
unlike the official ECU, there is no public issuer of the private ECU.
160  Although a sophisticated
settlement system for the clearing of the private ECU has developed, there is no monetary authority that
plays the role of a lender of last resort with respect to the private ECU market in the same way as a
central bank in a domestic money market.  
161
It is also the case that EU sovereign and supranational issuers have in practice played an important
role in providing liquidity to the private ECU market by issuing a significant share of the ECU bond
market.  
162  Moreover, it might be argued, the   supervisory role which the EMI has played with respect to
the private ECU market since the coming into operation of the Maastricht Treaty establishes an implicit
support by the EU    member states for the private ECU market.  
163  Thus, the EMI, as   precursor to the
European Central Bank, is charged under the Treaty with responsibility to oversee the role of the private
ECU market, including the smooth functioning of the ECU clearing system.
164 However, it is submitted
that these developments, while psychologically important to participants in the private ECU market, do
not add any financial security to the use of the private ECU.
165  Private ECUs are created by private
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financial institutions against the initial deposit of component currencies, and the value of the private ECU
must ultimately rest on its presumed convertibility into the component currencies.
166  At bottom, in the
absence of an official issuer or lender of last resort the private ECU may be regarded as a creature of
contract that derives its legal status from the terms of an agreement between contracting parties.  Where
such an agreement is governed by New York law, regard must be had to    New York contract law as the
governing law of the   contract rather than EC law as the law of the currency in resolving the legal status of
ECU obligations after EMU.
  ($FWRI6WDWH'RFWULQHDQG3ULYDWH(&82EOLJDWLRQV
The 1:1 transformation of obligations denominated in ECU into obligations denominated in euro is
an act of state, and under the act of state doctrine the provisions of the EU Council regulations relating to
private ECU obligations are therefore applicable to all ECU obligations whose situs are located in EU 
member   states.
167  To the extent that the act of state doctrine is    rooted in federal law, it takes   precedence
over conflicting    state law, including    state legislation.
168  Thus, the   applicable provisions of the EU
Council regulations may be applicable to all ECU obligations that involve obligors based in EU    member
states and/or payments that are   to be discharged within EU    member states, regardless of whether such
obligations   are governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
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In July 1997 the Governor of New York signed into law an amendment to the New York General
Obligations Law enacted to ensure the continuity of contracts after EMU.
169  With respect to ECU
obligations, the New York General Obligations Law provides that if a subject or medium of payment of a
contract, security or instrument is the ECU, the euro will be a commercially reasonable substitute and
substantial equivalent that may be either (i) used in determining the value of the ECU or (ii) tendered, in
each case at the conversion rate specified in, and otherwise calculated in accordance with, the regulations
adopted by the Council of the European Union.
170  The term “ECU” or “European Currency Unit” is
defined to mean the currency basket that is from time to time used as the unit of account of the European
Community as defined in European Council Regulation No. 3320/94.
171  The New York General
Obligations Law further provides with respect to ECU contracts that, when the euro first becomes the
monetary unit of participating    member states of the European Union, references to the ECU in a contract,
security   or instrument that also refers to the definition of the ECU as set forth above shall be replaced by
references to the euro at a rate of one euro to one ECU.
172  References to the “ECU” in a contract, security
or instrument without such a definition of the ECU shall be presumed, unless either demonstrated or
proved to the contrary by the intention of the parties, to be references to the currency basket that is from
time to time used as the unit of account of the European Community.
173
The cumulative effect of these provisions is that in a contract governed by New York law the euro
is treated as a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent for the ECU.  The provisions
of the New York General Obligations Law ensure the continuity of ECU contracts in a manner that is
substantially identical with the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of
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the euro.
174  Thus, the ECU is defined in accordance with its official definition as laid down in European
Council Regulation No. 3320/94.  As with the EU Council regulation,
175 all ECU obligations defined by
reference to the official ECU shall be automatically converted into euro obligations at the 1:1 conversion
rate.  Again, consistent with the EU Council regulation,
176 ECU obligations that do not contain a
definition of ECU shall be presumed to refer to the official ECU, in which case such ECU obligations
shall become euro obligations at the 1:1 rate. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a contrary
intention   by the parties.
(&82EOLJDWLRQV1RW'HILQHGE\5HIHUHQFHWRWKH2IILFLDO(&8
Although the vast majority of ECU obligations governed by New York law are derived from
contracts that define the ECU by reference to the official ECU, there    may be some ECU obligations that
are derived from contracts which do not define   the ECU.  In such circumstances the parties might
disagree as to what is meant by the term “ECU” after    the introduction of the single currency.  One party
might rely on   the presumption under the New York General Obligations Law that the ECU refers to the
official    ECU, references to which must be replaced by references to the euro   on a 1:1 basis.  The other
party might argue that the ECU simply refers to the basket of currencies underlying the ECU at the time
the contract matures, in which case the obligation may have to be discharged in a recomposed ECU
basket after EMU (i.e., a basket comprising the euro and those currencies reflected in the basket that do
not participate in EMU).  This raises the question of the extent to which the presumption    under the New
York General Obligations Law that the ECU refers to the official ECU may be rebutted by evidence of a
contrary intention by the parties to a particular ECU contract.
The ultimate goal in contract interpretation is the realization and effectuation of the parties’
intent.
177  The intention of the parties is found through an objective consideration of the language used
(i.e., what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought was meant), even though 
this may not accord with the   subjective intention of the parties.
178  As a general matter, a sensible
meaning of words should be sought by courts in the interpretation of contracts under New York law,
giving effect to the spirit and purpose of the agreement.
179  When the language used is susceptible of more
than one interpretation, the courts will look to the surrounding circumstances existing when the contract
was entered into, the situation of the parties and the subject matter of the instrument.
180  Thus the parties
to a contract on a subject matter concerning which known usages or customs prevail are deemed to have
incorporated such usages by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to the contrary.
181  Where
contracts are negotiated by counsel for sophisticated commercial parties, courts will interpret ambiguous
language to realize the reasonable expectations of the ordinary businessperson.
182
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The argument that the term “ECU”, as used in a particular contract, refers to the basket of
currencies underlying the ECU, as opposed to the official ECU as changed from time to time, might be
best advanced by arguing that the basic purpose underlying the contract was to limit the exposure to
exchange rate risks by investing in a basket of currencies whose cumulative exchange rate fluctuations are
less violent than the fluctuations of a single currency.  Indeed, the use of the private ECU as a   convenient
hedge against currency fluctuations is an oft-cited advantage of the   basket.
183
While it is undoubtedly    true that the exchange rate hedge has historically been   an important factor
making the private ECU an attractive investment asset, this will not suffice to establish that the parties to
a particular ECU contract intended to freeze their rights and obligations by reference to the composition
of the ECU basket at the time they entered into the contract.  The primary explanation behind the growth
of the private ECU market has been the general acceptance by financial markets of the “open basket”
definition of the private ECU, which allows the definition of the private ECU to change in line with
changes to the composition of the official ECU.
184  Thus, the continuity of ECU contracts was not
challenged in the aftermath of prior revisions to the ECU basket.  This was the case notwithstanding the
fact that the composition of the ECU changed quite significantly following the inclusion of the Spanish
peseta in the ECU in 1989.  Although the external value (i.e., U.S. dollar equivalent value) of the ECU
remained unchanged following each revision, the subsequent direction of the ECU’s exchange rate
against the dollar has clearly been affected by the inclusion of new currencies in the basket.
185  The 1:1
continuity of ECU obligations was assured following previous revisions to the composition of the ECU
because the use of the “open basket” definition is so widespread that it is implicitly understood in all ECU
contracts that the “open basket” formula applies.
186
The “open basket” formula implies that the private ECU always follows alterations to the official
ECU.  It is submitted that such alterations include not only changes in the composition of the official
ECU but also changes in the nature of the official ECU such as    its transformation into a currency in its
own right. This   argument is particularly compelling with respect to ECU obligations created after the
Maastricht Treaty    came into force.  It is a reasonable interpretation of post-Maastricht   ECU obligations
that the “open basket” definition of the ECU implies    that all   references to ECU in private contracts shall
be replaced by references to euro at the rate of one ECU for one euro.  As was the case with prior
revisions to the composition of the ECU, the transformation of the ECU into    a currency in its own   right
shall not of itself modify the external value of the new currency (i.e., the exchange rate between the ECU
basket and the U.S. dollar immediately prior to EMU will be identical to the exchange rate between the
euro and the dollar immediately after EMU).
187
The most sensible interpretation of the term ECU in a private contract is that it refers to the official
ECU of the EC.  This interpretation gives effect to what a reasonable person would have thought was
meant by the term “ECU”, even though it may not necessarily reflect the subjective beliefs of all
contracting parties.  This interpretation is consistent with the circumstances surrounding the private ECU
market, including the customary usage of the “open basket” formula and the development of the private
ECU as a basket currency separate and apart from the basket’s component currencies.  In this regard,
some commentators have explicitly rejected the notion that the exchange rate hedge explains the
popularity of the private ECU, pointing to the close link between the direction of the private ECU’s
market value and the overall process of European monetary integration.
188  It has also been suggested that
the argument that the open basket formula implicitly applies in all private ECU contracts will hold greater
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sway in the wholesale financial and interbank markets as opposed to the retail markets.
189  Most, if not all
ECU contracts governed by New York law involve sophisticated corporate and financial participants in
the wholesale markets who can be reasonably expected to have understood the implications of the “open
basket” formula.
In conclusion, the widespread acceptance of the “open basket” definition of the private ECU will
make it difficult to rebut the presumption under the New York General Obligations Law that the term
“ECU” as used in private contracts refers to the official ECU of the EC references to which should be
replaced by references to euro on a 1:1 basis. This presumption will be particularly compelling where the  
contract was entered into after Maastricht and the parties are sophisticated financial or corporate
institutions. It    will, however, always be open to the parties to adduce   clear evidence of a contrary
intention.     Such is the prevalence of the “open basket”   definition of the ECU that, even in the absence of
legislation in New York, obligations denominated in ECU would, under normal principles of contract
interpretation, be interpreted as referring to the official ECU of the European Community.  As a matter of
contract interpretaion, obligations denominated in the official ECU would therefore be construed sensibly
so as to follow the 1:1    replacement of references to the official ECU by references to the euro.
&RQWLQXLW\RI(&8&RQWUDFWV
Mirroring the language of the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro,
190 the New
York General Obligations Law provides that the introduction of the euro shall not have the effect of
discharging or excusing performance under any contract, security or instrument, or give a party the right
to unilaterally alter or terminate any contract, security or instrument.
191  This provision ensures the
continuity of ECU contracts after EMU by preventing parties from invoking doctrines such as frustration
or impossibility at common law or commercial impracticability under the UCC as a means of terminating
or otherwise discharging ECU obligations based on EMU.
It is submitted that    the provisions of the New York    General Obligations Law   ensuring the
continuity of ECU contracts after    EMU are largely declaratory of   existing law and do not alter pre-
existing contractual rights.  This is because parties could not have successfully invoked the doctrines of
commercial impracticability, frustration or impossibility in the absence of the New York legislation.  In
order to avail of the UCC doctrine of commercial impracticability or the common law doctrines of
frustration or impossibility to terminate or otherwise discharge contractual obligations denominated in
ECU it is necessary to show that the event rendering performance impracticable or otherwise frustrating
the contract was unforeseeable.
192  In the case of    the replacement of refrerences to the ECU by   references
to the euro, it would therefore be necessary to show that the      transformation of the    ECU into    a currency in
its own right was unforeseeable.  The   development of the ECU as a currency in its own right first became
a real possibility before the Maastricht Treaty was even drafted when in 1990, following an intense and
highly publicized political debate, the European Council rejected a dual currency proposal and decided
that the ECU would be the single currency of the European Community.
193  It is clear that market
expectations, both within and outside the European Community, regarding the role of the ECU in the
process of European monetary integration played an important role in the development of the private
ECU market at that early stage.
194  This was followed by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in early
1992, which specifically provided    that the ECU    would become a   currency in its own right.
195  Market
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expectations regarding the    role of the ECU in   the development of  the single currency have continued to
play an important role in the evolution of private ECU exchange and interest rates.
196
The implications of the Maastricht Treaty for the private ECU market have been repeatedly spelt
out by the European Community since the Treaty went into force, and this has resulted in the EU Council
regulation providing for the 1:1    replacement of references to the ECU by references to the euro (unless
the contracting parties intended otherwise).
 197  These clear signals from the European   Community have
prompted a flurry of activity in the financial markets over the past number of years, and market operators
have decided to update their ECU documentation to expressly take account of EMU.  
198  The long-
standing   foreseeability of the    transformation of the ECU    into a currency in its own right would   preclude
the invocation of contractual doctrines such as commercial impracticability, frustration or impossibility in
order to terminate or otherwise discharge ECU obligations governed by New York law in the aftermath of
EMU.
The U.K. Financial Law Panel has, however, expressed    a contrary viewpoint.   The Panel has
suggested that the euro may be much stronger than the ECU because the euro will be the currency of
those    member states with the strongest economies   while the ECU basket includes certain currencies that
may not satisfy the Maastricht Treaty’s economic convergence criteria.
199  The Panel argues that obligors
under contracts involving ECU-denominated obligations which were incurred before the details (or even
the possibility) of EMU became clear would be unhappy to discover that their obligations had in practice
been increased by the introduction of the euro.
200  In the aftermath of EMU, parties to such ECU contracts
might be inclined to argue that performance has been frustrated.  Such an argument would point to the
change in the nature of the ECU from a basket currency to a currency in its own right together with a
possible appreciation in the value of the euro compared to the ECU on the international currency markets
after January 1, 1999.
IPMA has strongly criticized the position adopted by the Financial Law Panel, arguing that the
Panel may not have given sufficient weight to the expectations of the market because investors in ECU
obligations expect such obligations to be transformed into euro obligations on a one-for-one basis.
201  It is
submitted that the view expressed by IPMA on this point is more consistent with the weight of evidence
establishing the long-standing foreseeability of the 1:1 replacement of references to of the ECU basket by
references to the euro.  
)ORDWLQJ5DWH2EOLJDWLRQV
Another issue that might arise under New York law is whether the possible disappearance of ECU
price sources might frustrate or render commercially impracticable the performance of ECU interest rate
obligations, particularly interest rate swaps.
202  This issue is specifically addressed by the New York
General Obligations Law which provides that calculating or determining the subject or medium of
payment of a contract, security or instrument with reference to an interest rate or other basis that has been
substituted or replaced due to the introduction of the euro and that is a commercially reasonable substitute
and substantial equivalent shall not have the effect of discharging or excusing performance under any
contract, security or instrument, or give a party the right to unilaterally alter or terminate any contract,
security or instrument.
203  This provision ensures that the replacement of a euro rate source for an ECU
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rate source will not threaten the continuity of floating rate ECU obligations.  In this respect, the New
York General Obligations Law confirms the general continuity principle under the EU Council
regulation.  
204
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In July 1997 the Governor of Illinois signed into law    the Illinois Euro   Conversion Act which
provides for the continuity of ECU obligations in a manner that is substantially identical to the EU
Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro and the New York
General Obligations Law.
205  One interesting drafting distinction between the Illinois Euro Conversion
Act and the New York General Obligations Law is that under    the Illinois Euro   Conversion Act a
reference to “ECU” in a contract, security or instrument ZLWKRXW GHILQLQJ “ECU” shall carry the
presumption, rebuttable by a showing of the contrary intention of the parties, that it is a    reference to the
official ECU,
206 whereas under the New York legislation this presumption applies to all ECU obligations
not defined by reference to the official ECU.
207  Thus, under the Illinois Euro Conversion Act, an ECU
obligation which does contain a definition of the ECU, but where that definition does not refer to the
official ECU, would not benefit from the presumption under the Illinois legislation.  In view of the fact
that most if not all contractual definitions of the ECU refer to the official ECU,
208 it may be the case that
this drafting distinction between the New York legislation and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act has no
practical importance.  The New York legislation is more consistent with the approach taken by the EU
Council regulation on this particular point.
209
Another interesting point to note is the distinction between the definition of the ECU used in the
Illinois Euro Conversion Act and the definitions used in other provisions of Illinois law.  While the ECU
is defined in the Euro Conversion Act as the currency basket that is from time to time used as the unit of
account of the European Community,
210 the ECU is expressly included within the definition of money
under the UCC and the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act adopted under Illinois law.  Under the
Illinois UCC money is defined to include a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental
organization or by agreement between two or more nations, which of course includes the ECU.
211  Under
the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act, money is defined to include a store of value authorized or
adopted by inter-governmental agreement, which is also intended to cover the ECU.
212  While these
provisions explicitly acknowledge the monetary nature of the official ECU, the Illinois Euro Conversion
Act does not appear to take a position on this point.  The recognition of the monetary nature of the official
ECU helps to buttress the 1:1    replacement of references to the ECU by references to the euro.  
It is also worth recalling that under the Illinois Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act it is provided
that all obligations expressed in the official ECU must be treated as if expressed in the euro at the 1:1 
replacement rate established under EC   law.
213  The Illinois Euro Conversion Act supplements this
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provision by explicitly applying the presumption that all ECU obligations that do not contain a definition
of the ECU refer to the official ECU.  
214
+(&8&RQWUDFW&ODXVHV  
The  terms and conditions of most private ECU obligations governed by New York law ensure the
1:1    replacement of references to the ECU by references to the   euro.  This is because most private ECU
obligations are specifically defined by reference to the official ECU.
215  Under New York law, either the
monetary status of the official ECU will be recognized, in which case the 1:1    replacement will be  
acknowledged in accordance with the applicable provisions of EC law, or alternatively a contractual
reference to the official ECU will be construed as requiring the 1:1    replacement in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the   New York General Obligations Law.
Often the definition of the ECU used in private contracts explicitly refers to the transformation of
the official ECU into    a currency in its own right.  On the other   hand, some uncertainty has been expressed
regarding the interpretation of older private ECU contracts that defined the ECU as the ECU used in the
European Monetary System.
216  This study will now consider the import of relevant contractual
definitions.
(&88VHGLQWKH(XURSHDQ0RQHWDU\6\VWHP
Prior to the joint statement by IPMA and ISDA recommending the adoption of a revised definition
of the private ECU,
217 all ECU swaps governed by the ISDA standard form documentation contained a
provision defining the ECU as “a currency, one unit of which is equal in value to the European Currency
Unit that is used in the European Monetary System.”
218  In addition to including this definition of the 
ECU,   many ECU bonds also contained provisions calling for repayment in U.S. dollars or a component
currency of the ECU if the ECU ceases to be used in the European Monetary System.
219
The European Commission’s 1994 analysis of the ECU bond market criticized this provision as
endangering the continuity of contracts if EMS rules were deeply revised after the start of a partial
monetary union (i.e., a monetary union enjoying the participation of some but not all EU    member
states).
220  The issuance of   ECUs against dollar and gold reserves will cease upon the introduction of the
euro.  The European Council    resolution establishing the framework for a new exchange-rate   mechanism
(ERM II) that will replace the existing European Monetary    System   demonstrates that the euro will play a
much more significant role in ERM II than the ECU does in the existing ERM.
221  Some of the features of
ERM II bear a close resemblance to the existing ERM (e.g., a 15% standard fluctuation band with the
possibility of narrower bands, compulsory intervention at the margins of the bands together with the
possibility of coordinated intramarginal intervention, and the availability of a very short-term financing
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facility to support the bands).  
222  However,   the fluctuation bands which the central banks are required to
defend will be constructed around the euro in ERM II, whereas in the existing ERM the bands are based
on bilateral exchange rates rather than the ECU.
223  While the ECU is used in the current EMS for the
purpose of indicating divergence by EMS currencies from   their central rates against the ECU, the
divergence indicator does not require EMS central banks to intervene in support of the ECU central rates.
224  The very particular   role played by the ECU in the EMS raises the question of whether the ECU used
in the EMS    would be interpreted by the    courts to refer to the single currency after EMU.
It is submitted that ECU obligations defined by reference to the ECU used in the European
Monetary System will be interpreted as referring to the euro after EMU.
Á First, the ECU that is used in the EMS is the official ECU, and under the New York General
Obligations Law obligations denominated in the official ECU will    automatically become
obligations denominated in euro   at the 1:1    replacement  rate.
225  In addition, the official ECU
issued by the   European Monetary Institute and used as a means of settlement between EMS
central banks may be regarded as a legal currency under New York law, in which case the 1:1 
replacement of contractual references to the   ECU by references to euro will be enforced in
accordance with the applicable provisions of EC law.
226
Á Second, the former ISDA provision describing the ECU as “a currency” implies that the
definition of the private ECU in ISDA swap contracts should always follow the law of the
currency (i.e., European Community law) under which the official ECU is issued, thereby
ensuring    the 1:1   transformation of private ECU obligations into obligations in euro.
Á Third, the definition of the    ECU as the ECU used in the EMS is of the   “open basket” variety.
227
Even in the absence of the New York legislation courts may interpret this definition to cover
not only changes in the composition of the ECU (i.e., changes in the weightings or currencies
included in the basket) but also changes in the nature of the ECU (i.e., its transformation into a
currency in its own right), particularly with respect to ECU obligations created after the
Maastricht Treaty entered into force.
228
Nonetheless, contract clauses defining the ECU by reference to the ECU used in the EMS have
given rise to interpretive difficulties.     The limited role of the ECU   in the existing ERM compared to the
role envisaged for the euro in    the revised ERM II has caused some uncertainty regarding whether the
ECU used in the EMS can be properly regarded as referring to the new single currency.     Market leaders
such as   ISDA and IPMA have recommended the adoption of alternative contractual definitions of the
ECU.
229
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In December 1995 IPMA and ISDA issued a joint recommendation proposing a legal definition of
the private ECU that defines it to be “the same as the ECU that is from time to time used as the unit of
account of the European Communities” and providing that “[c]hanges to the ECU may be made by the
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European Communities, in which event the ECU will change accordingly.”
230  Many ECU bonds also
provide for discharge in U.S. dollars or a component currency of the ECU if the ECU ceases to be used as
the unit of account of the European Communities.
231  This definition of the ECU refers to the official
ECU of the EC, and therefore requires    the 1:1   replacement of references to ECU by references to euro in
accordance with the provisions of EC law and the New York General Obligations Law.     This definition
expressly contemplates all manner of changes to the ECU by the European Community, including its
transformation into a currency in its own right.
Prior to the passage of the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the introduction
of the euro it had been suggested by the Financial Law Panel in London that if the ECU is abolished at the
start of EMU, it will not then be used as the unit of account of the European Communities.  
232  However,
under the   Maastricht Treaty the ECU will not be abolished but rather will    become a currency   in its own
right.
233  The preamble to the Council regulation specifically states that    as   from January 1, 1999    the    euro
will be the unit of account of the institutions of the   European Communities.  
234  Given that the euro will be
used as the unit of account of   the European Community, this definition of the ECU should ensure the 1:1
replacement of references to ECU by references to euro.  This legal interpretation of the unit of account
formula has been supported by both IPMA and the European Commission.
235  Moreover, contractual
clauses that contemplate general unspecified changes to the ECU may cover all possible modifications to
the ECU, including its transformation into a    currency in its own right.
236
Following the re-affirmation of the 1:1    replacement rate at the European   Council summit meeting in
December 1995, IPMA and ISDA recommended the adoption of language which dispelled any residual
doubt regarding this issue by specifically providing that “[f]rom the start of the third stage of European
monetary union all payments [payable in ECU] will be payable in euro at the rate then established in
accordance with the Treaty.”
237
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Many ECU bond issues contain clauses providing for the satisfaction of ECU obligations in U.S.
dollars or a component currency of the ECU in “the event that the ECU is neither used as the unit of
account of the European Communities nor as the currency of the European Union.”
238  The Financial Law
Panel has suggested that the second limb of this test calling for payment in U.S. dollars if the ECU is no
longer used as the currency of the European Union would be triggered in the event of a partial monetary
union because in such circumstances the single currency would merely be the currency of those    member
states participating in EMU rather than the   currency of the entire European Union.
239
This argument overlooks the pivotal role that EMU is designed to play in the process of European
political and economic integration.  The preamble to the Maastricht Treaty clearly regards the
establishment of an economic and monetary union as part of “the process of creating an ever closer union
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among the peoples of Europe.”
240  The Treaty contemplates that the non-participation of certain member
states in EMU should be transitional and that such    member states should be admitted   to the euro area as
soon as they satisfy the necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.
241  To this end the
Maastricht Treaty provides for the establishment of a General Council of the European Central Bank as a
third decision-making body of the ECB through which the interests of non-participating    member   states
will be represented.
242  The inclusion of non-participating    member states in one   of the European Central
Bank’s decision-making bodies clearly demonstrates that the euro will be the currency of the European
Union even though certain    EU member   states may not initially adopt the single currency.  This
interpretation of the euro as the currency of the European Union in the event of a partial monetary union
is    supported by the European Commission.
243
Nonetheless, a number of U.S. issuers have adopted language that seeks to   avoid all possible doubt
on this point by expressly providing that payments on ECU bonds will be made in the single currency
where the single currency is used as the currency of some or all of the    member states of the European
Union.
244
%RQGV'HQRPLQDWHGLQ(XUR
Beginning in 1997 a number of international issuers have issued bonds denominated in euro which
provide for the performance of the bonds prior to the introduction of the euro in ECU at the rate of one
ECU for one euro.
245  These bonds will thus be treated in the same manner as bonds denominated in ECU
that are required to be discharged in euro at the 1:1    rate.  The first such bond denominated   in euro and
governed by New York law was issued in June 1997.
246
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ISDA has adopted an EMU continuity clause that ensures the continuity of all obligations
denominated in the official ECU in a manner that is consistent with the EU Council regulation by also
providing that the substitution of the new single or unified European currency (whether known as the euro
or otherwise) for the ECU as the unit of account of the European Community will not affect the
continuity of ISDA contracts.
247  The ISDA EMU continuity provision also provides that the
disappearance or replacement of a relevant rate option or other price source for the ECU, or the failure of
the agreed sponsor (or a successor sponsor) to publish or display a relevant rate, index, price, page or
screen, will not have the effect of altering any term of, or discharging or excusing performance under an
agreement or transaction documented under an ISDA master agreement.  
248
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The official ECU is expressly recognized as a legal currency under the laws of 43 U.S. jurisdictions,
and    references to the official ECU    in obligations that are   governed by the laws of    these jurisdictions will
therefore be    replaced by references   to the euro at the 1:1    rate established under EC law.
249  While the
official ECU is not   explicitly recognized as a legal currency under New York law, the argument can be
made that the official ECU falls within the general legal definition of money under New York law, in
which case    references to the ECU in obligations governed   by New York law will be    similarly replaced by
references to the euro at the 1:1 rate      applicable under EC law.
250  In addition, a credible argument may
also be made that ECU obligations underwent a radical transformation after the Maastricht Treaty came
into force insofar as ECU obligations created after Maastricht    constitute contingent   monetary obligations
that will    become obligations denominated in euro after EMU.
251
As against that, it is not certain that the official ECU would be recognized as a legal currency under
New York law because of its limited uses as a reserve asset.
252  Also, it is unclear to what extent the
argument that the ECU underwent a radical alteration after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force would
be accepted under New York law.
253  In addition, the development of the private ECU as a quasi-currency
based on its widespread usage in the financial markets does not of itself support the argument that the
private ECU may be properly regarded as legal money.
254  In the absence of legal certainty regarding the
monetary status of private ECU obligations governed by New York law, it is necessary to determine the
legal status of such ECU obligations in accordance with New York law as the governing law of the
contract rather than EC law as the law of the currency.
255  This requires the legal status of private ECU
obligations to be determined under the provisions of recent legislation enacted by the New York State
Legislature.
256
Under the act of state doctrine, the replacement of references to the ECU by references to the euro
in accordance with the EU Council regulations may be regarded as an act of state applicable to all ECU
obligations governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions where those obligations have their situs in an EU
jurisdiction (i.e., where the obligor is based in an EU    member state and/or payments are to be made   in an
EU    member state).
257
Under the recently enacted provisions of the New York General Obligations   Law the euro is treated
in contracts as a commercialy reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent for the ECU, and
(consistent with the EU Council regulations) references to the official ECU in contracts shall be replaced
by references to the euro at the rate of one euro to one ECU.
258  References to the ECU in contracts not
defined by reference to the official ECU shall (consistent with the EU Council regulations) be presumed
to be references to the official ECU, unless demonstrated to the contrary by the intention of the parties.
259
In view of the widespread usage of the “open basket” definition of the ECU, it will be difficult to rebut
this presumption under the New York General Obligations Law that the term “ECU” refers to the official
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ECU of the European Community.
260  The New York General Obligations Law (again consistent with the
EU Council regulations) ensures the continuity of all ECU contracts, including floating rate ECU
obligations, thereby preventing parties from raising the doctrines of commercial impracticability,
impossibility or frustration as a means of terminating or otherwise discharging ECU obligations after
EMU.
261  The long-standing foreseeability of the    transformation of the ECU basket into    a currency   in its
own right (even before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty) would, in any case, have precluded the
invocation of such contractual doctrines.
262
Finally, the terms and conditions of most private ECU obligations are specifically defined by
reference to the official ECU and will therefore    ensure the 1:1   replacement of all references to ECU by
references to euro.
263
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Under the U.S. Constitution "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every    state shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws   of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
1  The power to
make treaties is vested in the President, to be exercised by and with the consent of a two thirds vote of the
U.S. Senate.
2  Treaties so signed and ratified prevail over    state law and are binding   on all American
courts.  There are various bilateral and multilateral treaties which have been ratified by the United States
that are relevant to the legal implications of EMU under U.S. law.
$%LODWHUDO7UHDWLHVRI)ULHQGVKLS
The United States has entered into bilateral treaties providing for friendly, reciprocal commercial
relations with a majority of the EU    member states.  Since the   Second World War the United States has
entered into such friendship treaties with nine EU    member states — Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland,   Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
3  It does not appear that the U.S. has
entered into any modern bilateral friendship treaties with the remaining six EU    member   states  (Austria,
Finland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) that contain provisions relevant to EMU.
The nine relevant treaties contain provisions that will help to support the continuity of contractual
obligations after EMU in accordance with the EU Council regulations.
Á Under eight of the relevant treaties (with the exception of the U.S.-Italy Treaty) it is provided
in similar terms that neither High Contracting Party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory
measures that would impair the [legally acquired] rights and/or interests within its territories of
nationals and companies of the other Party in the enterprises which they have established or in
their capital.
4  This provision could be interpreted as prohibiting the United States from taking
any measures that would impair the contractual rights of EU nationals that are parties to
contracts denominated in EU currencies by not recognizing the conversion of the EU
currencies participating in EMU into euro pursuant to the applicable provisions of the EU
Council regulations.  This argument might be particularly forceful with respect to financial
institutions and companies located in the EU that are participants in the international financial
markets, who could be discriminated against if the continuity of their obligations were to be
enforced in accordance with the laws of EU jurisdictions but were not to be recognized under 
U.S. law.  
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Á Under seven of the treaties (with the exception of the U.S.-Ireland and U.S.-Italy Treaties) it is
provided in similar terms that neither High Contracting Party shall impose exchange
restrictions except in general to protect the level of its monetary reserves.
5  Significantly, all
seven treaties define the term “exchange restrictions” broadly to include all restrictions,
regulations or other requirements imposed by either High Contracting Party which burden or
interfere with payments, remittances or transfers of funds or of financial instruments between
the territories of the two Parties.
6  Any action by the United States that would interfere with the
European Union's preparations for a smooth transition to EMU (including the development of
euro payment systems) could contravene the United States' bilateral treaty obligation to refrain
from the imposition of restrictions which would burden or interfere with payments and funds
transfers between the U.S. and the relevant EU countries (including France, Germany and the
three Benelux countries).  In particular, the United States may not impose restrictions or
requirements that burden or interfere with the making of credit transfer payments from the
United States to the relevant EU    member states that are made in the euro unit or   the applicable
national currency units during the transitional period in accordance with the “no compulsion,
no prohibition” principle enshrined in the EU Council regulation on the introduction of the
euro.
7
Á Finally, two treaties (the U.S.-Ireland and the U.S.-Italy Treaties) provide in similar terms that
any control imposed by either High Contracting Party over financial transactions (defined to
include all international payments and transfers of funds effected through the medium of
currencies, securities, bank deposits, dealings in foreign exchange or other financial
arrangements) shall be so administered as not to influence disadvantageously the competitive
position of the commerce or investment of capital of the other Party in comparison with the
commerce or the investment of capital of any third country.
8  This provision applies to all
forms of control of financial transactions.
9  Here again any action by the United States that
disrupts the smooth transition to EMU contemplated by the development of euro payment
systems in replacement for national currency payment systems could be inconsistent with these
treaty obligations.
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The transition to a single European currency does not currently contemplate the introduction of any
exchange control regulations.  Nonetheless, in view of the relatively unprecedented nature of the
monetary reform involved in the changeover to the single currency, restrictions on the free exchange of
money were contemplated in the earlier stages of the preparations for EMU.  Thus, the initial drafts of the
                                                
5U.S.-Belgium Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. 10(2); U.S.-Denmark Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XII(2); U.S.-France
Establishment Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. X(2); U.S.-Germany Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XII(3) ("Neither Party may, with respect to
the other Party, in any manner impose exchange restrictions which are unnecessarily detrimental to or arbitrarily discriminate against the
claims, investments, transportation, trade or other interests of nationals and companies of such other Party or their competitive position.");
U.S.-Greece Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XV(2); U.S.-Luxembourg Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XI(2); U.S.-Netherlands
Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XII(2).  Under six of these treaties (with the exception of the U.S.-Germany Friendship Treaty) it is
provided in similar terms that this provision does not alter the obligations of the parties to the International Monetary Fund.
6U.S.-Belgium Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. 10(5); U.S.-Denmark Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XII(5); U.S.-France
Establishment Treaty, VXSUD note 3 , art. X(5); U.S.-Germany Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XII(5) ("The term ’exchange restrictions’
.... includes all restrictions, regulations, ... and other requirements imposed by either Party, which burden or interfere with the assumption of
undertakings for, or the making of, payments, remittances, or transfers of money and financial instruments"); U.S.-Greece Friendship Treaty,
VXSUD note 3, art. XV(5); U.S.-Luxembourg Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XI(5); U.S.-Netherlands Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3,
art. XII(5).
76HH Document from the European Council Dublin Presidency, The Legal Framework for the use of the euro. ann. II, Draft Council
Regulation on the introduction of the euro, art. 8(3) (Dec. 1996), discussed VXSUD pp. 18-20.
8U.S.-Ireland Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, arts. XVII(1), XVII(4); U.S.-Italy Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, arts. XVII(1),
XVII(4).
9U.S.-Ireland Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XVII(1); U.S.-Italy Friendship Treaty, VXSUD note 3, art. XVII(1).clxv
EU Council regulation on the introduction of the euro contained provisions rendering exchange contracts
between EU national currencies or between the euro and the national currencies or between the euro and
the ECU at rates other than the irrevocably fixed conversion rates unenforceable unless such rates were
agreed before the adoption of the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.
10  This section will briefly consider
the legal status of any potential exchange contracts that might be introduced in the course of the
changeover to the single currency, however remote the possibility that such controls might be introduced.
Under Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement “[e]xchange contracts which
involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that
member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories
of any member.”
11
Article VIII, Section 2(b) has been enacted into law in the United States.
12   In 1949 the Board of
Directors of the IMF issued an interpretation of this provision, stating that “the obligations of such
contracts will not be implemented by the judicial or administrative authorities of member countries, for
example, by decreeing performance of the contracts or by awarding damages for their nonperformance.”
13
The Board further stated that “such contracts will be treated as unenforceable notwithstanding that under
the private international law of the forum, the law under which the foreign exchange control regulations
are maintained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its performance.”
14  The
Board interpretation has been fully accepted by American courts,
15 and it is beyond question that the
courts will decline to enforce exchange contracts that involve the currency of any IMF member and are
contrary to that member’s exchange control regulations.
16
The Bretton Woods Agreement does not define the term “exchange contracts” and the IMF’s Board
interpretation offers no guidance on the matter.  Broad and narrow interpretations of the term have been
advanced by courts and commentators alike, and one U.S. court has described the conflicting views as
follows: “[t]he narrow view of “exchange contracts” in Article VIII, Section 2(b) is that they are contracts
for the exchange of one currency against another or one means of payment against another.  The broad
view is that they are contracts involving monetary elements.”
17
On the whole U.S. courts have tended to define the term more narrowly than broadly.  Thus the
New York courts “are  inclined to view an interpretation of subdivision (b) of Section 2 that sweeps in all
contracts affecting any members’ exchange resources as doing considerable violence to the text of the
section.  It says ‘involve the currency’ of the country whose exchange controls are violated; not ‘involve
the exchange resources.’”
18  The narrow interpretation of “exchange contracts” has confined the term to
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contracts involving the exchange of currency, with courts emphasizing the word “exchange” as being
synonymous with the concept of barter, swap and foreign exchange.
19  Thus, the term has been interpreted
to apply to a contract to exchange lire for dollars while Italy maintained exchange control regulations,
20
but has been held not to apply to a contract of sale involving a foreign currency payment obligation,
21 a
U.S. dollar letter of credit established by a foreign bank in favor of a foreign partnership,
22 a U.S. dollar
loan agreement calling for repayment in U.S. dollars and designating New York as the situs of
repayment,
23 and insurance policies payable in U.S. dollars to foreign nationals or residents in the United
States.
24
Notwithstanding this impressive array of authorities, some U.S. courts have advanced a broader
view of “exchange contracts”, especially with respect to contracts involving foreign currency
obligations.
25  One court endorsing a narrower view of “exchange contracts” preferred a definition of the
term that covers all foreign currency transactions, and not just foreign exchange contracts: “transactions
which have as their immediate object exchange, that is, international media of payment . . . , or a contract
where the consideration is payable in the currency of the country whose exchange controls are
violated.”
26  The notion that all foreign currency transactions are governed by Article VIII, Section 2(b)
of the Bretton Woods Agreement has been supported in other cases.  Thus it has been held that a triable
issue existed as to whether a check payable in Cuban pesos contravened Cuban exchange regulations and
was therefore in violation of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
27  If the transaction did not involve an
exchange contract within the meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement there would have been no triable
issue for the lower court to resolve.
In one New York case involving a promissory note governed by New York law calling for payment
in New York by one foreign bank to another foreign bank in Swiss francs, it was stated that Article VIII,
Section 2(b) of Bretton Woods “renders unenforceable any agreement involving the currency of a
member    state   which is contrary to WKDWPHPEHU¶V currency control regulations.”
28  While the court did not
find it necessary to resolve the question of the applicability of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the court
“recognize[d] the validity of the Bretton Woods Agreement and its potential controlling effect over
international currency transactions,” notwithstanding the fact that the case concerned a foreign currency
debt rather than a foreign exchange contract.
29  A dissenting opinion in the same case went further still
and explicitly rejected the narrow interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of Bretton Woods.  Citing
the conclusions reached by courts in other countries which are members of the IMF and the views of
leading commentators, it was stated that “[a]lthough there are contrary views, the majority view reads
“exchange contracts” as used in the agreement, in light of the legislative history of the  provision, broadly
                                                                                                                                                                           
RI $JUHHPHQW RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0RQHWDU\ )XQG DQG WKH ([FKDQJH &RQWURO 5HJXODWLRQV RI 0HPEHU 6WDWHV, JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (July-Sept. 1962)).  The above quotation from Banco do Brasil has been cited with approval in  Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 897-
98 and Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 174.
196HH Libra, 550 F. Supp. at 899-900.
20Southwestern Shipping, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 522-25.
21John Sanderson & Co. (Wool) Pty. Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., Ltd., 569 F.2d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1978).
22Zeevi, 333 N.E.2d at 174.
23Libra, 570 F. Supp. at 900.
24Pan-Am Life Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing Theye Y Ajuria v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 161 So.2d
70, 73-74 (La. 1964)); Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Raij, 156 So.2d 785, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
256HH Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1473 (citing Weston Banking, 442 N.E.2d at 1200; Ugalde, 164 So.2d at 2); Brill, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 904;
FI Banco do Brasil, 190 N.E.2d at 236.
26Banco do Brasil, 190 N.E.2d at 236 (quoting Arthur Nussbaum, ([FKDQJH&RQWURODQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO0RQHWDU\)XQG, 59 YALE
L.J. 421, 426 (1949)).
27Brill, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
28Weston Banking, 442 N.E.2d at 1200.
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enough to encompass a transaction based in contract which involves exchange or affects the balance of
payments or exchange resources of a member nation.”
30
The broad view of Article VIII, Section 2(b) has found support in other cases.  In one Floridian case
it was held that the courts of Florida were obliged by the Bretton Woods Agreement to apply Cuban
currency control laws to a U.S. dollar denominated insurance policy issued by a Canadian company to a
Cuban resident and governed by Cuban law.
31  In another U.S. federal case the court showed a
willingness to hold that a U.S. dollar denominated certificate of deposit payable in Mexico could fall
within the scope of Article VIII, Section 2(b).
32
In summary, U.S. courts are divided regarding the scope and coverage of the Bretton Woods
Agreement with respect to the enforceability of exchange contracts that are inconsistent with exchange
control regulations imposed by IMF members.  The majority of courts have adopted a narrow view of the
Bretton Woods provision, appearing to confine its application to foreign exchange contracts, but a
minority of courts have taken a more expansive position and held that it may also apply to other  foreign
currency transactions and possibly even certain U.S. dollar transactions that are inconsistent with the
exchange control regulations of foreign countries.  Should the EU Council introduce exchange controls in
the course of the transition to EMU the extent of the coverage of Article VIII, Section 2(b) could become
very important for EU currency transactions involving U.S. elements.
,QVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUPRIWKH,0)DIWHU(08
The creation of a single European currency and concomitant establishment of a European Central
Bank raise broad institutional questions with respect to the future roles of the institutions of the European
Community and the individual EU member states in the International Monetary Fund and under the
Bretton Woods Agreement generally.
33  Because of the transfer under the Maastricht Treaty of the
monetary sovereignty of the individual EU    member states to the European Union and   the attendant
responsibilities that will be acquired by the European Central Bank, the EU will become increasingly
relevant for the achievement of the purposes and operation of the International Monetary    Fund after
EMU.
34  It has been suggested that consideration be given to an amendment of the Bretton Woods
Agreement in order to admit the European    Union to membership of the IMF.
35  Also, the composition of  
the SDR, whose value is currently calculated on the basis of the relative weights assigned to the U.S.
dollar, the Deutsche mark, the French franc, the Japanese yen and Pound sterling, will need to include the
euro.
36  In accordance with the State theory of money, references in international treaties to the currencies
of participating EU member states will be automatically replaced by references to the euro at the
irrevocably fixed conversion rates, and any renegotiation of international agreements for the sole purpose
of modifying the monetary unit is therefore unnecessary.
37  These are issues which the U.S. Treasury and
Federal Reserve are monitoring.
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32Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1473 (citations omitted).
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With the establishment of the Wall Street Committee on the transition to EMU in late 1995,
followed by the establishment of an ISDA New York EMU working group in mid-1996, representatives
of Wall Street financial institutions, law firms and trade associations began to consider whether the
continuity of contracts governed by New York law might be best protected after EMU by the enactment
of legislation by the New York State Legislature in Albany.
1  In February 1997, the New York EMU
working group (which includes ISDA, the Financial Markets Lawyers Group, the Public Securities
Association and the Securities Industry Association) forwarded a draft legislative proposal to the New
York State Legislature in Albany that seeks to confirm the continuity of contracts affected by EMU.
2  In
July 1997 the    legislative proposal drafted by the New York EMU working group was   passed by both
Houses of the New York State Legislature and was signed into law by the Governor of New York as an
amendment to the New York General Obligations Law.
3
Similar legislative proposals have been forwarded to the Illinois and California State Legislatures,
and in July 1997 the legislative proposal drafted by the New York EMU working group was enacted in
Illinois as the Illinois Euro Conversion Act.
4
$6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQDQGWKH0RQHWDU\6RYHUHLJQW\RIWKH   (XURSHDQ8QLRQ  
The New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act confirm the
continuity of contracts denominated in EU national currencies and the ECU basket in a manner that is
broadly consistent with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro. This is consistent with
the fact that, as discussed below, the enactment of any legislation by an American    state that fails to   fully
recognize the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union over the currencies   of EU member states
would represent an unconstitutional infringement on the Federal Government’s undisputed authority over
international monetary relations.
5  The New York and Illinois legislation must therefore be interpreted in
a manner that is fully consistent with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro.  This
approach accords with the well-established principle that    state statutes will,   whenever possible, be
interpreted so as to avoid constitutional difficulties.  
6  In addition, in the case of any conflict between the
state legislation and the EU Council regulations, the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations
shall prevail insofar as the State theory of money forms part of federal common law.
7
The New York EMU legislation amending the New York General Obligations Law implicitly
recognizes that the State theory of money is applicable to all contractual obligations governed by New
York law that are affected by foreign currency alterations.  Thus, the General Obligations Law provides
that in circumstances of currency alteration, other than the introduction of the euro, the relevant
provisions of the General Obligations Law shall not be interpreted as creating any negative inference or
negative presumption regarding the validity or enforceability of contracts, securities or instruments
denominated in whole or in part in a currency affected by such alteration
8  This is because it is the law of
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the currency that determines what things pass as legal currency and how, in case of a currency alteration,
sums expressed in the former currency are to be converted into the existing one.
9
%5HWURDFWLYH$SSOLFDWLRQRI1HZ<RUNDQG,OOLQRLV6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQ
It has been suggested that it is doubtful that the New York and Illinois EMU legislation will have
any retroactive effect with respect to contracts entered into prior to the enactment of the legislation in
mid-1997.
10  It is submitted that whether the New York and Illinois legislation applies retroactively is of
little legal significance in view of the application of the State theory of money under U.S. federal law.
Thus, in accordance with the State theory of money, all relevant contractual obligations created before the
passage of the New York and Illinois legislation must be discharged in accordance with the EU Council
regulations on the introduction of the euro, regardless of whether the New York and Illinois legislation
has any retroactive effect.
11
For the sake of completeness we will now consider whether the legislation, and particularly the
New York legislation, may be considered to have retroacitve application.  
/DQJXDJHRI/HJLVODWLRQ
Generally, legislation may only apply prospectively, unless there is a clear indication that a contrary
interpretation is to be applied.
12  The question whether a given statute is prospective or retroactive is a
question of statutory interpretation to be determined by ascertaining the legislative intent.
13  The surest
guide in determining the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself.
14  Thus, it is well settled
that a statute will not be given a retroactive construction unless its language, either expressly or by
necessary implication, requires that it be so construed.
15
Neither the New York EMU legislation amending the New York General Obligations Law nor the
Illinois Euro Conversion Act expressly provide that the legislation applies retroactively to contracts
entered into before the passage of the legislation.  The New York legislation provides that “[t]his Act
shall take effect immediately.”
 16  The Illinois Euro Conversion Act provides in similar terms that “[t]his
Act takes effect upon becoming law.”
 17  There is extensive authority holding that where a statute by its
terms directs that it is to take effect immediately, it does not have any retroactive operation and effect.
18
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This factor does not, however, appear to be dispositive as remedial and other legislation made effective
immediately has been held to have retroactive effect.
19
In a section captioned “Application”, the New York EMU legislation provides that
“[n]otwithstanding the Uniform Commercial Code or any other law of this State, this title VKDOO apply to
DOO contracts, securities and instruments, including contracts with respect to commercial transactions, and
VKDOOQRWEHGHHPHGWREHGHHPHGWREHGLVSODFHGE\DQ\RWKHUODZRIWKLV6WDWH.”
20  In a section captioned
“Statutory Construction” the Illinois Euro Conversion Act provides in similar terms that “[t]his Act VKDOO
apply to DOO contracts, including commercial contracts governed by any other law of this State, and VKDOO
QRWEHGHHPHGWREHGLVSODFHGE\WKHSURYLVLRQVRIDQ\RWKHUODZRIWKLV6WDWH.”
21
There is considerable authority holding that a statute framed in future words such as “shall” is
construed as prospective only.
22  This would indicate that the legislation is prospective.  
The use of the word “all” implies that the legislature entended the statute to apply to DOO contracts
affected by EMU, whether entered into before or after the passage of the legislation.
23  As against that it
has been suggested that even where the words used in legislation are so general and broad as in their
literal sense to comprehend existing cases, they must be construed as applicable only to such cases as may
thereafter arise, unless the intention to embrace all is plainly and unequivocally expressed.
24  Thus, it
might be argued that the legislation shall apply only to all those contracts entered into after the enactment
of the legislation.
Another possible argument in favor of retroactivity is that the provision that the legislation shall not
be deemed to be displaced by any other law of the state implies that the legislation may not be displaced
by any other such law with respect to contracts entered into prior to the legislation’s enactment.  As
against that it might also be argued that this provision only requires that the legislation not be displaced
by any other law with respect to contracts entered into since the passage of the legislation.
It is submitted that this provision does not, in and of itself, establish that the legislation is intended
to operate retroactively.  This provision was not inserted into the New York and Illinois legislation so as
to ensure that the legislation applies retroactively.  Rather the provision was drafted so as to avoid the
need to amend the New York Uniform Commercial Code in addition to the New York General
Obligations Law.  Because some contracts affected by EMU, and particularly transactions involving the
exchange of money, may be governed by the UCC, whereas other contracts involving debt and interest
rate obligations are governed by the general principles of common law, the drafters of the legislation
inserted this provision into the General Obligations Law in order to ensure that DOO contractual obligations
governed by New York or Illinois law would be subject to the provisions of the legislation, regardless of
whether such obligations are subject to the general principles of common law or the UCC.
25  In this
                                                
196HHCady, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 207; McGuirk v. City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 501 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); In re Meegan,
478 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), UHY¶GRQRWKHUJURXQGV 475 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1984); Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent.
Sch. Dist., 653 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); In re New York City Transit Authority, 538 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163-64 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989); VHHDOVR 97 N.Y. JUR., 6WDWXWHV § 230 (1992).
20S.B. 5049, 220th Leg., 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (to be codified at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601-1604), § 5-1604(1)
(emphasis added).
21Euro Conversion Act, Public Act No. 90-268, 1997 Ill. Adv. Legis. Serv. 268 (to be codified at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 617/1-30), §
30 (emphasis added).
226HHHJDalziel v. Rosenfeld, 191 N.E. 841, 842 (N.Y. 1934); Weiler v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst., 17 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1940), DII¶G 29 N.E.2d 938 (N.Y. 1940); Dillon v. Coughlan, 539 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), DII¶G 550 N.Y.S.2d 115
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Jespersen-Kay Modular Constr. Ltd. v. Clinton Ave. Paul Place Houses, Inc., 381 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976); In re Karnbach’s Estate, 144 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955); VHHDOVR N.Y. STATUTES § 51(b) (McKinney 1971); 97 N.Y.
JUR., 6WDWXWHV § 229 (1992).
23 6HHCity of New York v. Foster, 133 N.Y.S. 152, 155-56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911); FILongines-Wittnauer, 209 N.E.2d at 73.
246HH N.Y. STATUTES § 51(b) (McKinney 1971) (cited in Abelson v. Abelson, 298 N.Y.S.2d 381, 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)).
256HHMemorandum from Daniel P. Cunningham, R. Brent Jones and Patricia L. Hogan, &UDYDWK6ZDLQH	0RRUH, for Financial
Markets Lawyers Group, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, PSA The Bond Market Trade Association and Securities Industry
Association, Continuity of Contract Statutory Language (Apr. 10,  1997) (on file with author).clxxi
regard, Section 1-103 of the UCC provides that the provisions of the UCC may be supplemented by
general provisions of law and equity, but only if such general principles have not been “displaced by
particular provisions of [the UCC].”
26  The effect of the New York and Illinois legislation is that no
provision in the legislation will be deemed displaced by the provisions of the UCC, including the UCC
provisions excusing performance if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made.
27  This provision does not, however, directly address the question of the legislation’s
retroactive application.
Based solely on the wording of the New York and Illinois EMU legislation, it is not clearly
established that the legislation is intended to apply retroactively.
/HJLVODWLYH+LVWRU\DQG3XUSRVHRI/HJLVODWLRQ
Leaving aside the language of a particular statute, a legislative intent that a statute be applied
retroactively may also be established by its legislative history,
28 as evidence by committee and legislative
reports,
29 floor debates,
30 governors’ memoranda approving legislation
31 and legislative recommendations
made by non-legislative bodies that are relied upon by the legislature.
32  The occasion of the enactment of
a law may also be looked at to assist in determining its character as retroactive or prospective, and its
purpose may be evidence that the legislature intended it to apply retrospectively.
33  However, an act will
only be given retroactive application where the intent of the legislature to do so is clearly and
unequivocally established.
34  Thus, it has been held that a statute should not be given retroactive effect
when it is capable of any other construction.
35
The strongest arguments in favor of the retroactive application of the New York and Illinois EMU
legislation lie not so much in the wording of the legislation as in the legislative history preceding its
enactment. The sponsors of the New York legislation were prompted to propose legislation because of a
specific concern that the introduction of the euro “will create uncertainty in relation to H[LVWLQJ contracts”
affected by EMU.
36  The sponsors stated that “[t]his bill clarifies that VXFK contracts will still be fully
enforceable, since `euros’ may be substituted, at the appropriate exchange rate, for the original currency
referred to.”
36  This demonstrates a clear legislative intention that the New York legislation applies to
both existing and future contracts affected by EMU.
37
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It is also clear that the New York EMU working group that drafted the legislation intended the
legislation to apply to existing as well as future transactions. In particular, the drafters recommended the
introduction of legislation partly because of a concern that EMU only became a foreseeable event after
the signing and entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93, and that there might therefore be
legal uncertainty with respect to contractual obligations created prior to Maastricht.
38  This demonstrates
that the drafters were motivated by a desire to address legal uncertainties associated with contracts
entered into long before the possibility of legislation in New York and Illinois had even been conceived.
The basic purpose of the New York EMU legislation also supports the retroactive application of the
legislation.  The justification advanced for the introduction of the New York legislation by its sponsors
was that “NY law is the governing law for many international contracts, so it is particularly important that
NY law be clear on this issue.”
 39  Thus, the need for legal certainty was driven by a desire to protect New
York’s position as an international financial center.
40  Because of the enormous number of transactions
affected by EMU that were entered into prior to the passage of the New York legislation in mid-1997, the
legislation would not, RILWVHOI accomplish its stated goal of providing legal certainty for the New York
financial markets if its application is prospective only.
1R,PSDLUPHQWRI&RQWUDFWXDO5LJKWV
Another factor that should tip the balance in favor of the retroactive application of the legislation is
that a statute not affecting a substantial right of a party ordinarily may be given retroactive effect, whereas
a statute that impairs one’s substantial rights will generally not be applied retroactively.
41  Indeed, it has
been suggested that the general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes is designed
only to prevent impairment of vested rights.
42  Thus, it is less likely that legislation will be applied
retroactively where the legislation imposes new conditions upon contracts already existing.
43
The New York and Illinois EMU legislation does not deprive contracting parties of pre-existing
contractual rights.  This is because, notwithstanding certain possible discrepancies, the legislation
confirms the continuity of contracts in a manner that is broadly consistent with the EU Council
regulations on the introduction of the euro, consistent with the State theory of money.
44  Thus, the New
York and Illinois EMU legislation may be properly regarded as remedial legislation that only operates in
furtherance of the confirmation of vested contractual rights, and as such does not come within the legal
conception of a retrospective law or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
45
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In conclusion, while the wording of the EMU legislation enacted in New York and Illinois might
suggest that it only applies prospectively to transactions entered into since the legislation’s enactment,
there is compelling evidence that the legislation was intended to apply both to existing contracts as well
as future transactions.  Regardless of whether the New York and Illinois legislation has retroactive effect,
all contractual obligations entered into prior to the enactment of the New York and Illinois legislation
must be discharged in conformity with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro,
consistent with the State theory of money.  In view of the application of the State theory of money under
U.S. law, the question whether the New York and Illinois legislation has retroactive application is of little
legal significance.
&2EOLJDWLRQV'HQRPLQDWHGLQ(81DWLRQDO&XUUHQFLHV
With respect to obligations denominated in EU national currencies, the New York General
Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act each provide that if a subject or medium of
payment of a contract, security or instrument is a currency that has been substituted or replaced by the
euro, the euro will be a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent that may be either
(i) used in determining the value of such currency or (ii) tendered, in each case at the conversion rate
specified in, and otherwise calculated in accordance with, the regulations adopted by the Council of the
European Union.
46  The “euro” is defined as the currency of participating    member states of the European
Union that adopt a   single currency in accordance with the Treaty on European Union (i.e., the Maastricht
Treaty).
47  Thus, the euro is treated in all contracts as a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial
equivalent for the EU national currencies participating in EMU at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates
established by the EU Council.
The treatment of the euro as a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent for the
EU national currencies at the applicable conversion rates confirms the application of the recurrent link
between the euro and the EU national currencies that will be established by the EU Council.  An
interesting point here is whether, in view of the widespread acceptance of the State theory of money
under U.S. law, the euro is in fact the legal equivalent of EU national currencies in which contractual
obligations are denominated, and not only a “commercially reasonable substitute” and “substantial
equivalent” for those currencies.  In this regard it is instructive to note that under the Uniform Foreign-
Money Claims Act adopted in California and Illinois a new currency is explicitly treated in contracts as
the legal equivalent of its predecessor currency in accordance with the recurrent link.  Thus, it is provided
under the Uniform Foreign Money Claims Act that if, after an obligation is expressed or a loss is incurred
in a foreign money, the country issuing or adopting that money substitutes a new money in place of that
money, the obligation or the loss is treated as if expressed or incurred in the new money at the rate of
conversion the issuing country establishes for the payment of like obligations or losses denominated in
the former money.
48
With respect to the definition of the euro as the currency adopted “in accordance with the Treaty on
European Union,” it is presumed that, in the absence of any guidance from an    EU court considering the
issue, an American court would   not second-guess the decision of the EU Council as to which EU member
states have fulfilled the necessary conditions for the adoption of the single currency.  Such an inquiry by
an American court would involve a highly sensitive analysis with important diplomatic repercussions that
would intrude on the Federal Government’s authority over foreign affairs, thereby endangering the
constitutional validity of the legislation.  
49
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Tracking the language of the EU Council regulation on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the euro,
50 the New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act
both provide that the introduction of the euro (which is defined to include the implementation from time
to time of EMU in member states of the European Union pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty) shall not have
the effect of discharging or excusing performance under any contract, security or instrument, or give a
party the right to unilaterally alter or terminate any contract, security or instrument.
51  As with the EU
Council regulation, this provision ensures the continuity of contracts after EMU by preventing parties
from invoking doctrines such as frustration or impossibility at common law or commercial
impracticability under the UCC as a means of terminating or otherwise discharging contractual
obligations based on EMU.  In particular, this provision ensures the continuity of fixed interest rate swaps
together with cross-currency swaps and currency options involving two EU currencies participating in
EMU.
52
With respect to floating rate obligations, the New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois
Euro Conversion Act expressly provide that calculating or determining the subject or medium of payment
of a contract, security or instrument with reference to an interest rate or other basis that has been
substituted or replaced due to the introduction of the euro and that is a commercially reasonable substitute
and substantial equivalent shall not have the effect of discharging or excusing performance under any
contract, security or instrument, or give a party the right to unilaterally alter or terminate any contract,
security or instrument.
53  This provision explicitly ensures the continuity of floating rate swaps
denominated by reference to a floating rate price source linked to an existing EU national currency that
may be replaced by a successor price for the euro.  In this respect the legislation expressly confirms the
continuity of floating rate obligations in accordance with the general principle of the continuity of
contracts applicable under the EU Council regulation.
54
Finally, the New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act also
expressly provide that the tendering of euros in connection with, or the determining of the value of any
obligation contained in a contract, security or instrument the subject or medium of payment of which is
either a currency that has been substituted or replaced by the euro shall not have the effect of discharging
or excusing performance under any contract, security or instrument, or give any party the right to
unilaterally alter or terminate any contract, security or instrument.
55  This provision would appear to be a
re-affirmation of the general continuity provision outlined above.
  ()UHHGRPRI&RQWUDFW  
The New York General Obligations Law embraces the principle of the freedom of contract,
providing that the EMU legislation shall not alter or impair and shall be subject to any agreement between
parties with specific reference to or agreement regarding the introduction of the euro.
56  The Illinois Euro
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Conversion Act provides in similar terms that the Act is subject to anything that the parties to a contract
agree with specific reference to the introduction of the euro.
57  In this respect the New York and Illinois
legislation is consistent with the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulation.
58  It should be noted
that these provisions may have the effect of abrogating contract clauses that call for the payment of
obligations in U.S. dollars where the currency of the contract is no longer used by the government of the
country issuing such currency.
59  This is because such clauses were not drafted with specific reference to
the introduction of the euro.
  )1R&RPSXOVLRQ1R3URKLELWLRQ
The New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act also provide for the
performance of obligations originally denominated in EU national currencies either in the relevant
national currency unit or the euro unit during the 3-year transitional period prior to the withdrawal of
national currency banknotes from circulation.  In this regard, the legislation seeks to apply the “no
compulsion, no prohibition” principle to obligations governed by the laws of New York and Illinois.  In
particular, it is provided that performance of any of the obligations contained in a contract, security or
instrument the subject or medium of payment of which is either a currency that has been substituted or
replaced by the euro or the ECU may be made in the currency or currencies originally designated in the
contract, security or instrument (so long as that currency or those currencies remain legal tender), or in the
euro, but not in any other currency, whether or not the other currency (i) has been substituted or replaced
by the euro or (ii) is a currency that is considered a denomination of the euro and has a fixed conversion
rate with respect to the euro.
60
It might be argued that the “no compulsion, no prohibition” provisions in the New York and Illinois
legislation differ from the corresponding provisions in the EU Council regulation on the introduction of
the euro.  Under the EU Council regulation, the general rule is that subject to anything which parties may
have agreed, acts to be performed under legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in a
national currency unit shall be performed in that national currency unit, and acts to be performed under
legal instruments stipulating the use of or denominated in the euro unit shall be performed in the euro
unit.
61  By way of exception to this general rule, the regulation provides that any amount denominated
either in the euro unit or in the national currency unit of a given participating    member state and payable
within that      member state by crediting an account of the creditor, can be paid by the debtor either in the
euro unit or in that national currency unit, and the amount paid shall be credited to the account of the
creditor in the denomination of his account, with any conversion being effected at the irrevocably fixed
conversion rate.
62
The “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle included in the New York and Illinois legislation
may be contrasted with the EU Council regulation in two respects.
(81DWLRQDO&XUUHQF\2EOLJDWLRQV
First, under the New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act it would
appear at first glance that DOO obligations originally denominated in EU national currencies may be
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performed in the euro unit during the transitional period.
63  By contrast, under the EU Council regulation,
not all obligations originally denominated in EU national currencies may be performed in the euro unit
during the transitional period; rather the only obligations that may be performed in the euro unit are those
which are payable to a creditor’s account in the currency of the    member state in which the account is
located.
64  Thus, the New York   and Illinois legislation appears to contemplate that a wider range of
payments can be effected in the euro unit than is provided for under the EU Council regulation.
It may be that such a broad interpretation of the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle would
represent an infringement on the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union.
65  For example, if under
the New York and Illinois legislation   obligations denominated in the Deutsche mark may, during the
transitional period, be performed by a debtor in the euro unit by way of a credit transfer to a creditor’s
account located in any financial center outside Germany (HJ, London, Paris, Brussels or Luxembourg),
this would be inconsistent with the provisions of the EU regulation which contemplate that such credit
transfer payments may only be made to accounts located in Germany.  Insofar as the monetary
sovereignty of the    European Union forms part of    federal common law, any conflicting provision of    state  
law would be superseded by applicable provisions of EU legislation enacted pursuant to the monetary
sovereignty of the    European Union over the currencies of EU   member states.
66
In addition, the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle contained in the EU Council regulation is
an act of state, and    would therefore be directly applicable   to all contractual obligations whose situs are
located in EU    member states by virtue   of the act of state doctrine.
67  As a doctrine rooted in federal law,
the act of state doctrine   would also supersede conflicting provisions of    state legislation.
68  Thus, the  
provisions of the EU Council regulation permitting obligations denominated in the national currency units
to be performed in the euro unit during the transitional period    would be applicable to obligations that
involve obligors based in EU    member states   and/or payments that are to be discharged within EU 
member states, regardless of   what law is stated to govern performance of the contract.
Another issue is whether a provision in the New York and Illinois legislation that permits DOO
obligations denominated in the national currency units to be performed in the euro unit would impose
requirements that burden or interfere with payments or transfers of funds, contrary to the terms of the
United States’ bilateral friendship treaties with several EU    member states (including France, Germany
and   the three Benelux countries).
69  In this regard, it may be that financial institutions in the European
Union would be unwilling to readily provide conversion facilities between any national currency unit and
the euro unit other than the domestic national currency unit of the    member state in which that financial
institution is located.  Thus,   New York legislation permitting parties to perform an obligation originally
denominated in a national currency unit in the euro unit could impose burdensome requirements with
respect to cross-border payments and funds transfers in transactions the performance of which are
governed by New York or Illinois law.
In view of the importance of the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle to the legal framework
for the changeover to the single currency, it may be necessary to attribute a narrower interpretation to the
New York and Illinois legislation in order to avoid any possible intrusion on the monetary sovereignty of
the    European Union   as expressed in the EU Council    regulations on the introduction of the euro.  A  
corollary of the doctrine that it is the duty of the courts, where possible, to construe a    state statute so as to
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avoid constitutional difficulties is that if a    state statute is   readily susceptible to a narrowing construction
that would make it constitutional, the narrowing construction will be applied so as to uphold the
legislation.
70  In applying this principle of statutory construction, the Supreme Court has stated that courts
should not rewrite a    state law to conform it to constitutional requirements.
71
Based on the above principles, it is submitted that the “no compulsion, no   prohibition” principle
contained in the New York General Obligations Law and the Illinois Euro Conversion Act should be
interpreted in a restrictive manner so as to be fully consistent with the EU Council regulation.  This would
accord with the presumed policy of the New York and Illinois State Legislatures to confirm the continuity
of obligations in a manner that is consistent with the EU Council regulations.  This common sense
interpretation also ensures uniformity in the increasingly integrated international financial markets and
avoids unnecessary confusion regarding the scope of payments that can be made in the euro unit in cross-
border funds transfers during the 3-year transitional period.  This narrowing interpretation ensures that the
New York and Illinois legislation does not infringe the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union.  It
also ensures that the legislation is   interpreted consistently with the obligations of the United States under
various bilateral friendship treaties.
To the extent that the New York or Illinois legislation is not readily susceptible to such a narrowing
construction, the discrepancies between the state legislation and the EU Council regulations must be
resolved by applying the relevant provisions of the EU Council regulations insofar as the monetary
sovereignty of the European Union is recognized under federal law by virtue of the State theory of
money.
72
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The second distinction between the New York and Illinois legislation and the EU Council
regulation with respect to the application of the “no compulsion, no prohibition” principle relates to
obligations denominated in the euro unit.  Under the EU Council regulation, an obligation denominated in
the euro unit, which would include obligations originally denominated in ECU prior to EMU, may, where
payable by credit transfer, be paid in the national currency unit of that member state in which the
creditor’s account is located.  By contrast, the New York and Illinois legislation does not appear to
contemplate the performance in a national currency unit of an obligation denominated in the euro unit.
Rather, the New York and Illinois legislation provides that obligations denominated in ECU may be
performed either in the currency originally designated in the contract (so long as such currency remains
legal tender) or in euro, but not in any other currency.  Where the ECU is the currency originally
designated in the contract, neither the ECU nor the euro unit that substitutes the ECU will be a legal
tender during the transitional period.  Thus, the New York and Illinois legislation only permits obligations
denominated in ECU to be performed in the euro unit.  In this respect, the scope of the “no compulsion,
no prohibition” principle embraced by the New York and Illinois legislation is narrower than that
included in the EU Council regulation.
The fact that the New York and Illinois legislation does not make provision for the performance in a
national currency unit of obligations originally denominated in ECU does not mean that the
corresponding provisions of the EU Council regulation are inapplicable to transactions governed by New
York or Illinois law.  If a transaction involves an obligation originally denominated in the official ECU, it
is arguable that the relevant provisions of the EU Council regulation may be recognized under the State
theory to the extent that the official ECU    is classified as a legal   currency.
73  If the transaction involves an
obligation originally denominated in the euro unit after EMU, a stronger case can be made for the
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application of the provisions of the EU Council regulation under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions on the
ground that the provisions were adopted pursuant to the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union.
74
Thus, the provisions of the EU Council regulation would be   applicable, and the New York and Illinois
legislation would have to be interpreted accordingly (i.e., as not implicitly preventing the performance of
obligations   originally denominated in the euro unit in the national currency unit of that    member   state in
which a creditor’s account is located).
In addition, under the act of state doctrine the provisions of the EU Council regulation relating to
the performance in the national currency units of obligations originally denominated in ECU or the euro
unit during the transitional period may be applicable to all such obligations whose situs is located in an
EU member state.
75
Finally, it should be noted that any interpretation of the New York and Illinois legislation as
preventing the performance of obligations originally denominated in the euro unit in a national currency
unit might also be regarded as conflicting with the bilateral treaty obligation of the United States to
refrain from imposing requirements that burden or interfere with payments or transfers of funds between
the U.S. and several    member states of the European Union (including   France, Germany and the three
Benelux countries).  
76
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Matters not addressed by the New York General Obligations Law or the Illinois Euro Conversion
Act but covered by the EU Council regulations include provisions permitting bond redenomination and a
provision permitting the application of netting, set-off or techniques with similar effects to monetary
obligations during the transitional period, irrespective of their currency denomination, if that
denomination is in the euro unit or in a national currency unit with any conversion being effected at the
conversion rates.
77  In accordance with the expansive interpretation of the State theory of money accepted
under U.S. law, strong arguments can be made that the provisions of the EU Council regulation
permitting the redenomination of bonds are applicable to bonds governed by the laws of U.S.
jurisdictions.
78
The netting provision in the EU Council regulation cannot of itself be applied outside the EU 
member states that participate in EMU because, by its terms, the EU   Council regulation only provides for
the application of national legal provisions of SDUWLFLSDWLQJ EU    member states which permit or impose
netting, set-off or   techniques with similar effects.
79  In the United States, the question of whether
contractual provisions that permit or impose netting, set-off or techniques with similar effects will allow
amounts denominated in one national currency unit to be netted against amounts denominated in another
national currency unit raises a question of contract interpretation.  In the absence of a specific contractual
provision addressing this issue, a plausible argument can be advanced that contractual provisions
permitting or imposing the netting of amounts in a particular currency against amounts in that same
currency cover the netting of one euro national currency unit against another euro national currency unit
because each such unit is a denomination or expression of the same currency.
80
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The legislation passed by the New York and Illinois State Legislatures that confirms the continuity
of contracts after EMU    may apply retrospectively to all relevant contractual obligations created prior to
the passage of the legislation.  The Constitution of the United States contains several provisions limiting
the ability of State Legislatures to enact retroactive legislation.  In addition, the Constitution of the State
of New York contains provisions limiting the ability of the New York State Legislature to enact
retroactive legislation.  The limitations in the U.S. Constitution applicable to State Legislatures are
contained in two provisions:
Á First, the Contract Clause provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”
1
Á Second, the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the States from depriving
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
2
As discussed in more detail below, retroactive    state legislation clearing the   hurdle of the Contract
Clause can be reasonably expected to survive a constitutional challenge under the less onerous
requirements of the fourteenth amendment’s Due Process Clause.  The Contract Clause and the fourteenth
amendment by their terms only apply to    state legislatures.  In addition to the restrictions of the    U.S.  
Constitution, retroactive legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature is also subject to the
limitations contained in the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution which provides, in
similar terms to the Due Process Clause of the    U.S. Constitution, that “No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property   without due process of law.”
3
$&RQWUDFW&ODXVHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQ
While the Contract Clause was interpreted expansively by the Supreme Court during the nineteenth
century to invalidate statutes that retrospectively impaired almost any contractual obligation,
4 the Court
has abandoned this position during this century and shown itself willing to tolerate retrospective
limitations on contractual rights introduced to protect basic societal interests such as the “strong public
interest” in preventing environmental harm,
5 the “significant and legitimate State interest” in protecting
consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation,
6 a    state’s interest in
preventing excessive litigation over uncertain land   titles,
7 and the economic interest of a    state “to
safeguard the vital interests of its   people” during an economic emergency such as the Great Depression of
the 1930s.
8
Several principles can be gleaned from the case law as to whether legislation violates the Contract
Clause.  The threshold inquiry is whether the    state law has in   fact operated a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship.
9  The severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state
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46HH JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394-400 (4th ed. 1991).
5Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502-05 (1987).
6Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1983).
7City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 509-17 (1965).
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295 U.S. 56 (1935) DQG W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
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legislation must clear,
10 and a minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first  
stage.
11  Whether the nullification of contractual obligations imposes a completely unexpected liability is
a factor that may be considered in this context,
12 and the Supreme Court has held that the foreseeability of
legislation altering contractual rights is a basis for holding that a party’s reasonable expectations have not
been impaired and that there has therefore been no substantial impairment of contractual rights.
13
Assuming that an impairment of contractual obligations has occurred the next step involves a
consideration of whether that impairment is permitted under the Constitution.
14  This involves a two-step
inquiry.  First, it must be examined whether the law was enacted to protect a significant and legitimate
public purpose (e.g., whether the law was enacted to deal with a broad and general social or economic
problem).
15  Legislation enacted to protect a narrow class rather than a broad societal interest is less likely
to survive constitutional attack.
16  Second, assuming that the public welfare is at stake, consideration must
then be given to whether the adjustment of contractual rights is appropriately tailored to the strong public
interest that it was designed to meet.
17  Unless the    state is itself a contracting party, courts should   properly
defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.
18  States are
therefore given a broad latitude to abrogate contractual rights in pursuit of a strong public interest.
%'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQ
As previously noted, retrospective    state legislation also “must meet the test   of due process” laid
down in the fourteenth amendment: “a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.”
19  The
Supreme Court has laid down several principles regarding the constitutionality of retrospective    federal
20
and state   legislation under due process standards.  The Court has stated that the strong deference accorded
legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied
retroactively.
21  Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate
legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain
within the exclusive province of the legislative branch.
22  Retroactive legislation does however have to
meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects.
23  That burden is met simply by
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative
purpose.
24
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As is the case with the Contract Clause,
25 the starting point for an inquiry as to the constitutionality
of legislation impairing private contractual rights under the Due Process Clause is whether the statute
alters contractual rights or obligations.
26  If an impairment is found the reviewing court next determines
whether the impairment is of constitutional dimension; if the alteration of contractual obligations is
minimal, the inquiry may end at this stage.
27  However, when there is a substantial impairment of
contractual obligations and the relevant legislation is reviewed under the Due Process Clause rather than
the Contract Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that the Due Process Clause imposes “less searching
standards” than “the limitations imposed on States by the Contract Clause.”
28  This next inquiry is
especially limited, and the Court has held that the party asserting a due process violation “must overcome
a presumption of constitutionality and ‘establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way.’”
29
&'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHRIWKH1HZ<RUN6WDWH&RQVWLWXWLRQ
As noted above, retroactive legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature must also meet
the test of due process laid down in the New York State Constitution.
30  It was held in older cases that
because the Due Process Clauses in both the    United States and New York State Constitutions are
formulated in the same   words and are intended for the protection of the same fundamental rights “there is,
logically, no room for distinction in definition of the scope of the two clauses”.
31
More recently, however, it has been held that under    New York State’s Due   Process Clause the New
York courts “may impose higher standards than those held to be necessary by the Supreme Court under
the corresponding    federal constitutional   provision.”
32  In the context of retrospective legislation affecting
contractual obligations, it is doubtful that those standards will be higher than the standards imposed by the
Contract Clause of the    U.S. Constitution.  The New York State courts   have consistently held that in order
to pass constitutional muster under the due process clauses of the New York State and United States
Constitutions, the retroactive application of legislation must serve a compelling public interest and not be
harsh, oppressive or unfair.
33
'&RQVWLWXWLRQDO9DOLGLW\RI0RQHWDU\/HJLVODWLRQ$SSO\LQJ5HWURDFWLYHO\WR&RQWUDFWXDO
2EOLJDWLRQV
The constitutional validity of    federal legislation with retrospective application   to private contracts
that was enacted by Congress to effect a change in the monetary  system was considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the aftermath of the introduction of paper greenback dollars not backed by gold during
the U.S. Civil War.
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In the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV
34 the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the legal tender legislation
permitting debts originally denominated in gold dollars to be discharged in paper dollars was prohibited
by the spirit of the Constitution because it indirectly impaired the obligation of pre-existing contracts and
involved a taking of property without due process of law.  First, the Court held that there was no
impairment of the obligation of contracts because “the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that
which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made.”
35  This obligation was fully
satisfied by the payment of legal tender notes in lieu of dollars backed by gold.  Second, the Court stated
that Congress is not prohibited from taking action that might indirectly have the effect of impairing the
obligation of contracts as “contracts must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of
the rightful authority of the government” —  its constitutional and sovereign authority over its currency.
36
“[N]o obligation of a contract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government authority.”
37
This was reiterated by the Supreme Court in -XLOOLDUGY*UHHQPDQ
38 where the Court held that
when a particular power is vested in Congress under the Constitution — as is the power over the currency
— “it is no constitutional objection  .  .  .  to its exercise that  .  .  .  the contracts of individuals may be
incidentally affected.”  Whether it is “wise and expedient” to issue paper currency “is a political question,
to be determined by Congress when the question of exigency arises.”
39
The downfall of the Confederate dollar at the end of the American Civil War was followed by
legislation in some    states declaring all contracts the consideration   of which was Confederate money to be
null and void.  In 'HOPDV Y ,QVXUDQFH &R
40 the Supreme Court held that a provision in a State
Constitution to this effect was an impairment of the obligation of contracts in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
As part of the economic reconstruction of the South following the American Civil War many of the
former Confederate    states enacted legislation revaluing   Confederate dollar debts in U.S. dollars.
41  The
Supreme Court struck down as an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts    state
legislation requiring   the value of the consideration furnished by a Confederate dollar creditor to a debtor
to be taken into account in determining the extent of such revaluation.
42  The Court held that a different
value might be placed upon the contractual consideration than the price fixed by the parties in
Confederate currency.
43
In the aftermath of the absorption of the island of Puerto Rico as a U.S. possession following the
1898 Spanish-American War Congress passed legislation fixing the exchange rate at which the U.S.
dollar substituted the Puerto Rican peso and providing for the payment of debts denominated in the
Puerto Rican peso at this fixed exchange.  In 6XFFHVVLRQRI6HUUDOHVY(VEUL,
44 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated unequivocally that “[t]his [legislation] did not impair or change the obligation of any contract.”
The abolition of gold clauses in private contracts by Congress in 1933 clearly altered contractual
rights and obligations by preventing parties from being paid an amount calculated by reference to the
price of gold.  In the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHs the Supreme Court held that there had been no taking of property
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without due process of law, and reiterated that “contracts must be understood as having been made in
reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the Government” over the currency, and that
“no obligation of a contract ‘can extend to the defeat’ of that authority.”
45  Significantly, the Supreme
Court and the New York Court of Appeals signalled that this will hold true regardless of whether the
contract is governed by the laws of the country whose currency is at issue and regardless of whether the
contract is between nationals of the country issuing the currency.
46  The New York court approved the
action of foreign courts in enforcing the Congressional prohibition on the use of gold clauses in U.S.
dollar contracts, and by analogy could be reasonably expected to enforce the legislation of a foreign
country affecting private contracts whenever such legislation would be enacted pursuant to that country’s
sovereign power over its currency.
47  Overall, the position of the New York courts is that “[a] currency
regulation which alters either the value or character of the money to be paid in satisfaction of contracts is
not a ‘confiscation’ or ‘taking.’”
48
(&RQVWLWXWLRQDO9DOLGLW\RI5HWURDFWLYH6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQUHJDUGLQJ(08
This study will now consider whether the    retroactive application of the New York and Illinois
legislation confirming the continuity of contracts after EMU would   be compatible with the United States
and/or New York State Constitutions.  It is submitted that the retroactive application of the legislation
would not violate the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The legislation does not impair pre-
existing contractual obligations.  This is    because, notwithstanding certain possible discrepancies, the
legislation ensures the continuity of contracts in a manner that is broadly consistent with the EU Council
regulations on the introduction of the euro.
49
In accordance with the State theory of money, as articulated by U.S. and New York courts and
codified by the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act, the obligation of
a contract to pay foreign currency is to pay that which the law of the foreign country that issues such
currency will recognize as its currency when the payment is to be made.
50  Thus, contractual obligations
denominated in EU national currencies must be automatically converted into obligations denominated in
the single currency at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.  Insofar as the New York and Illinois
legislation confirms the application of the State theory of money to the introduction of the euro, thereby
ensuring the continuity of contractual obligations in accordance with the applicable EU Council
regulations, the legislation is purely declaratory of existing law, amounting to a detailed legislative
codification of principles previously enunciated by American courts and already reflected in the Uniform
Commercial Code.
51  In this respect, the legislation is in the same genre as the EU Council regulations
that specifically legislate for the continuity of contracts governed by the laws of EU jurisdictions,
notwithstanding the universal acceptance of the State theory of money.
With respect to ECU obligations, the New York and Illinois legislation is drafted consistently with
the EU Council regulations.     Thus, obligations denominated   in the official ECU will    automatically
become obligations denominated in euro at the   rate of one euro to one ECU.
52  This is consistent with a
treatment of the official ECU as a legal currency under the laws of U.S. jurisdictions.
53  Even assuming
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that the official ECU does not fall within the definition of money under New York law, obligations
defined by reference to the official ECU should, under standard principles of contract interpretation, be
understood as referring to the official ECU as it may change from time to time, including its
transformation into    a currency in its own right.
54  Moreover, the vast majority of private ECU obligations
that are governed by New York and other U.S. laws contain definitions of the ECU that refer to the
official ECU, and often explicitly to its transformation into    a currency in its own right.
55  With respect to
ECU obligations not expressly defined by reference to the official ECU, it will be presumed, absent a
contrary intention, that    a reference to the ECU refers to the official ECU and should therefore be    replaced
by a reference to the euro on a 1:1 basis.
56  This presumption is consistent with standard principles of
contract interpretation under New York law.
57
In conclusion, the provisions in the    state legislation with respect to ECU obligations do not alter or
impair pre-existing contractual obligations but rather are declaratory of existing law.
It is arguable that the legislation enacted by the New York and Illinois State Legislatures does
impair contractual obligations insofar as it abrogates contractual clauses calling for the discharge of
obligations in U.S. dollas where the currency of the contract is no longer used by the government of the
country issuing such currency.
58  Under the New York and Illinois legislation such clauses will not be
triggered by EMU because they are general clauses that were not drafted with specific reference to the
euro.
59  Insofar as this abrogation of contractual rights is consistent with the EU Council regulations, it
may be that the relevant provisions of the New York and Illinois legislation are declaratory of existing
law insofar as they give effect to the monetary sovereignty of the    European Union over the currencies of
EU member states.
60  Contracts for the payment of foreign money that are governed by New York law
must be understood as having been made in reference to the rightful authority of foreign governments
with respect to their monetary systems.
61  State legislation confirming the continuity of contracts in
accordance with the EU Council regulations ensure legal certainty for the  financial markets by giving
effect to the sovereign powers of the European Union over the currencies of EU member states.  The
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution may not be invoked to prevent the exercise of these legitimate
powers.
62
Even if the New York and Illinois legislation does impair contractual rights, it is submitted that the
legislation would still not violate the Contract Clause.  In order to violate the Contract Clause, the
legislation must operate a VXEVWDQWLDO impairment of a contractual relationship.  Whether an impairment is
substantial will turn on, among other things, the extent to which the legislation altering contractual rights
was reasonably foreseeable.  It is submitted that, in view of the long-standing foreseeability of EMU and
the concomitant    1:1 replacement of contractual references   to the ECU by references to the euro, it has
been reasonably foreseeable for many years that obligations denominated in European national currencies
and the ECU would be    transformed into obligations denominated in the single currency.
63
 
In addition, an impairment of contractual obligations will be tolerated under the Contract Clause
where it is designed to protect a broad societal interest implicating a generalized economic problem and is
carefully tailored to protect that interest.  State legislation ensuing the continuity of contracts after EMU
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advances the important societal goal of preventing any unnecessary litigation that could disrupt a smooth
transition to EMU in the increasingly integrated global financial markets.  In this regard, the words of
Chief Justice Chase in the /HJDO7HQGHU&DVHV should be noted: “we assume as a fundamental proposition
that it is the duty of every government to establish a standard of value.  The necessity of such a standard
is indeed universally acknowledged.  Without it the transactions of society would become impossible.”
64
By analogy, transactions on the interdependent international financial markets could become impossibly
burdensome if the continuity of contracts affected by EMU were not fully assured.
  Moreover, the New York courts have repeatedly emphasized that New York   has a strong policy
interest in maintaining its status as an international financial and commercial center.
65  Thus, in :HOWRYHU
,QFY5HSXEOLFRI$UJHQWLQD,
66 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “New York,
as a preeminent commercial center, has an interest in protecting those who rely upon that reputation to do
business, whether through the banking industry or otherwise.”  The avoidance of litigation in the
aftermath of EMU is an important societal goal in terms of promoting certainty and predictability in the
financial markets and thereby protecting New York’s strong reputation as an international financial
center.
Finally, the deference which the courts accord to the Legislature’s judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure also supports the constitutional validity of any legislation in this
area.  In this regard it should be recalled that in the *ROG&ODXVH&DVHV the Supreme Court went so far as
to uphold the constitutional validity of a legislative abrogation of contractual clauses (i.e., gold clauses)
enacted pursuant to the monetary sovereignty of the United States over its currency.
67   I n  t h e s e
circumstances it is inconceivable that the constitutional validity of    state legislation confirming the
continuity of EU national currency contracts after   EMU could be successfully challenged on the ground
of its retroactive application.
State legislation having a retrospective effect on contractual obligations must also meet the test of
due process.  For the same reasons as under the Contract Clause, it is unlikely that legislation confirming
the continuity of contracts after EMU will be regarded as altering contractual rights or obligations.
Moreover, the courts will, in view of the importance of clarifying the legal status of contracts affected by
EMU, defer to the Legislature’s judgment as to whether an impairment of contractual rights serves a
legitimate legislative purpose and is further by rational means.
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It is uncontroverted that the Federal Government is entrusted with full and exclusive authority over
the conduct of foreign affairs under the U.S. Constitution.
1  The power to make treaties is vested in the
President, to be exercised by and with the consent of a two thirds vote of the U.S. Senate.
2  The “Power
. . . to regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations” is vested in Congress.
3  More broadly, the executive
power of the United States is vested in the President.
4
The conduct of foreign affairs clearly includes the regulation of monetary relations with foreign
governments.  The U.S. Constitution implicitly recognizes that the establishment of a new currency by a
foreign country falls within the exclusive sovereignty of such country’s government.
5  Moreover, in
accordance with the State theory of money, the monetary sovereignty of a foreign country with respect to
its currency is recognized as extending to the use of that currency in transactions governed by the laws of
American jurisdictions.
6  Any action by an American state legislature that impinges on the monetary
sovereignty of a foreign government therefore implicates the authority of the Federal    Government over
international   monetary affairs.
%&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HVWULFWLRQVRQ6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQ$IIHFWLQJ)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV
The foreign affairs powers conferred upon the Federal Government are to the exclusion of the state
governments: “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement . . . with a
foreign power.”
7  Thus the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Federal Government must be free
to exercise its powers in the field of foreign relations free from interference by the states.
8  Consequently
any state law that involves a state in the actual conduct of foreign affairs is unconstitutional.
9
Notwithstanding these proscriptions on the exercise of    state power over   international affairs, U.S. 
state governments have played an increasingly robust role   in foreign affairs in recent years.  There is an
extensive legal literature considering the constitutional validity of    state and local legislation covering
such diverse matters   as measures to combat apartheid in the former South Africa and job discrimination
in Northern Ireland, restrict the procurement of foreign goods in alleged contravention of free trade
arrangements with foreign trading partners, admit refugees from Central America, resolve cross-border
environmental problems with neighboring Canadian provinces, and so on.
10
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More relevant in the context of EMU has been the decision by the New York State Legislature and
the 20 jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act to pass legislation
ensuring that courts may award damages in foreign currencies in respect of actions involving foreign
currency obligations.
11  In particular, the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act provides that if, after an
obligation is expressed in a foreign money, the country issuing or adopting such money substitutes a new
money in place of that money, the obligation is treated as if expressed in the new money at the conversion
rate established by the issuing country for the payment of like obligations denominated in the former
money.
12
It has been suggested by some commentators that legislation regarding foreign currency matters
affects international relations and thus falls within the province of the Federal    Government.
13  This raises
the question of whether legislation   enacted by the New York State Legislature to ensure the continuity of
contractual obligations in the aftermath of EMU would withstand constitutional challenge as an
impermissible intrusion on the Federal    Government’s authority over foreign affairs.  
The Supreme Court has held that legislation pertaining to a matter that has been traditionally
regulated by the    states must give way if it impairs the effective   exercise of the Federal    Government’s
foreign policy.
14  Thus the Court struck down   as an impermissible intrusion into the field of foreign
affairs an Oregon inheritance statute that restricted the ability of aliens to inherit property under a will
unless reciprocal inheritance rights were extended to U.S. citizens.
15  It appears, however, that such
legislation will only be declared unconstitutional where it is applied in such a manner as to intrude on the
Federal    Government’s authority over international   affairs.
16  Thus the Oregon statute had a direct impact
on foreign relations because the Oregon courts routinely launched inquiries into the type of government
that obtained in the inheritor’s country, inquiries that often radiated Cold War attitudes regarding
Communist régimes, thereby holding great potential for embarrassment in U.S. relations with East Bloc
countries.
17  Courts have consistently upheld    state   legislation in areas normally falling within a    state’s
competence where the legislation   is uniform and is not applied selectively according to the foreign policy
attitudes of the courts.
18
The Supreme Court has also upheld the validity of    state legislation which will   only have some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries provided it does not directly impact on foreign relations.
19
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The Court has pointed out that many    state laws   have incidental or indirect effects in foreign countries
which nobody would claim cross the forbidden line.
20  In trying to decide where to draw the line it has
been suggested that the mere possibility that the legislation might become the subject of international
negotiations cannot of itself justify invalidation of a statute.
21
The courts will not be bound by evidence that the State Department does not regard the relevant 
state statute as unduly interfering with the conduct of U.S. foreign   relations.
22  Nonetheless, courts have
been influenced by the attitude of Congress and the Executive towards such    state or local legislation.
Thus,    state legislation allegedly   intruding upon the Federal    Government’s foreign affairs powers has been
upheld   where there was evidence that Congress had directed its attention to the matter implicated by the 
state statute and had taken no steps to preempt    state legislation   through the enactment of    federal
legislation.
23  Again, local laws have been upheld   where the legislative history for related Congressional
legislation evidenced a Congressional expectation that the matter at hand would be resolved by local
law.
24  Factors that have been taken into consideration in upholding such local laws include the fact that
Congress is free to remedy the situation by legislation and the existence of evidence that the State
Department does not regard the legislation as intruding impermissibly into the conduct of foreign
relations.
25
The cases regarding    state legislation in the field of international trade   relations also shed light on
the limits of    state power in the international arena.  It is   incontrovertible that international commerce, like
foreign affairs generally, is pre-eminently a matter of    federal concern.
26  Thus, a    state’s power in the
context of   foreign commerce is constrained because of the special need for    federal uniformity.
27
  The
Supreme Court has held that if a    state regulation prevents the Federal      Government from speaking with
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments it is unconstitutional.
28  Thus,
the Supreme Court has struck down novel    state taxes that might lead to retaliation from foreign nations  
disadvantaged by the taxes.
29  More recently the Supreme Court appears to have eased its approach,
upholding a controversial Californian method of computing taxes for multinational companies
notwithstanding the fact that the governments of many of the United States’ trading partners expressed
strong disapproval of California’s method of taxation.
30
The Supreme Court has also recognized that certain    state regulations will not   infringe the    federal
power to regulate international commerce where they merely   have “foreign resonances”.
31  The fact that
Congress has failed to preempt the    state   legislatures by affirmative regulation does not of itself mean that
a    state is free to   legislate in that area because the Supreme Court, and not a    state legislature, is the   final
arbiter of the competing demands of    state and national interests.
32  The Court   has stated that the need for
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a consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive responsibility of the Federal    Government,
enhances the necessity that   Congressional authorization not be lightly implied.
33  Where the facts
establish that the Federal    Government affirmatively decides to permit the    states to act, the    state   action
will not be viewed by the Court as preventing the Federal    Government from   speaking with one voice in
the regulation of international commercial relations.
34  In its most recent pronouncement on this subject,
the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Congress need not convey its intent with unmistakable clarity
but may more passively indicate that certain    state practices do not impair federal uniformity in an   area
where federal uniformity is essential.
35  Thus the Supreme Court held that Congress had implicitly
permitted the    states to legislate based on evidence of   Congress’ failure to enact numerous bills introduced
in Congress and based on the Senate’s failure to ratify certain provisions in tax treaties that would have
preempted the    states.
36
&&RPSDWLELOLW\RI6WDWH/HJLVODWLRQUHJDUGLQJ(08ZLWK)HGHUDO  *RYHUQPHQW¶V)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV
3RZHUV
The introduction of the single European currency clearly implicates the authority of the Federal
Government over foreign affairs.  In articulating the official position of the United States with respect to
EMU, the Federal Government has stated that “America’s relationship with Europe has long been the
cornerstone of our economic and foreign policy” and that “[t]he United States has long supported the
broad objectives of European integration.”
37  In that vein, the Federal Government regards EMU as “the
latest step in the process of European integration” and the official position of the United States is that
EMU “is a European matter, for Europeans to decide.”
38  Thus,    “[t]he [U.S.] administration has never
thought it fitting   to enter the debate over whether economic and monetary union is right for Europe, nor
RYHUWKHGHWDLOVRIKRZLWVKRXOGEHVWUXFWXUHG.”
39  The questions “whether there will be or should be an
EMU” and, significantly, how “should EMU be structured” are “questions ¼ for Europeans to answer for
themselves.”
40
In accordance with the State theory of money, the establishment of a new foreign currency is a
matter that lies exclusively within the sovereign powers of the foreign government that issues such
money, and this sovereignty extends to the regulation of monetary obligations contained in private
contracts.
41  The issue which arises here is the extent to which    state legislatures may exercise the dormant
powers   of the Federal    Government over the conduct of international monetary affairs so as   to legislate for
the continuity of contracts after EMU.
The regulation of private contract law is an area that has traditionally fallen within the competence
of the    states rather than the    federal authorities.  Moreover,   New York, as a preeminent center of
international financial activity, has a strong policy interest in ensuring that its laws are applied in such a
manner as to protect its reputation in the financial community.
42  The introduction of the single European
currency has sparked a highly publicized debate in the international financial media regarding the status
of financial contracts denominated in EU currencies and governed by New York law.
43  Because of the
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significant amounts of foreign currency obligations in swap, derivative and bond contracts that are
affected by this issue,
44 New York State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that there is no legal
uncertainty in the financial markets after EMU.
In resolving the competing demands of state and national interests the federal courts will be
persuaded by the fact that the state legislation confirms the continuity   of contracts affected by EMU in a
manner that is broadly consistent with the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro.
Because the state legislation is broadly compatible with the exercise of the monetary sovereignty of the 
European   Union over the currencies of EU member states there is little danger that the legislation will be
applied in such a manner as to intrude on the Federal Government’s authority over international affairs.  
Any state legislation that fails to recognize the continuity of contracts in full conformity with the
State theory of money would of course intrude on the Federal Government’s foreign affairs powers.  Such
legislation would disrupt a smooth   transition to EMU and could provoke an unfavorable reaction in the
European Union.  Thus the states’ powers are carefully circumscribed so that any legislation enacted   by
the states in this area may only give full effect to the monetary sovereignty of the European Union by
confirming the continuity of contracts in accordance with the EU Council regulations.  It should be noted
that this particular goal has already been explicitly accomplished in those jurisdictions, such as California
and Illinois, that have adopted the Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act.
45
It is true that legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature clarifying the legal implications
of EMU would have a direct effect in member states of the European Union insofar as many EU nationals
are parties to contracts governed by New York law.
46  Thus, it cannot be said that such legislation would
only have “foreign resonances”.  Nonetheless, the effect of such legislation is incidental insofar as it
implements the monetary sovereignty of the European Union in accordance with   the State theory of
money, and does not therefore alter the substance of relevant contractual obligations.
In view of the important implications of EMU for the international monetary system it might be
prudent for American    state legislatures to pay deference to the Federal Government’s authority over
foreign relations by informing Congress of any decision to pass legislation addressing the implications of
EMU.  This would ensure that the Federal    Government would not be prevented from speaking with one
voice   on behalf of the United States with respect to EMU.  This would also afford an opportunity for the
Federal    Government to indicate to the state authorities that it does   not object to legislative initiatives by
the    states in this area.  Evidence of the Executive’s position, perhaps in the form of a letter from the
Treasury Secretary, would also help to fully insulate    state legislation from any possible constitutional  
challenge.  Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that the failure to consult the Federal Government would of
itself prejudice the constitutional validity of any relevant    state   legislation.
In conclusion, it is submitted that    state legislation, insofar as it seeks to confirm the continuity of
private contracts after EMU in a manner that is broadly consistent with the applicable provisions of the
EU Council regulations, does not intrude on the constitutional authority of the Federal    Government to
conduct international monetary affairs.
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This study concludes that the introduction of the single European currency presents few
uncertainties for the continuity of contracts governed by New York law and the laws of other U.S.
jurisdictions.  In accordance with the State theory of money, all contractual obligations denominated in
EU national currencies and governed by the laws of U.S. jurisdictions must be discharged in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the EU Council regulations on the introduction of the euro after EMU.
The legislation enacted in New York and Illinois confirming the continuity of contracts after EMU is
broadly consistent with the EU Council regulations.  Possible discrepancies between the state legislation
and the EU Council regulations can be overcome by interpreting the state legislation so as to harmonize it
with the EU Council regulations.  In any case, in the event of a conflict between the EU Council
regulations and the New York or Illinois legislation, the provisions of the EU Council regulations shall
prevail by virtue of the State theory of money.
Contractual obligations denominated in the official ECU and governed by the laws of most U.S.
jurisdictions shall be discharged in accordance with the provisions of the EU Council regulations.  ECU
obligations governed by New York law shall be discharged either pursuant to the EU Council regulations
or in accordance with the substantially idential provisions of the New York legislation confirming the
continuity of contracts after EMU.
Because the state legislation confirms the continuity of contracts in a manner that is broadly
consistent with the applicable EU legislation, it will not retroactively impair the obligation of contracts
contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitution.  Nor will the    state legislation infringe the
U.S. Federal Government’s authority over international monetary relations.  This is because the state
legislation generally defers to the monetary sovereignty of the European Union over the   currencies of EU
member states.cxcii
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